

**DEMOCRATIZATION AS DESECURITIZATION:  
THE CASE OF TURKEY**

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**Dr. Münevver Cebeci**  
**Assistant Professor**  
**Marmara University**  
**European Union Institute**  
**Istanbul-TURKEY**  
[munevercebeci@superonline.com](mailto:munevercebeci@superonline.com)

Turkey has entered an unprecedented process of democratic reform in recent years. This course of democratization in the country, which started mainly as part of its efforts to join the European Union, can sufficiently be labelled as a process of desecuritization. This is because Turkey's problems with regard to democracy and human rights – seen in the country a decade ago – were the consequences of its conception of security. The 'security-first' orientation of the state has considerably affected the observance of civil liberties and pluralism in the country. The democratization process in Turkey can thus be appropriately named as desecuritization since political reforms could only be possible through refraining from security speech acts and through passing legislation on sensitive issues, even some top security priorities. Granting rights of education and broadcasting in mother tongue to minorities in the country could be given as an example in this regard. This is because even in the year 2000 granting of such rights to minorities was regarded as a move which could divide Turkey. However, this issue was successfully desecuritized and is now dealt with in the realm of normal politics.

This study attempts at analysing the process of desecuritization Turkey. The major argument put forward is that in Turkey's case, democratization means desecuritization. Its analysis is mainly based on the Copenhagen School's (CoS') definition of securitization as a process which involves the use of extraordinary measures that break the normal political rules of the

game (Buzan *et al.*, 1998); limiting fundamental rights and freedoms, pluralism and democracy. As the CoS' approach is mainly social constructivist with a political realist flavour<sup>1</sup> on Schmittean lines (cf. Schmitt, 1996[1932]); it is well suited to explain both how processes of securitization and desecuritization occur in Turkey – and constitute/ de-constitute its political community – and how a Schmittean political realist view of the world is embedded in the security rhetoric that has prevailed in the country since its foundation as a Republic. On the other hand, the recent developments that have taken place in Turkey can be considered as a reflection of how the everydayness of the masses (cf. Huysmans, 1998: 581) in the country has taken over the political realism of its political and military elites and can best be evaluated through the dichotomy between Schmittean political realism and societal rationalisation (between the exception and everydayness) portrayed by Jef Huysmans in his 'The Question of the Limit:...' (1998).

As these conceptual reflections suggest, the method of this study is the application of a theory (the CoS' theory of securitization) to a specific case. The study starts with an assessment of the conceptual framework within which the term desecuritization finds its place. It reflects heavily on the Copenhagen School's definition of desecuritization and tries to enquire into how desecuritization can be regarded as democratization. Secondly, the conception of security in Turkey before it entered the process of political reform is analysed. Thirdly, the processes of desecuritization in Turkey are scrutinized. The study ends with the conclusion that although the process of desecuritization in Turkey is rather limited in nature and needs to be enhanced in several ways; the recent developments in the country reveal that a certain degree of internalisation at the societal level has already taken place.

### **Securitization, Desecuritization and 'Democratization as Desecuritization'**

The CoS definition of security as 'a speech act'(Waeber, 1995, Buzan *et al.*, 1998) and an intersubjective practice clearly reflects a social constructivist view. This contention underlies their conceptions of securitization/desecuritization as it is by naming something as a security threat that the process of securitization starts. In their view, security is 'a self-referential

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<sup>1</sup> I would not prefer to go that far to claim that in the CoS 'the concept of "security" plays a role almost identical to that which Schmitt defined as his concept of the "political"' as Michael Williams (2003: 515) does. Nevertheless, I would not also deny that securitization, as a process, inherently – and rather inevitably – involves a political realist aspect on Schmittean lines; in that it incorporates exceptionality, emergency and a certain degree of decisionism (cf. Williams 2003 and Huysmans 1998).

practice because it is in this practice that it becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat’ (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 24). Securitization is an intersubjective act as it is not solely the subjective assessment of the security actor that makes something a security issue (*Ibid.*: 29-31). There has to be an audience to accept it as such<sup>2</sup> and once it is accepted, it is no longer dealt with in the confines of the normal political rules of the game. Rather, it is lifted ‘above politics’ (*Ibid.*:26).

The security actor attaches some degree of emergency and exceptionality to the related issue and thus claims the right to deal with the said threat by extraordinary means that might involve ‘the breaking of normal political rules of the game’ (Waever, 1996: 106). These measures can be in the form of ‘secrecy’, ‘levying taxes’, ‘conscription’ and ‘limitations on otherwise inviolable rights’ (*Ibid.*). In case of securitization by state actors (e.g., the government), their sphere of interference may be broadened to cover other areas in which they do not interfere under normal conditions. Therefore, securitizing an issue may lead to undesirable consequences such as increased state control (cf. Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 29), and problems with accountability of securitizing actors and with the systems of checks and balances, etc. Such instances might threaten democracy and freedom in a country.

Building on the CoS’ rather analytical view of securitization, Huysmans (1998: 577) defines securitization as ‘a constitutive practice’ – ‘a political technique with a capacity to integrate a society politically by staging a credible existential threat in the form of an enemy’ – through the lens of Schmittean political realism. In this sense, he contrasts the CoS’ instrumental and functional definition of securitization as derived from the assumption of liberal politics with Schmittean political realism which ‘desires a radical break with the neutralisation of the political sphere, especially the liberal concept of the neutral state’(*Ibid.*: 579). Taking this stance one step further, Huysmans (*Ibid.*: 580) states his disagreement with the CoS’ definition of securitization as ‘the extreme form of politicisation on the continuum non-politicised, politicised, securitised<sup>3</sup>’. In his view:

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<sup>2</sup> For a securitizing move to be successful, a security speech act would not suffice alone; it would require an audience to accept it as such. It would also require some facilitating conditions such as a ripe context or a real (objective) threat (e.g. occurrence of an endangering event). The logic of securitization is that the collective has a right to survival and the actor can act on its behalf.

<sup>3</sup> Huysmans here cites Buzan et al. (1998: 23).

The political significance of manufacturing an existential threat is not located in this continuum if it emerges in a political realist culture. In a political realist project, the political nature of securitization cannot be interpreted in line with the liberal understanding of politics as a mere exceptional politicisation, in so far as, it aims at the destruction of the liberal concept of the political itself. (*Ibid.*)

Huysmans' contention is of significant value in understanding the political realist nature of securitization. Nevertheless, I do not agree his contention that the political significance of manufacturing an existential threat is not located in the continuum non-politicised, politicised, securitised if it emerges in a political realist culture. This is not only because securitization in such cultures still starts with a speech act and that there are still *rules* in such societies which does not necessarily have to be liberal democratic *rules* (cf. Buzan et al., 1998: 24) but because it is also possible to read the security narrative from its end backwards. In other words, even if manufacturing an existential threat in a political realist culture may not be located on this continuum, its unmaking surely is and should be. What this study attempts to do is exactly this: starting the interpretation of unmaking of an existential threat in a political realist culture (i.e. Turkey) from the securitization end of the continuum towards the non-politicized end.

Desecuritization, as the unmaking of an existential threat, is regarded as an ethico-political problematique by Jef Huysmans (1998) whereas Ole Waever (1995: 57) rather sees it as a more effective way of dealing with issues. Although Waever's view in this regard can be associated with the CoS' pragmatic approach to securitization (an approach much criticized by some analysts<sup>4</sup>); one should not overlook the fact that the CoS actually refers to desecuritization as an ideal – 'the optimal long range option' (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 29).

In CoS' definition of the term, free of its ethical/political context/content, desecuritization takes place when a certain issue (which is securitized beforehand) is taken out of the realm of security and starts to be dealt with in the political realm. This refers to a normalisation process in which the use of extra-ordinary means for tackling the issue is abandoned. In other words, the issue starts to be handled within the confines of *the normal political rules of the game*.

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<sup>4</sup> At this point, Michael Williams' contention should appropriately be recalled as an answer to those criticisms: "In representing security as a speech-act, the Copenhagen School is doing more than developing a sociological thesis: it is representing a political ethic." (2003: 524)

Desecuritization is also significant for its nature as it paves the way for normalisation, and for a more liberal and democratic form of politics. Huysmans (1998: 574) contends that desecuritization is unmaking of a particular conceptualization of the political and it addresses the normative question of how political government should be organized. In his view (*Ibid.*: 576):

... desecuritisation unmakes politics which identify the community on the basis of expectations hostility. Instead of simply removing policy questions from the security sector and plugging them into another sector, desecuritisation turns into a political realist strategy which challenges the fundamentals of the political realist constitution of the political community head on.

Huysmans' contention, in fact, refers to the transformative nature of desecuritization. A similar view is shared by Williams who addresses the difficulty of reversing securitization but who also does not overlook the possibility of desecuritization. He argues (2003: 524)

... relations may be "sedimented" to such a degree that discursive ethics and tactics of social negotiation are unlikely to succeed and need to be subordinated (at least in the short term) to more traditional mechanisms of (relatively fixed) interest manipulation and material power balancing. .... As resistant as they may be, these security policies and relationships are susceptible to being pulled back into the public realm and capable of transformation, particularly when the social consensus underlying the capacity for decision is challenged, either by questioning the policies, or by disputing the threat, or both.

This transformative nature of desecuritization<sup>5</sup> may well be associated with democracy<sup>6</sup>. As the definition of security involves 'the breaking of the normal political rules of the game' which might limit democracy, pluralism and fundamental rights and freedoms; desecuritization which is the reversal of the securitization process might come to mean democratization in this regard. Nevertheless, in Claudia Aradau's conception, democratization can be framed as emancipation (2004: 401). On the other hand, Aradau (*Ibid.*: 405) also claims that the under-theorized concept of desecuritization should be reworked through a

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<sup>5</sup> On the transformative nature of processes of securitization and desecuritization, see Williams (2003: 524).

<sup>6</sup> For analytical utility, the term "democracy" is taken in its broadest sense in this study. This broad definition covers not only free and fair elections per se but also balanced civil-military relations; preservation of fundamental rights and freedoms and respect for minority rights in a country. This actually refers to a consolidated liberal democratic structure.

politics of emancipation as democratic politics<sup>7</sup>. In Turkey's case, however, democratization can rightly be labelled as desecuritization, as will be discussed below.

But how can desecuritization become possible? Desecuritization usually happens when the threat perception is removed – either due to the disappearance of an objective (real) threat itself – as in the case of the removal of the Soviet threat and the end of the Cold War – or due to a de-construction of (cf. Huysmans, 1998) or re-construction of (cf. Jutila, 2006) the threat<sup>8</sup>. On the other hand, desecuritization might also happen when the securitizing speech act is no longer used or is limited<sup>9</sup> (Waever, 1995: 60). In Waever's view, "Securitization studies are likely to lead to a special interest in strategies that pre-empt or forestall securitization rather than those that solve already declared security problems" (2000: 254). Therefore, avoiding security speech acts would be appropriately employed before an issue gets securitized as it would be harder to undo security rather than pre-empt it. Once an issue gets securitized, securitization studies would try to move it from insecurity to security, or if it stays securitized, it would try to keep the responses in forms that do not generate security dilemmas and other vicious circles (*Ibid.*: 253). The latter refers to the third way of achieving desecuritization through a 'management of securitized issues' (Roe, 2004: 285) without the excessive or unnecessary use of extraordinary means.

A related question asked in this study is whether desecuritization can happen through a fourth way; through moving an issue out of the security realm and putting it into the realm of normal politics without necessarily deconstructing or reconstructing it or without the removal of an objective threat. This could be possible in Turkey's case through passing legislation on securitized issues and thus putting them back into the confines of normal political rules. Although it remains to be seen whether one example can suffice to reach a general assumption about a possible way of achieving desecuritization; it might be appropriately labelled as a sound proposition due to the degree of pragmatism involved in the CoS' suggestion of

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<sup>7</sup> Given that a discussion on the Critical Security Studies' conception of security as emancipation is well beyond the scope of this paper and that emancipation is too intensive a word for a democratizing country like Turkey, the link between emancipation, desecuritization and democratization is not elaborated on here. Nevertheless, the approach adopted in this study does not also deviate considerably from Aradau's views which equate desecuritization with emancipation and add a normative and political dimension to it.

<sup>8</sup> For example, relations between Germany and France in the aftermath of World War II have successfully been de-securitized due to the de-construction of perceptions of threat on both sides and the normalisation of their relations; especially within the framework of the European Communities. This is also the major reason why the European integration is regarded as a desecuritization process.

<sup>9</sup> Waever (1995: 60) defines the *Détente* as 'negotiated desecuritization and limitation of the use of security speech act'.

deseuritization as a more effective way of dealing with problems (Waeber, 1995: 57). Therefore, it would not be fully erroneous to argue that securitization can sometimes happen out of pragmatic need and an evaluation in terms of effectiveness, rather than a slow, internalised process of deconstruction or reconstruction.

Although it may seem as an instance of putting the cart before the horse; passing legislation may well desecuritize an issue by removing it from the realm of security and placing it within the confines of normal political rules and internalisation – deconstruction/reconstruction – might possibly follow. This has at least been the case for Turkey so far, as it will be discussed in the following sections. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that this way of deseuritization would be rather hard when compared to others as it is done without necessarily reconstructing or de-constructing a threat. This type of deseuritization requires a process of internalization, as only passing legislation may not suffice alone to de-construct some deep-rooted security perceptions in the long term. Lacking effective internalization, the deseuritization process remains rather fragile and might easily be reversed.

### **Securitization in Turkey**

Despite the practice of multi-party elections in the country for over half a century, Turkey can hardly be considered a consolidated democracy. This character of the country has engendered intensive debate among many analysts. Some tend to call Turkey “a functioning if imperfect democracy” (Larrabee and Lesser 2003: 26); some others regard it as “an unconsolidated ‘procedural democracy’” (Tsakonas, 2001: 2)<sup>10</sup>; some argue that the country suffers from “an electoralist fallacy”<sup>11</sup> (Moustakis and Sheehan, 2002: 76) in its definition of democracy; and others view it as a “protected democracy” (Cizre, 2000: 4) due to the military’s role as the guardian of democracy in the country.

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<sup>10</sup> Note that Tsakonas (2001: 2) also names the state’s regime in Turkey as “anocratic”, i.e. a mixture of democratic and autocratic characteristics.

<sup>11</sup> Moustakis and Sheehan refer to J.J. Linz and A. Stepan, (*Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3-4) in their definition of an “electoralist fallacy” and describe it as “the acceptance of elections as a sufficient condition for democracy” (2002: 76). Furthermore, quoting Linz and Stepan they give an example of “electoralist fallacy”, claiming: “even with elections and a democratically elected government, a previously ruling military, ..., may retain extensive privileges, even though it has relinquished direct control” (ibid.). Maintaining these arguments, they contend that Turkey fits in this model (ibid.). Finally, they conclude that “elections should be accompanied by the granting of extensive civil liberties and the existence of legally bound state institutions” (ibid.).

Arguments naming Turkey as “a special case” have frequently been used to justify Turkey’s problems in consolidating its democracy<sup>12</sup>. Such arguments maintain that the threats surrounding the country (due to its “unique” strategic position), coupled with the specific nature of its internal dynamics (including the threats of secession, religious fundamentalism and terrorism), render its democratization rather delicate<sup>13</sup>. Unsurprisingly, the logic that follows calls for an evaluation of Turkey’s democracy in the light of the conditions specific to the country rather than according to the generally accepted norms and procedures of the universal (or at least European) conception of democracy<sup>14</sup>.

It can be argued that the military and political elites in the country have a political realist stance. If one attempts to apply Huysmans’ conception of securitization in political realist terms (1998); it can possibly be contended that the political moral judgement which is the founding practice for the Turkish political community is built on a rhetoric of an existential threat to the secularist regime and territorial and national integrity of the country. It is evident that security has long been embedded in ‘the political integration’ (*Ibid.*: 573) of the Turkish society and its definitions of ‘the good and right way of life’ (*Ibid.*). This is exactly why it is not surprising that the ‘state’ has been the predominant element of the Turkish political system since the foundation of the Ottoman Empire. Heper argues that the Ottoman desire for a strong state that would regulate the polity and society from above left a particular imprint on democracy in Turkey (2000: 71). This, of course, gives important clues on how the continuity of the state-oriented Ottoman political culture can still be observed in contemporary Turkish politics<sup>15</sup>. Such an observation is also crucial for analysing the level of democracy and pluralism in Turkey.

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<sup>12</sup> Ersel Aydınli and Dov Waxman (2001: 385) quote Ecevit stating: “[...] demands for further democracy are nice but Turkey’s special geopolitical conditions require a special type of democracy”. This quotation in Aydınli and Waxman is made from *Hürriyet*, 07.09.1999 (the title of the article n/a).

<sup>13</sup> Note Ecevit’s statement: “In Turkey, the TAF has a special position. This position is caused by Turkey’s specificity. Turkey is located in a critical region in terms of security when compared to Western European countries. This is why internal security and external security become inseparable. Therefore, European countries are not in a position to be taken as an example. Because Turkey has a unique [*sui generis*], very sensitive geopolitical position. Meanwhile, the issue of the NSC is sometimes put on the agenda. If the NSC had not existed, it would have to be established.” (*Hürriyet* 2000).

<sup>14</sup> That is constitutional liberal democracy.

<sup>15</sup> “For the state elite, the republic came first and democracy second.” (Heper, 2000: 73)

It would not be erroneous to suggest that ‘individualism’ that is inherent in liberal thought (which appears as the founding ideology of contemporary Europe) usually lacks in Turkey<sup>16</sup> and, instead, there is a strong sense of collectivity imposed mainly by ‘national security’-oriented state policies. This strong sense of collectivity lies behind the importance attached to the unity of the nation and the survival of the state and pluralism (which is a crucial ingredient of liberal democracies) has been regarded by some political and military elites as a potential threat to national unity and territorial integrity in the country. This clearly involves a security logic, turning the political issues of pluralism and democracy into security issues. Securitization on these lines has sometimes led to authoritarian practices on the part of the state in the form of restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms; especially on freedom of thought and expression. As securitization involves *the breaking of the normal political rules of the game*; the persistent problems experienced with regard to the human rights (including minority rights) situation and democratization in Turkey can also be attributed to some cases of excessive securitization in the country<sup>17</sup>.

### **Desecuritization in Turkey<sup>18</sup>**

The attempts at the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria have started a process of gradual desecuritization in Turkey. In the period between 1999 and 2005, Turkey passed eight EU harmonisation packages. Through the adoption of these packages, the country entered into an unprecedented process of reform in the fields of democracy and human rights. Even in those areas which had been constructed as top security issues in Turkey, a process of desecuritization has started.

As Huysmans argues (1998: 572), ‘a preference for desecuritisation above securitisation does not necessarily have to be made on ethico-political grounds’ as one ‘can also opt for desecuritisation on instrumental grounds’. This has exactly been the case for Turkey. The

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<sup>16</sup> Note that Parla (1993:7-8) argues that Turkish political thought and public philosophy is corporatist and thus it rejects the individualism of liberalism.

<sup>17</sup> What is crucial to note with regard to securitization in Turkey is that it only has one predominant security referent: the state. Therefore, the survival of the state is regarded as an absolute value. Despite the fact that there is only one referent object, the definition of threats has rather been broad in the country. This means that anything from education to relations with its neighbours could be securitized – almost solely with reference to the Turkish state. It also points to a security understanding which attaches equal importance to internal threats and external ones. Under such circumstances, the survival of the state has preceded the rights and freedoms of its citizens.

<sup>18</sup> The information given under this title is an updated and revised version of the information covered in Cebeci (2006).

practical need to fulfil EU conditionality and to get a date to start accession negotiations with the Union; rather than an ethico-political judgement<sup>19</sup> on the part of the political and military elites has started the democratization/desecuritization process in the country.

As a clear attempt at demilitarization (if not desecuritization); the role and composition of the National Security Council (NSC) was amended by several harmonisation packages through which the number of civilian members of the NSC was increased and its role was diminished to that of an advisory nature<sup>20</sup>. The tasks of the NSC were also redefined (in October 2001) in such a way to emphasize the advisory nature of its decisions. With the Seventh EU Harmonisation Package, which became effective in August 2003, extensive powers of the Secretary General of the NSC were abolished<sup>21</sup>. According to this amendment, the Secretary General could also be a civilian and the NSC-GS would only provide the services of a Secretariat without any extra-functions/powers.

The granting of rights of education and broadcasting in mother tongue to minorities was seen as unthinkable in the country a decade ago. Even during the Nice European Council of December 2000, the TAF sharply rejected the idea of granting such rights to minorities, arguing that this would lead to the disintegration of Turkey (Radikal, 2000 and Milliyet, 2000). However, through a series of harmonisation packages<sup>22</sup>, this issue has been resolved

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<sup>19</sup> Regardless of the ethico-political nature of EU conditionality to open accession negotiations.

<sup>20</sup> According to the original version of the 1982 Constitution a ratio of 5:5 was observed between the civilian and military members of the NSC. With an amendment in the constitution – made as part of the efforts of harmonisation with the EU in October 2001 – this composition was changed, increasing the number of civilian members of the NSC to nine with the addition of Deputy Prime Ministers, and the Minister of Justice.

<sup>21</sup> A regulation was passed in December 2003 for the implementation of this amendment. According to the regulation, if the Secretary General is a civilian, the Deputy Secretary General will be appointed from the military and if the Secretary General is from the military then the Deputy Secretary General will be a civilian. With the same regulation, the secrecy with regard to the appointments to the NSC General Secretariat and the Regulation on the NSC was also abolished. (cf. Yetkin, 2003 and Nethaber, 2003).

<sup>22</sup> With the Third Harmonisation Package adopted on 3 August 2002, legal restrictions on the learning of different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens were removed. According to the amendment, private courses for the purposes of education in mother tongue could be opened in new premises. Similarly, in the same package, legal restrictions on broadcasting in these languages and dialects were also lifted. With the Sixth Harmonisation package, the Law on Census was amended in such a way to remove the restrictions that were imposed on naming children. The Sixth Harmonisation Package which went into force on 19 July 2003, further relaxed the procedures for broadcasting in mother tongue. In the Seventh Harmonisation Package that entered into force on 30 July 2003, learning of different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives is relaxed and opening particular classes within existing language courses (previously it was only possible within new premises) is made possible. Within the context of the functionality of the executive, the provision on obtaining the view of the NSC when determining which foreign languages will be taught and learned in Turkey was abolished, leaving the cabinet as the sole relevant authority in this respect. This latter amendment can safely be regarded as an open act of desecuritization. The information provided here on the Harmonisation Packages are taken from: <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/uyum/uyum-ingilizce.htm>

and the implementation of reforms in this field has started despite the fact that the process is working rather slowly; partially due to bureaucratic obstacles. This is clearly an act of desecuritization on the part of Turkey since the use of such minority rights has been taken out of the realm of security and has started to be dealt with in the confines of normal political rules through the passing of legislation.

Acts of desecuritization are usually made by civilian actors in Turkey; mainly by the government and the Grand National Assembly. In some cases, business organisations or the media also become involved in acts of desecuritization. Especially in 2000s, it has become commonplace to observe increasing support for EU Harmonisation Packages from the media. Business circles in Turkey have also been supporters of democratisation and harmonisation with the EU. Through lobbying and publishing regular reports on the country's basic concerns (such as democratisation and relations with the EU), business organisations have produced significant input for economic, political, and social reform in Turkey.

On the other hand, it has to be underlined that especially during Gen. Özkök's office, the TAF members had refrained from using security speech acts over sensitive issues such as minority rights, etc. The TAF's attitude in this regard can be viewed as a sign of its support for Turkey's membership in the EU. Surely, this attitude by the TAF has significantly contributed to the process of desecuritization in Turkey.

Despite these developments, the process of desecuritization in Turkey is rather premature and limited in nature. Resistance (by Euro-sceptics) against some reforms is still prevalent in the country. Furthermore, a reform fatigue has also been observed in the country. A possible way of furthering the process of desecuritization in Turkey can be a revival of the impetus observed in Turkey-EU relations in early 2000s.

### **Turkey's Shift from Political Realism towards Societal Rationalisation: The Recent Developments**

The latest developments about the presidential elections in Turkey which led first to a military memorandum and finally to early parliamentary elections have revealed the vulnerabilities of

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and <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/uyum/uyum-ingilizce-58hukumet.htm> (for the third package); and <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/uyum/uyum-ingilizce-59hukumet.htm> (for the sixth and seventh packages).

the desecuritization/democratization process in the country. The results of the early parliamentary elections (the high public support for the AKP), on the other hand, interestingly showed that some degree of internalisation at the societal level with regard at least to desecuritization concerning the secular regime of the state has taken place. If one considers the AKP's moderate stance on minority rights, it can also be argued that such internalisation at the societal level began to appear in this realm as well. This shows that the desecuritization process that started in the country via passing legislation has not been an instance of putting the cart before the horse. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that such desecuritization has not been internalized at the level of the military and secular political elites in the country.

On the other hand, the results of the recent parliamentary elections in Turkey makes one think on Huysmans' lines that societal rationalisation was at work in the country rather than political and moral judgements. Economic stability in the country (especially the belief that a one-party government would pursue this economic stability whereas a coalition government equalled instability) has definitely been a factor in this rational decision of the Turkish electorate. It can also be contended that the results of the elections reflected a choice on the part of the Turkish society between the application of political realism – on the lines of the logic of securitization which has been embedded in the secularist/Kemalist political and military elites' notion of the Republic – and the application of liberal politics and 'the expansion of societal rationalisation' (Huysmans, 1998: 579) – at least on the part of the business circles and the lower classes in the country.

This shows that a fundamental shift occurred in Turkey, within which everyday life has taken over politics and the masses have taken over the secularist political and military elites in the country. So, the major conclusion that may be drawn here is that securitization/political realism has given in to desecuritization/societal rationalisation in Turkey but this could mainly become possible through everyday life concerns and not through ethico-political motives.

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### **Official Documents and websites:**

*Harmonisation Packages can be accessed through the websites of the Office of Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information:*

<http://www.byegm.gov.tr>

<http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/uyum/uyum-ingilizce.htm>

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