

**SIXTH PAN-EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONFERENCE
SGIR/ECPR**

Session 4.2: Peace and International Security

TURIN, SEPTEMBER 12-15 2007

**EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: THE HEGEMON CONCERN WTH DEMOCRACY
OR SECURITY?**

PRELIMINARY VERSION

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I. INTRODUCTION¹

Among the various independent variables that the literature identifies as conducive or otherwise inhibitive of the consolidation of the Third Wave democracies, this paper will focus on democracy promotion by means of external variables. Exporting democracy by various means is a relatively small field in the vast literature on democratization and it is quite often unequivocally pro-American.

In times of military operations in the Middle East, however, when democracy enjoys a privileged place in the rhetoric of the hegemon, even after September 11th, exporting democracy becomes a subject of utmost importance, both within the academia and in the political doctrine that underlies the foreign policies of industrialized Western countries.

In the context of the literature on democracy promotion, the basic question is obviously how and how much external variables influence the process of building democracies. The first generation in the democracy literature (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1987) considered domestic factors as much more relevant than external variables in the process of democratization. Such a consensus was put to test with the wave of democratization that swept the Communist countries at the beginning of the 1990s, mainly motivated by external forces. Whitehead (1996) and Schmitter (1996) presented four modalities of external factors, conducive to democracy according to the following binomial combinations: power/coercion *versus* voluntarism and unilateralism *versus* multilateralism. They are control (power), contagion (voluntarism), conditionality (coercion), consent (voluntarism) – the first two being exerted unilaterally and the second two, multilaterally. For O'Donnell and Schmitter, power and coercion are too relevant in the international context. Consent and contagion are generally insufficient factors: an increase in control and conditionality is often needed. For these authors, external intervention is at any rate for any of the four modalities presented more efficient and enduring in the phase of democracy consolidation than during transition from an authoritarian regime to the new one. That is so because the

¹ I wish to thank the comments and support of Amena Yassine as well as the efficient data collection and organization by Ulysses Tavares Teixeira and Leonardo Souza Santos.

speed and unpredictability of the transition process hinder the actions and decisions taken by foreign actors.

Farer (1996), however, assumes two premises: (i) that external actors may contribute to the defense and strengthening of democracy and (ii) that, in a globalized and even more interdependent world, tolerance to and even demand for external action has grown substantially. Based on the Kantian democratic peace principle, threats to democracies are seen as threats to collective security. Strongly committed to external actions, Farer (1996) yields though that they may not always be decisive, but other external threats, such as sanctions, especially economically and military ones, may give a fledging democracy some time to breath and recover from internal threats.

Many are the means to promote and export democracy: they range from cultural exchange programs for both students and researchers and supervised elections to economic embargoes, political sanctions, economic and political conditionalities imposed by multilateral development and financial agencies to the employment of force (*invasion tout court*, collective security actions, peace operations).

We will investigate the legitimate or unlawful employment of force as a tool to exporting democracy. The option for the employment of force has to do with the fact that force is the most radical and authoritative of the means and, as such, the most difficult to be employed in the name of democracy. We intend to show that this has happened, even when security became a major concern of the hegemon, after September 11th.

This paper, however, is not but an initial and small part of a larger project.² It will exam the pillars of the American foreign-policy doctrine in the post-cold war period, which cornerstone is exactly the promotion of democracy abroad.

² This is a two-years project, sponsored by the National Research Council – CNPq, coordinated by the author of this paper and having as researchers Amena Yassine (University of Brasilia) and Eduarda Passarele Hamm (Institute of International Relations, Catholic University/Rio de Janeiro) and research assitants Ulysses Tavares Teixeira (University of Brasilia) and Leonardo Souza Santos (University of Brasilia)

II. EXPORTING DEMOCRACY

About thirty years ago, Pakenham (1973) taught us that the doctrines of US foreign policy that guide decision-makers and the theories of political scientists share the same body of central ideas, strongly normative in character and based on premises of what he named “American liberal tradition”. Pakenham assessed aid doctrines (economic, security and democracy doctrines) and the literature (modernization theory), which then referred to the political development of the Third World.

The project indicated above intends to show that in the post-Cold War era the Third Wave (cf. Huntington, 1991) democratization literature and the foreign policy doctrines of the hegemon and its NATO allies share the same body of concepts, principles and values of the Western liberal democracy. We intend to reach such an objective by reviewing the literature on exporting democracy, on the one hand, and by analyzing the speeches of the Presidents and their Secretaries of State, on the other. It follows a very brief reference to the literature on democratization.

The root-concept of democracy employed by the literature and based on Schumpeter (1942) and Dahl (1971) is minimalist and procedural. It defines the process of choosing a ruling elite through free and competitive elections. For that, political rights and civil liberties to all citizens must be safeguarded. The transition period from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one is divided in two phases: transition (up until foundational elections) and consolidation. The second is still object of much controversy. What conditions are necessary and enough for a democracy to be considered consolidated is still a matter for discussion. Many consider Dahl’s list insufficient and add to the 8 conditions put forward in *Poliarchy* (1971) another one or two that they consider indispensable – this definition is called expanded procedural minimum.³ Diamond (1996, 1999) talks of electoral democracies to refer to non-consolidated democracies and liberal democracies to refer to consolidated democracies.

³ An analysis of this literature will be provided in detail in a future version of this work.

These basic concepts of the literature on democratization are in the root of foreign aid doctrines and democracy promotion policies. They are the basis for the allocation of financial resources that goes to the National Endowment for Democracy⁴ and serve as a criterion to classify countries according to Freedom House's⁵ categories. This NGO annually classify all countries in the world in three degrees of freedom: Free, Partially Free and Not Free. The classification criterion is based on Political Rights and Civil Liberties indexes, which, combined, range from 1 to 7. The methodology used by the Freedom House and by Diamond (1996) is very similar, corresponding Diamond's "liberal democracies" to Freedom House's "free countries", "electoral democracies" to "partially free countries" and "authoritarian regimes" to "non-free countries".

Indexes Freedom House's may have relevant consequences. When multilateral development and financial institutions – such as the IMF and the World Bank – put political conditionalities in exchange for financial aid, these institutions may refer to indexes of that kind. Another relevant consequence of such indexes has to do with the employment of force to safeguard or impose order and the proper function of democratic institutions (Boot, 2002; Mallaby, 2002) in politically unstable regions, fledging democracies, failed states and rogue states (Ignatieff, 2003). Afghanistan and Iraq are blatant examples of that.

These consequences are all the more important if we consider that such indexes like the Freedom House's are largely used both by academics and decision-makers. These are normative indexes in that they reflect a particular concept that was developed in a very specific historical, cultural, political and institutional context – the Western Europe and some of its colonies, especially the United States - and applied in very different empirical environments.

⁴ The National Endowment for Democracy – NED is a NGO that receives funds from the American federal budget for the development of a program geared to the strengthening of democratic institutions around the world.

⁵The Freedom House is a NGO funded in 1941 and established in New York, that classifies annually the countries of the world according to degrees of freedom, published in the *Comparative Survey of Freedom*.

On the normative character of the literature and doctrines of democracy promotion, Castro Santos (2001) observes:

“A significant part of the literature on democracy (...) assumes a *naïve* and missionary, when not militant, but certainly strongly ideological, stand in favor of the defense and promotion of [liberal] democracy worldwide, justifying important institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy. On the other hand, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and of the not-so-*naïve* missionary stand of the academia, the “political conditionality” imposed by multilateral development agencies – IMF and World Bank – is juxtaposed to the economic conditionalities of past decades. In fact, the US government, now theoretically free from its ambiguities of the past bipolar world – where it supported anti-Communist dictatorships and promoted “democracy by anti-democratic means” –, is now strongly pressing developing states to turn democratic, as part of its foreign policy, with the help of the European Union, the European Council or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OAS and the UN (cf. Farer, 1996, and, for a divergent opinion, Król, 1996 and particularly Schmitter & Santiso, 1997). (Castro Santos, 2001, pp.733,744)

In the next section we will analyze how democracy and security are used in the post-cold war speeches of the American Presidents and their Secretaries of State and how they combine to form the basic premises and principles of the hegemon foreign-policy doctrine.

III. DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

We argue that the literature on Third Wave democracies as well as the foreign policy doctrine of the hegemon and their NATO allies are based on the same basic principles or premises. In this paper, however, we will concentrate mainly in the analysis of selected speeches of top decision-makers, reporting partial results of the major research project indicated above, still in its initial phase. They are:

(1) The values and principles of the western liberal democracy are universal, i.e, all the peoples in the world wish to turn democratic. Therefore, promotion of democracy is for the good of mankind.

(2) Democracies do not fight each other. Therefore, exporting democracy means promote world peace. Here democracy is deeply linked to global security.

(3) The promotion of democracy makes the world safer and more prosperous for the United States (corollary of 2). Here democracy is linked to American security and interests.

To those principles we add a proposition:

(4) Americans think of themselves as having a mission before the mankind: to bring it freedom and democracy.

This first principle is implicit in Fukuyama's (1992) argument that the man finally became conscious of the fact that only liberal democracy makes possible the fully rational recognition of human dignity and, therefore, democracy is the only legitimate political regime in the world. There is no viable alternative "way of life" to the Western liberalism, except, perhaps, for the Islamic fundamentalism (Jowitt, 1996).

Accepting those premises, Farer (1996) thinks that, with the end of the cold war, it has arrived for the United States the historic chance of influencing and pressing other countries for democracy, leading the hemisphere in the collective task of defending it. Diamond (1992) takes the same direction:

"Not since the end of the World War II have the Western democracies had such an opportunity to shape the political nature of the world. By promoting democracy abroad, the United States can help bring into being for the first time in history a world composed mainly of stable democracies"(Diamond, 1992, p. 27).

Warren Christopher, Clinton's Secretary of State, expresses the same idea:

"The Soviet Empire is gone. No great power views any other as an immediate military threat. And the triumph of democracy and free markets is transforming We now have a remarkable opportunity to shape a world conducive to American interests and consistent with American values – a world of open societies and open markets." (Address delivered at the John Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, Mass. January 20, 1995)

The universal-democratic-values premise was reinforced by American victory in cold-war. Bush Senior refers to democracy as the universal aspiration of mankind and to the triumph of the democratic ideas as the confirmation of the "wisdom of our nation's founders." (State of the Union, February 9, 1989). This premise were to be found as well in the speeches of the Secretaries of State that followed, be them republicans or democrats. Secretary Christopher, for instance, at the Sixth-plus-Seven Open Session of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (Singapore, July 26, 1993) said that democracy is not unsuited

for Asia. On the contrary, “[t]he yearnings for more freedom are not a Western export: they are a human instinct”. Or stated more clearly:

“While we recognize that each nation must find its own path, consistent with its own history, we believe that these ideals of the Universal Declaration reflect the values not just of the United States, but of countries and cultures all over the world.” (The Us & China: Building a New Era of Cooperation, 1996)

In the same vein, Colin Powell, referring to the Arab World stated that:

“Every country is sovereign. But what we said to our friends in the Arab world and in other parts of the world (...) is that we believe that these universal values of democracy and human rights, respecting the views of all people, (...) these common fundamental human values are applicable to all people, and that there is a need for reform in many parts of the world and in the Arab world” (On-the-Record Briefing on U.S. Foreign Policy. Foreign Press Center, Washington D.C., May 28, 2004).

In July, Powell said at the Institute of Peace with regard to U.S. efforts to assist the people of Iraq (Washington, 2004) that U.S. would not step back from the challenge of fighting terrorism and that this would be done using all the elements of national power, but above all, using a value system

“ (...) that is still respected around the world, a value system that has fueled this nation for so many hundred of years and is fueling so many other nations around the world, a value system that says democracy works and it is not restricted to western cultures or to the United States”.

Therefore, he said in another speech, “There’s no reason that democracy can’t work in Afghanistan (...)” (Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies. Atlanta, Georgia, October 1, 2004).

Condoleezza Rice refers very frequently to the universality of democratic values as well. Considering the Iraqi elections she said that the high turn out of the population indicated “what we’ve always known, that democratic principles don’t have boundaries, they’re not Western values; these are universal values” (interview on ABC, Washington D.C., January 30, 2005. See also Remarks after Meeting with Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller, Washington DC, March 3, 2005). She goes on and contradicts Huntington (19), stating

that “(...) there is no inherent conflict between Islam and democracy. These two can exist side by side, as they do, for instance, in Turkey” (Remarks at the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris-Sciences Po, Paris, February 8, 2005). At this point she felt compelled to clarify that although the democratic values are those embraced by the United States they are not imposed by the superpower upon other countries. “Dictators impose”, she said, “democracies support and nurture each other toward a democratic development as we have done (...) in Turkey” (Remarks with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul after Meeting, Ankara, Turkey, February 6, 2005). And she continued:

“What you do with democracy is to support those who within their own indigenous circumstances are trying to bring about freer societies. (...) It is not a cultural issue; it is a human issue to want to have control of your own life” (Remarks at the Young Global Leaders Policy Roundtable. Washington DC, April 19, 2007)

The thesis that democracies do not fight each other comes from the kantian proposition according to which republics – because are pure forms of governments – offer the best conditions for the emergence of durable peace among nations. The literature on Democratic Peace offers two possible explanations for the link between democratic regimes and less propensity to war. The first one claims that institutional restrictions of democracies (elections, public debate, political party pluralism) refrain governments from make war (Doyle, 1992; Russett, 1993). The other one emphasizes elements of cultural (consensus tradition, mutual respect, cooperation) and economic (interdependence) order that would act like buffers between potentially hostiles democracies (Starr, 1992; Rummel, 1983). Democracies can militarily face non-democracies, exactly because of the incompatible institutional and cultural aspects of these different regimes. The theory of Democratic Peace has been tested since the epistemological (Mearsheimer, 1990), methodological (Schweller, 1992; Kegley and Hermann, 1996, 1996) and empirical (Layne, 1994) point of view and its validity has been largely accepted by academics and American politicians.

The democratic-peace premise has been largely used to justify the promotion of democracy abroad, including by means of the use of force. The democratic world is a stable and secure world and, therefore, serves the interests of the mankind. In the post-cold war era these

assertions are more consistent than before. They are, for instance, at the core of American foreign policy toward the Former-Soviet-Union and East-Central-European countries after the backlash of the communist world. This is most clear in the Clinton administration, when the scenario of the post-cold war was more clear. His speeches of the State of the Union stressed that, although Americans should not cut defense further, protecting the readiness and quality of their Forces, the best way to ensure durable peace and security was to support democratization (as well as to promote market reforms). “Our purpose”, he said, “must be to bring the world together around democracy, freedom and peace (...)”. At this point, he showed especial concern with Russia and China (cf. State of the Union speeches, 1994, 2000).

The Secretaries of State often refers to the second premise. Referring to Israel and Palestine, Condoleezza Rice said that “We are determined to see two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and in security. Genuine peace will only blossom when it is rooted in genuine democracy”, therefore, “ (...) we all support the process of reform in the Palestinian Authority (...)” (Remarks at the London Meeting Supporting the Palestinian Authority, London, March 1, 2005 and Remarks with European Union Representatives, Luxembourg, February 10, 2005).

Warren Christopher resorts to the kantian-peace premise very explicitly. Regarding the Central-Eastern European countries he said:

“Europe’s long-term security – like America’s – requires that we actively foster the spread of democracy and market economies. Democracies tend not to make war on each other. They are more likely to protect human rights and ensure equal rights for minorities. They are more likely to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords, and environmental protection. (...). The states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union need our help. These countries are trying to develop into free market democracies. Assisting them is not charity; it is essential to our common security (...)” (Intervention at the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO, Brussels, February 26, 1993).

See also his Statement before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, House Appropriations Committee, Washington DC, March 10, 1993, where he listed all the merits of democracy. In his Statement at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, Six-plus-Seven Open Session, Singapore, July 26, 1993, he said:

“Democracies are not just a moral imperative; they are a practical necessity. Democracies do not threaten their neighbors. They do not practice terrorism. They do not spawn refugees. They respond to the needs of their citizens and thereby achieve greater stability and prosperity for all.”

When terrorism dramatically reached American territory in September 11, it became inextricable part of the foreign-policy equation, so to speak. It was easily incorporated, with no major change in the ideological core of the hegemon foreign policy:

“(…) we can’t talk about global security without discussing terrorism. And the promotion and establishment of democracy is necessary because it is democracy that is the ultimate enemy of terrorism and that which will eventually defeat terrorism.” (Colin Powell, Remarks at the Development, Democracy and Security Bretton Woods Committee Conference, September, 2004)

The first and second premises - the universality of democratic values and the democratic peace combine to build and nourish the American Mission. Top decision-makers talk about destiny, God, burden, mission. The feelings are noble. Sometimes they assume the posture of a “chosen people”, sometimes, some would say, they show arrogance. It follows excerpts of some speeches of the Presidents and Secretaries of State. In 1990, when the Soviet Union was falling apart, President Bush expressed himself in these words:

“(…) today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens and sacrifices. But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans; we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do, freedom works” (speech of the State of the Union, 1990)

Under the then recent impact of the attack to the Twin Towers, President George Bush spoke in his State of the Union speech of 2002: “History has called America and our allies

to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight". In the speech of the State of the Union two years later, he said that America ought to "finish the historic work of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq," after all:

"America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is a democratic peace, a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this case with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special calling: This great Republic will lead the cause of freedom"

The sense of mission pervades the speeches of the Secretaries of State as well. In a interview to the NBC-TV in 1998 about a possible strike against Saddam Hussein, Madeleine Albright used these words:

"Let me say that we are doing everything possible so that American men and women in uniform do not have to go out there again (...) But if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us. I know that the American men and women in uniform are always prepared to sacrifice for freedom, democracy and the American way of life."

Colin Powell, by its turn, speaking about bringing democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan – a major goal of Bush administration –, expresses himself as follows:

" We fight terrorism because we must. We seek a better world because we can, because it is our desire, it is our destiny to do so. That is why we devote ourselves to democracy, development, global public health, human rights – as well as to the structure of global peace that enables us to pursue our vision for a better world." (Remarks at the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington DC, September 5, 2003).

And:

" America will continue to live out its destiny of helping people around the world achieve their own form of freedom, their own form of democracy so that their people, too, can live as God intended them to live: free (...)." (Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies, Atlanta, October, 1, 2004).

The American mission is altruist, geared to the other nations, to the other people in the world, to mankind as a whole. But, what about American interests? What about American security? It is here that the corollary of the democratic- peace premise joins the ideological pillars of American foreign policy.

From the perspective of the academia, there is a literature that sees no contradiction between promotion of democracy and U.S. power. Owen (2006) refers to the adepts of this point of view, called “principled realists” or “pragmatic idealists” who, in contrast with the realists and pure idealists, believe that there is a close connection between the growth of American power and the spread of democracy. The author argues that “(...) the spread of free institutions has a rightful place among U.S. foreign policy goals, not least because it can serve the pre-eminent goals of national security and prosperity. This is why the United States has declared democracy promotion to be official policy since June 1982 (...)”(pp. 35 e 36). Diamond (1992), who not necessarily should be put under this label, shares this same point of view with the principled realists:

“...[it is a] is a fallacy in thinking that “real” interests can be distinguished from the US interests in fostering democracy. A more democratic world would be a safer, saner, and more prosperous world for the United States. (...) Promoting democracy must therefore be at the heart of America’s global vision. Democracy should be the central focus – the defining feature – of US foreign policy.” (pp. 30,31).

We can perceive this link of American security and prosperity with promotion of democracy in the speeches of the top decision-makers. President Clinton made this link clearly. His administration faced the huge challenge of defining the American foreign policy toward ex-communist countries. He, as seen above, coherently with the ideological pillars of the American foreign policy stressed the importance of supporting those countries to build free political regimes and free market. Still coherently, he went further and sponsored the NATO enlargement. However, there was concern among the American people and within Congress if this policy would not undermine U.S security. Clinton,

besides assuring, as seen above, that the Armed Forces would suffer no budget cuts and that their readiness and technical capacity would be maintained at their best, indicated clearly the importance of the spreading of democracy to American security:

“Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other, they make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy. This is why we have supported (...) the democracies reformers in Russia and in the other states of the former Soviet bloc (...) We must also remember as these nations chart their own futures (...) how much more secure and more prosperous our own people will be if democratic and market reforms succeed all across the former Communist bloc.” (Speech of the State of the Union, January 25, 1994).

Clinton’s Secretaries of State, stress this point too. Madeleine Albright declared in the Senate that “[b]y building partnerships with other freedom-loving peoples, we sustain the growth of open markets and democracy that has enhanced our own security and prosperity, and which has been the signature element of our age.” (Statement before Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Washington DC, May 22, 1997), while Warren Christopher said in a intervention at the special Meeting of NATO (Brussels, February, 1993) that “the states of Central and Eastern Europe , and the former soviet Union, need our help. These countries are trying to develop into free market democracies. Assisting them is not charity: it is essential to our own common security.” He developed more on this theme one month before when he addressed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Washington DC, January 1993):

“Promoting democracy does not imply a crusade to remake the world in our image. Rather, support for democracy and human rights abroad can and should be a central strategic tenet in improving our own security. Democratic movements and governments are not only more likely to protect human and minority rights, they are also more likely to resolve ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes in a peaceful manner and to be reliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accord, and global environmental protection.”

One month later Christopher expressed the same idea before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Executives’ Club of Chicago (Chicago, March, 1993) when he said: “By

helping promote democracy, we do more than honor our deepest values. We are also making a strategic investment in our nation's security. History has shown that a world of more democracies is a safer world."

Clinton would refer to American interests too. In 2000 he mentioned the two fundamental challenges America was to meet to shape the 21st century:

"First, we must continue to encourage our former adversaries, Russia and China, to emerge as stable, prosperous, democratic nations(...) A second challenge is to protect our security from conflicts that pose the risk of wider war and threaten our common humanity. America cannot prevent every conflict or stop every outrage. But where our interests are at stake and we can make a difference, we must be peacemakers" (Speech of the State of the Union, January 27, 2000)

We may suggest here that a priority rule is being given to foreign policy. That would explain, for instance, why intervention in the Middle-East is assigned high priority, while humanitarian interventions in Africa are not so promptly. That would explain, as well, the rapid intervention in the Gulf war. As Bush Senior put it:

"Most American know instinctively why we are in the Gulf. They know we had to stop Saddam now, not later. (...) They know we must make sure that control of the world's oil resources does not fall into his hands, only to finance aggression. They know that we know to build a new, enduring peace (...)"(Speech of the State of the Union, January 29, 1991)

The American interests would be in fact very much used by the Secretaries of State in an extension of the corollary to the second premise. That is to say, not only a democratic world is a safer world to the United States, but it also serves their interests. Those interests, involve, as put by Secretary Christopher, not only security but also "economic, and moral interests." And also, we would add, political and geopolitical interests.

It follows excerpts from the speeches of the Secretaries of State, where the American interests are made to fit into the basic tenets of the foreign policy ideology:

“(…) we must continue to support democracy and human rights because it serves our interests and our ideals.” (Warren Christopher, speech at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, Mass, January 1995).

“(…) support for democracy and human rights reflects our ideals and reinforces our interests. (…) Our obligation – the American obligation – is to promote democratic values and democratic institutions and to pursue our national interests at all times.” (Warren Christopher, speech at Harvard University, 1996).

“(…) When we work to spread liberty and democracy, we don’t see it only in terms of idealism. We see that work also in terms of our own enlightened self-interest. As the President said, this strategy “reflects the union of our values as well as our national interests.” (Colin Powell, Keynote Address of the 60th Anniversary Dinner of the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, October, 2004).

“Because there is one thing that we know: when democracy is in retreat, America is vulnerable; and when democracy is on the march, we are more secure. (…) [w]hen we talk about it among senior staff, I don’t ever talk about the competition or the conflict between our democracy promotion and our interests. I think you would be hard-pressed to hear that I’ve ever said that, because I see them as one.” (Condoleezza Rice, Remarks on Transformational Diplomacy, Washington DC, February, 2007).

What were the consequences of September 11 on the pillars of American foreign-policy ideology? For sure a great emphasis was put on security,⁶ but paradoxically democracy did not lose ground as the ideological cornerstone of foreign policy. The same principles have been kept, but perhaps their relative importance has changed. In this way, we suggest – in a tentative way – that:

- (1) *The premise of the universality of democratic values was reinforced.*
- (2) *The democratic-peace premise, linking democracy to international security, was less called upon, while its corollary, that ties democracy to American security and American interests, grew much stronger.*

⁶ Just for one to have an idea, the Bush speeches of the State of the Union from 2001 to 2007 contain the word democracy 42 times against 91 times of the word security.

(3) The altruist mission of bringing freedom and democracy to the world has been also less called upon.

The reinforcement of the first premise can be easily understood if we agree that American top decision-makers and Congress must believe that the people of Afghanistan and Iraq desire to turn democratic and that there is no reason these countries cannot make the transition to democracy. This has been indicated in the excerpts of the speeches of President George Bush and their Secretaries of State when we first discussed the universality of the democratic values above.

The strengthening of the corollary to the second premise is demonstrated by the analysis of the speeches of Bush and Condoleezza Rice. Thus, the major lesson that the Bush administration seemed to have learned with the attack to the Twin Towers, clearly expressed by the President 4 years later in the swearing-in ceremony of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (January, 2005), is exactly the strengthening of the link between the spread of democracy and American security and interests :

“September 11, 2001, made us see more clearly than ever how our values and our interests are linked and joined across the globe. That day of fire made us see that the best way to secure a world of peace and hope is to build a world of freedom.”

The importance of democracy in the agenda of security would be stressed in several occasions by the President. In his speeches of the State of the Union of 2006 and 2007 he repeated it:

“On September 11, 2001, we found that problems originating in a failed and oppressive state 7,000 miles away could bring murder and destruction to our country. Dictatorships shelter terrorists, feed resentment and radicalism, and seek weapons of mass destruction. Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their citizens and their neighbors, and join the fight against terror. Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer, and so we will act boldly in freedom’s cause.” (January 31, 2006)

“This war is more than a clash of arms. It is a decisive ideological struggle, and the security of our Nation is in the balance. (...) So

we advance our own security interests by helping moderates, reformer, and brave voices for democracy. The great question of our day is whether America will help men and women in the Middle East to build free societies and share in the rights of all humanity. And I say, for the sake of our own security, we must.” (January, 23, 2007).

In the same month that Secretary Rice took office (January 2005) she expressed the emphasis on democracy as a tool to defend America’s interests and security in at least three occasions. Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee she said that “More than ever, America’s diplomats will need to be active in spreading democracy, fighting terror, reducing poverty, and doing our part to protect the American homeland.” In an interview on CNN she said again that “(...) our military people and our diplomats are taking tremendous risks, (...) they are putting their lives on the line for the exercise of democracy in support of our security and freedom.” At the end of the month she bluntly recognized that they have to change the Middle-East:

“We face a world in which we recognize after September 11th that we have to have change in the Middle East, change based on democratic values, change based on the spread of liberty, because without the dignity and the hope that liberty and freedom bring, we’re going to see nothing but the kind of hopelessness that terrorism brings. And we now understand that we have to have a different kind of Middle East. It’s time, again, when America’ values and America’s interests are completely linked.” (Remarks at Town Hall Meeting, Washington DC, January, 2005).

As for less emphasis in the American mission by top decision-makers after September 11, this is still a preliminary hypothesis. The American hearts and minds would be more focused on the United States. That is to say, decision-makers know that a democratic world is a safer world for the U. S., but now, more than before September 11, they will probably concentrate where their immediate interests are, for example, in the Middle-East rather than in Latin-America or in Africa. It is the altruist component of the mission that would receive less emphasis. The speeches examined seem to point in this direction, but further research is needed before confirming it.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Our research project is still incipient. So, instead of conclusions we will indicate some points to be opened to discussion:

1. We suggest that the American foreign-policy doctrine is based in the following premises:

(1) The values and principles of the western liberal democracy are universal, i.e, all the peoples in the world wish to turn democratic. Therefore, promotion of democracy is for the good of mankind.

(2) Democracies do not fight each other. Therefore, exporting democracy means promote world peace. Here democracy is linked to global security.

(3) The promotion of democracy makes the world safer and more prosperous for the United States (corollary of 2). Here democracy is linked to American security and interests.

To those principles we add a proposition:

(4) Americans think of themselves as having a mission before the mankind: to bring it freedom and democracy.

2. The American cold-war ambiguity between democracy and security seemed to have been solved in the post-cold war period in the vision of the “principled realists” and in the minds and actions of the top decision-makers. In fact, both groups believe that a democratic world is a safer and more prosperous world for the United States (corollary of the democratic peace premise), both accepting that sometimes democracy can be promoted by the force of arms. Despite a great emphasis on security after September 11, this corollary was reinforced. The premise of the universality of the democratic values was also reinforced. Bush top decision-makers must believe that Afghanistan and Iraq can turn democratic and that there are no cultural or any other obstacle to democracy inherent to any given nation. Because U.S. cannot reach the whole world they focus on regions where their major interests are at stake. The exporting of democracy has been, therefore, a very important part of American foreign policy. So, democracy is definitely in the agenda of American security and it can be said to be the cornerstone of American foreign policy.

3. There is no problem in accepting that a democratic world is a safer and more prosperous world for the United States. After all, those are their values and free markets form their economic system. Probably the Soviet Union would think the same: that a socialist world would be a safer and more prosperous world for it. The trouble is with the premise that

democratic values are universal that all the people in the world wish to turn democratic. After the defeat of communism Americans are not prepared to accept that maybe there is a new “way of life”⁷ (Jowitt, 1992, 1996)) to compete with liberal market democracies. Or to accept Huntington’s (1996) argument that there are cultural characteristics incompatible with democracy. This would explain why they define the western-society enemy as terrorism, rather than Islamic fundamentalism. Terrorism is not a way of life, it is just something bad operated by bad people, something to be extirpated and easier to get allies to go along. But Islamic fundamentalism could be a new “way of life”.⁸ So, the lesson learned from September 11 could have been an alert about the existence of a people that do not accept democracy or the leadership of the United States. It could have been an alert about the existence of a nation which is building a competitive way of life. Instead Americans invoked the universality of democratic values and went deeper in the exporting of democracy – by the force of arms.

⁷ “A new way of life consists of a new ideology that militantly rejects existing social, economic, religious, administrative, political, and cultural institutions. It calls for the creation of new and better ones (this invidious element is essential); a new political language that “names” and delineates the new way of life; a new and potent institutional expression; the emergence of a social base from which members and leaders can be drawn; the assignment and acceptance of a great historical task demanding risk and sacrifice; and finally, a geographical or institutional core area able to furnish resources equal to the task of creating a new way of life” (Jowitt, 1996, p.30)

⁸ Jowitt (1996) says that after the extinction of Leninism only the Islamic fundamentalism could possibly be a new way of life emerging from the Third World (cf. p. 32).

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