

# **Japan's National Identity and Japan-Russia Relations**

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## **Introduction**

This article seeks to go beyond the militarist/pacifist dichotomy, which have guided the existent constructivist research on Japan and to avoid pre-theorization regarding the relationship between identity and foreign policy by engaging in inductive analysis. In terms of national identity I propose to depart from the search for a comprehensive cultural or normative structure and to approach national identity as a socio-cultural construction in which the national “self” is defined vis-à-vis numerous “others.” In other words, national identity is seen not as a coherent and monolithic structure but as a multiplicity of discourses, which emerge in relations with multiple others (Neumann 1996,1 also Haas 1997, 23.) In this sense, this article continues the tradition of “breaking down Japan”, which has emerged within the broadly defined Japan studies (Dower 1994.) Here I explore one particular discourse on the nature of Japan’s national identity that has developed in the context of contemporary debates on Russia.

Russia provides a particularly interesting case-study for analyzing Japan’s “self” construction, as it has never been part of either Japan’s “Orient” or Japan’s “West” which are generally seen as the dominant “others” vis-à-vis which modern Japan has been constructed and re-constructed (Tanaka 1993.) At the same time, since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the two nations had a rather dense history of interactions, including a number of major military conflicts. Hence, obviously Russia cannot be simply dismissed as belonging to the group of “others”, which are irrelevant to the socially constructed “self” (Hopf 2002.)

The first part of this article will examine the structure and the roles of the dominant Japanese discourse on Russian national character, which emerged in late 1970s and sustained its relevance after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this part, I historicize the origins of the discourse and argue that it cannot be reduced to one single event but emerged from a constellation of long-term and immediate socio-political and economic

trends. Furthermore, I argue that this identity construction has played a very particular role in constructing Japan's national identity. I argue that while the discourse has its origins in the Cold War rivalry, it has played a very particular role in the Japanese society. This, at least partially, accounts for the continuous dominance of the discourse after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The identity discourse examined in the first part emerged in the context of virtually non-existent relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan's relations with Russia grew "thicker" and more diversified. The second part of this article examines Japan's foreign policy discourse and the actual policies vis-à-vis post-communist Russia, divided into economic, security and territorial dispute related policies. It argues that there are certain commonalities and influences between the cognitive lens of the identity discourse and foreign policy formulation, but they cannot be reduced to one discursive body or to a simple cause-effect relationship as often argued by constructivist scholarship.

## **1. Japan's "Russia"**

### **1. 1 The postwar discourse**

It has been often argued that the prevailing negative perceptions of Russia among the Japanese public and the establishment are a combined product of Japan's historical fear of Russia with an objective reflection of the injustice done to Japan by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1945. In general, the "injustice" refers to period of August-September 1945 during which the Soviet government swiftly and unilaterally revoked the neutrality pact, invaded Japan occupied Manchuria, detained and placed in labor camps about 600 thousand Japanese POWs and occupied (and later unilaterally annexed) four islands from the Kurile (Chishima in Japanese) chain, which Japan claims to be an inherent Japanese territory. Among those actions, the territorial dispute, which came to be known in Japan as Northern Territories issue and continues to haunt bilateral relations until today, is seen as the main factor in causing the negative attitude towards Russia in Japan (for example, Glaubitz 1995, Hasegawa 2000a, Kimie 1998.) Below I argue that while

these actions of the Soviet government provided a fertile ground for the negative perceptions, the discourse, which developed three decades after the end of the Pacific War, contained much more than a simple reflection of injustice. Furthermore, this discourse bears certain resemblance to other instances of “othering” Russia in Japan’s history but its structure and functions were peculiar to the 1970s and 1980s Japan.

Historians that take a slightly critical position towards Japan’s official quest for the return of “inherent territory” note that the territorial dispute was to a large extent a product of the Cold War rivalry, in which Japan found herself firmly located within the Western camp. To a large extent, the creation of the territorial problem was a successful attempt on behalf of the American policy makers to prevent Soviet-Japanese rapprochement and to direct Japanese nationalism away from the US, who continued its occupation of Okinawa until 1972 and maintained military bases in Japan proper. This strategy was also very convenient for Japan’s conservative government, which needed an enemy to consolidate the nation in order to recover from the political and economic defeat of the Pacific War (Hasegawa 2000b, 302-303 and Wada 1999, 9.)

In the immediate postwar years, the “injustice” was perceived in Japan as a natural result of the defeat in the Pacific War. A book for young readers titled “The Story of the Soviet Union” (*Soren no hanashi*) published by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 provides an interesting insight into the official perceptions of the situation in Japan immediately after the defeat, when the Cold War structure was only taking shape. In the book, the part that discusses Soviet relations with Japan makes no reference to the violation of the neutrality pact, as probably it did not seem to be of any relevance at that time. The Soviet participation in the Pacific War and the following occupation of Southern Sakhalin and the Northern Territories are described as a natural result of the Yalta agreement. While the text states that these territories “are occupied,” there is no separation between Sakhalin, Southern (which Japan has no claims to) and Northern Kuriles (the Northern Territories) and they appear on the attached map with other “newly acquired” Soviet territories including Königsberg, the Baltic States, Moldavia and other territories in the European part (MoFA 1948, 100-101.)

In terms of the public perceptions of the territorial dispute, it can be argued that well into the 1950s, probably until the 1955-1956 negotiations, the Japanese public had a very vague and heterogeneous understanding of the territorial issue between Japan and

USSR. For example, in a questionnaire sent to China and Soviet specialists that included scholars, analysts, members of Diet and public officials in January 1954 by the respectable *Soren Kenkyu* (Soviet Studies) journal, one of the questions asked the respondents to state their wishes and hopes from Kremlin for the new year. While the demand for the return of the POWs detained in Soviet labor camps was mentioned by most of the respondents, less than one fifth of them stated the demand for the return of the disputed territories. Equally interesting is that there was no unity among the respondents about the scope of the islands that constitute Japan's "inherent territory" and need to be returned.<sup>1</sup> Bearing in mind that these are responses from mainstream "experts" (most of whom are taking a critical position vis-à-vis USSR) it is obvious that the understanding of the territorial issue and the actual scope of the islands was rather vague among the Japanese at that time (*Soren Kenkyu* vol 3, no 1, 1954, 2-16.)

The general discourse on Russia/USSR, the Russian national character and its relationship with the Soviet system in the intermediate postwar years was rather fragmented. In the media, the reporting on the Soviet Union consisted mainly of translations of Western reporters generally negative critique of the Soviet Union and communism in general, and writings by Japanese. These, in turn can be divided into Japanese reporters that visited the Soviet Union "from the front door" and former POWs, who have seen only the "toilet" of the USSR, as noted by one of those returnees (Tantoku 1949.) The latter were obviously of a negative character depicting the hardships the Japanese POWs encountered in the Soviet labor camps. However, many of the articles written by reporters were full with admiration of the Soviet industrial and social progress (for example Kiyokawa 1946 and Watanabe 1948.) Obviously, for many reporters coming from defeated Japan, devastated and exhausted by war, the victorious Soviet Union was an object of an envious admiration. Some of these observers attempted to establish a relationship between the industrial progress and Russian national character. *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper's reporter stationed in Moscow from 1932 to 1947 argued that, traditionally, Russia was inferior to the West in terms of "material culture" (*busshitsu bunka*), meaning technological progress. This inferiority stemmed from the agrarian nature of the society which suffered from "natural laziness"

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<sup>1</sup> The reference to the "territories" varied from "Chishima" to "Chishima archipelago" to "Chishima and Krafuto" to "South Krafuto and Chishima archipelago" to "Habomai and Shikotan"

and which lacked practical sense. However, reflecting on the Soviet industrial progress, he argued that while the national character cannot be changed overnight, it is not an absolute value. In his view, the industrial development achieved by the Soviet Union could be seen as evidence of the transformation of the traditional Russian national identity into a more advanced “Soviet man” identity (Maruyama 1948, 3-6.)

The public opinion polls conducted in early 1950s also provide some interesting insights into the public perceptions of the Soviet Union and Russia.

In 1951, days before the San Francisco Peace Conference, polls show that attitude towards Russians is divided with 64 points (not percentage but a rather complicated method of measurement) for positive and 68 for negative (compared with 10 and 219 for Chinese and 296 and 3 for Americans respectively.) The evaluation of Russian national characteristics got more negative responses, but it was far from an overwhelming majority: positive 116 and negative 253 (compared with 448 and 36 for the most highly respected Americans, and 27 and 403 for the most despised Koreans.) The evaluation of Russian culture was split in half (60 positive to 79 negative), placing Russian culture between the negative Asia (Korea 3 to 198, China 12 to 170) to the positive West (US 268 to 3 and England 248 to 1 in Wilbur in Borton et al 1957, 299-312.)

In a different set of polls conducted in 1952, 5% of the respondents singled out the Soviet Union as generally more advanced than Japan. While the US got the overwhelming number of voices (81%) this can be compared with 2% for Switzerland, 6% for Germany, 7% for France and only few votes for countries such as Canada, Norway, Denmark and Holland. Interestingly that USSR got a substantial 12% from young people aged 16 to 19 and 10% from the 20-24 age group of city dwellers but a relatively low 4-5% from all the country side age groups (Sorifu 1953, 35.) While the US proved to be overwhelmingly popular country the respondents would like to visit (48%) the Soviet Union got 3% of the votes (5% among men and 1% among women)-same as Switzerland, Germany and China and more than Italy, Denmark, Hawaii and Europe in general. In terms of which aspects these countries are more advanced than Japan, USSR got 51% of the votes for science (as compared to 62% for US and 48 % for UK) and 13% and 5% for “culture” and “spirit” respectively, in this question getting

the same score as the US. Furthermore, in terms of economical development USSR got 14%, more than the US and UK (11% each.) (Sorifu 1953, 35-39.)

Furthermore, in spite of a massive domestic anti-communist propaganda, very few Japanese have expressed fear of the Soviet Union or communism in general. For example, in an opinion poll conducted among business leaders, high government officials, labor union leaders and scholars in May 1954, just over a year from the end of the Korean War, only 3% of the respondents indicated a fear of communism or Communist aggression (Wilbur in Borton et al 1957, 312.)

The findings of these polls are particularly interesting in light of the fact that in 1950, following the break of the Korean War, the American authorities conducted a comprehensive suppression of publications that were perceived as pro-communist. In June 1950, the publication of the communist party newspaper Akahata was suspended and in July a total number of 561 publications that were perceived as pro-communist was banned. Furthermore, faithfully following the occupation authorities' directives, other newspapers and news agencies engaged in a thorough purge of suspected communists and their "bed-fellows" that resulted in a total of 700 discharged, 104 and 119 in the major newspaper Asahi Shimbun and the public radio NHK respectively (The Japanese Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association 1951, 15.)

## **1.2 The (re)-emergence of national identity discourse**

The peace negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union resulted in restoration of diplomatic relations but failed to resolve the territorial dispute, which became the main pillar of Japan's policy vis-à-vis the USSR. Since the restoration of relations until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bilateral relations between Japan and the Soviet Union can be characterized as very low profile. Political relations remained basically non-existent (with a brief and failed attempt to normalization in early 1970s) till the advent of Gorbachev's *perestroika* in spite of the continual, economic involvement of Japanese private businesses, mainly in projects related to development of natural resources in Siberia and export of industrial machinery.

According to the public opinion polls, since 1960 the popularity of the Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia, was consistently low and its unpopularity always higher than that of the US and China (Hasegawa 2000b, 278.) In 1960s, there was an outstanding

number of publications examining the various aspects of Soviet economy, history and literature but, written mainly by leftist scholars, these works remained within the esoteric realm of the academia, and, following the materialist tradition paid little attention to the Russian national character. The discourse on Russian (and Japanese) national character emerged in late 1970s, to a large extent as a revolt against the Marxist hegemony and, for lack of competitors, remains the dominant discourse today. It is also important to note that, unlike the earlier Marxist discourse, it was not as esoterically scientific and manifested itself not only in academic literature but also in general public oriented books, novels, articles and essays in newspapers and general magazines. The main proponents of this discourse include prominent academics with ties to the government and ex-diplomats. Shiba Ryotaro, the most popular historical novelist and essayist on Japan's history and culture who has achieved and maintained tremendous popularity in the last three decades also contributed greatly to the construction and popularization of the discourse (see Bukh 2007a for an extensive analysis of Shiba's "Russia.") Before proceeding with the analysis of the structure of the discourse and its functions, I will outline the socio-political environment within which the discourse emerged.

From late 1960s till its peak in late 1970s, Japan experienced an upsurge in academic and general public oriented literature analyzing and arguing the unique character of Japan's national identity (*nihonjinron*.) In general, the Japanese "national character" lens presupposes the persistent and unchangeable nature of national identity, both the positive qualities of Japanese character and the negative qualities of the "other" it is defined in relation and contrast to. In this genre, the geo-ecological differences are considered to play a very important role in the cultural formation of the "peaceful and harmonious" Japan which is an "island" covered by "forest" and "paddy" where the nature is "rich" and "prevails over man" (Dale 1986, 41-42.) In many ways this discourse responded to the need to fill the ideological vacuum left as the result of the retreat of leftist ideology, which dominated the public debates in the beginning of the 1960s. "Postwar" was over and public discourse became dominated by conservatism. Japan had become a world power again, but this time in economic terms. The economic prosperity and the political stability, argues Aoki, resulted in a new need for "culture and identity" in the Japanese society (Aoki 1999, 86-122.)

This trend was embraced by the conservative political elite and incorporated into the political discourse. PM Oohira's (1978-80) declaration of the "coming of the age of culture" at the Diet Policy Speech conducted on in January, 1979 and the establishment of a "Study Group on the Age of Culture" can be seen as the first official postwar declaration of Japan as not only an economic superpower, but also as a nation with a unique culture. The report produced by the Study Group, like many other popular contemporary texts on Japanese uniqueness, did not engage purely in a cultural debate. It attempted to establish a dialectical relationship between culture and economics, implying that, Japan's economic success expressed an underlying cultural superiority (Study Group on the Age of Culture 1980.)

Another important political trend was PM Nakasone's (1982-1987) nationalism and strong anti-Soviet stance, further reinforced by the Soviet downing of the Korean Airlines jet in 1983 whose passengers included 28 Japanese nationals (Iokibe 2001, 198-200.) Nakasone has also followed the "cultural" line established by Oohira, and continued to call for building Japan as a state with uniquely "strong culture and welfare" (Policy Speech at the Diet 3.12.1982.) Here it is important to note that the emphasis on Japan's unique cultural identity has not disappeared from the political discourse and also today appears in various government related reports and policy speeches (for example see the report produced by the Group for Promotion of Cultural Diplomacy 2005.)

It is hard to pinpoint the exact time the discourse on Russian national character emerged. It was probably in late 1970s early 1980s, when the first texts on Russian national identity published by established academics, like Tokyo Foreign Languages University Professor Shimizu Hayao's *Nihonjin wa naze soren ga kirai ka* ("Why do the Japanese hate the Soviet Union?" first published in 1979) and Hokkaido University Professor Kimura Hiroshi's *Soren to roshiajin* ("The Soviet Union and Russians" published in 1980) that the present discourse started to take shape.

Russian national characteristics, which are interchangeably referred to as national identity, or political culture, or patterns of behavior, are presented as historically consistent and static. Russian national character is seen as being shaped by the forest and the steppes, a geopolitical location that lacks natural barriers, the harsh climate and the history of invasions and conquests, etc (for example, Kimura 1995, 13.) The main

historical factors that have shaped Russian national character are usually seen as the cultural influence of Byzantine Empire, and the political and administrative influence of the Mongolian rule. Both of these factors have encouraged the emergence of strong autocracy and submissiveness of the people, non-existence of individualism and rationalism (Ito 1987, 136-142, Kimura 1980, 46-55, Kimura 1995, 13-15, Hirooka 2000, iv-vii.)

In brief, Russia is constructed as the negative opposite of the universal “self.” To a great extent, this discourse replicates the American Cold War discourse (which also has its roots in the “traditional” Western discourse on Russia) of the struggle between the “civilized” and “normal” on one side and “barbarian” and “pathological” on the other (Campbell 1992, 195.) This discourse on Russia has certain structural and functional similarities with Japanese debates on Russian national identity from the years of Russo-Japanese War when Japan was depicted as the defender of Western civilization against the barbarian and oriental Russia (Shimazu 2005, 365-369) and the discourse of late 1930s on the jingoistic and militant Russian national character (for example, Ouchi 1937.) However, in the contemporary context, the discourse on Russia has played a rather different role than in the Western (Anglo-Saxon) context or earlier in Japan.

Both Russia and Japan have shared the role of outsiders in the modern international system and both have been subject to the practice of “othering” by the broadly defined “West” and at the same time, the “West” (or, in case of Russia, often it was “Europe”) have been a central point of reference in the modern identity discourse of both nations (for Russia see Neumann 1996 and 1998, for Japan see Tanaka 1993, 18 and Hammond 1997.) Hence, over the last century, Russia often served as the mirror or as anti-image in the construction of the Japanese self-image. This construction has adopted the Western practices of “othering” in an attempt to locate Japan within the realm of universal civilization and utilized the Western discourse on Russia to achieve this aim. No doubt that the utilization of “Russia” was made easier by the numerous conflicts between Japan and Russia. The history or bilateral relations provided plenty of material to be utilized as empirical evidence in the construction of historical narrative, which constituted and integral part of the “othering” discourse.

Japan’s military and spiritual defeat in the Pacific War and the resulting embrace of the Western values led to at least partial incorporation of the Western discourse on Japan’s

deviation from normalcy. The celebrated *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* written by the American anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1946) on assignment from the US Army during the Pacific War as a study into Japanese national character was translated into Japanese as early as 1948, with the latest edition coming out in 2005. To the present day it continues to be a compulsory reading in many Japanese universities. It is also important to remember that the “othering” discourse on Japan did not disappear during the Cold War, but continued to reside in the shadows of the battle with communism. In the second half of 1980s and early 1990s, the increasing trade frictions between Japan and Western nations (mainly, the US) on one side and the growing rapprochement with the Soviet Union on the other, resulted in a revival of the “yellow peril” like discourse regarding the Japanese threat in the West (Campbell 1992, 226-240.)

The Western-centric “othering” of Japan could also be found in the works of Japanese intellectual. The best example, is, probably Maruyama Masao, the most celebrated Japanese postwar intellectual and social scientist. Maruyama, whose works present a much more sophisticated and nuanced inquiry as compared to Benedict, devoted his life to research into Japan’s history and history of political thought and engaged in an extensive critique of Japan’s prewar nationalism and fascism. He has traced the origins of these ills to “particular social organization, political structure and cultural patterns” of the Japanese society (1963, 136.) While not being as orientalist as Benedict and other Western commentators on Japan’s peculiar national identity (for example, Karel van Wolferen 1989), Maruyama’s discourse has also located Japan on the fringes of universal/Western normality, lacking the proper norms and attitudes (Bellah 2003, 140-149 and Hiraishi 2003, 241-242.)

Hence, from 1970s onwards, when Japan achieved the status of economic superpower and recovered from the shock of the defeat, “Russia” presented an opportunity to establish Japan’s “normalcy” and to rescue her from the negative identity traits attributed to her by the domestic and Western discourse. As will be shown below, this was achieved through incorporation of the Western “othering” discourse on Russia and projection on Russia of the negative national qualities that were attributed to Japan. At the same time the “otherness” of both nations in the Western discourse enabled a simultaneous construction of a positively unique Japan, similarly to Russia located

outside of the West, but unlike Russia, culturally superior to it. Below I outline the identity discourse along these lines.

In Benedict's work on Japan's national character, Japan is perceived as schizophrenic, embodying the personalities of both the chrysanthemum and the sword. The chrysanthemum stands for positive values like aesthetics, politeness, adaptability and hospitality while the sword represents Japanese militarism, rigidity, conservatism etc. In the discourse on Russia, she is also presented as suffering from national schizophrenia. This condition, along with an implied irrationality, is presented as resulting from the "exit from the forests" to the steppes (Ito 1987, 136.)

Unquestioning respect of power, the hierarchical structure of the Japanese society and the hierarchical construction of the world with Japan at the top that Benedict (1946) and Maruyama (1963) saw in pre-1945 Japan also were transformed into and projected onto Russian national character. The Russian "deep rooted tradition of inordinate respect of force" is seen as explaining Soviet negotiation tactics, which are characterized, among other negative qualities, by bluffing, threats and display of force (Kimura 2000a, 127 also in Shimizu [1979] 1992, 277-283 and Sato 2005,82-83.) The Japanese inherent obsession with honor and respect, and ultimate sensitivity to insults (Benedict 1946, 145-175) can be found in the Russian messianic spirit and the inherent and persistent desire to conquer the world. The historical memory of the Mongol yoke is perceived as the cause of various nationalistic ideologies and the continuous sense of threat, which, in turn has given birth to the uniquely Russian messianic spirit and the "Great Russia" ideology (Hirooka 2000, iv-vii and Shiba [1986] 2002, 22.)

Other negative national traits, like innate aggression, savageness and cunningness, which are still a common feature of the images of Japan in the West (Littlewood 1996, 163), have also become part of the Russian identity. A "long tradition of Russian xenophobia", which is seen a product of Russia's unique geo-political position, is perceived to be the source of the Soviet mistrust of alliance and reliance on self-help. Combined with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the geo-political location has also provided for Soviet "suspicions, hostility and distrust of foreign nations"( Kimura 2000a, 41 and Shiba [1986] 2002, 10-11 also 199.) Shiba's (one of the most widely read historical novelists and essayists on Japanese history) narrative repeats the socio-medical discourse of differentiation or the normal/pathological dichotomy, which has constituted

one of the main modes of constructing difference in the Western discourse on the “self” and the “other” (Campbell 1992, 92-101.) Russia is depicted as exhibiting a pathological deviation from normalcy. Hence the “*abnormal* fear” of foreign invasion, the “*pathological suspicion*” of other states and the potential “*lust of conquest and an abnormal belief*” in military force, are believed by Shiba to be the cultural genes that constitute Russia and emerged as a result of the rule of (the Mongolian) Kipchak Khan and the prolonged Russian subordination to this rule ([1986] 2002, 25-26 emphasis added.)

As the same, as already mentioned, the discourse on Russia is utilized to create for Japan a unique and superior place in the realm of world civilizations. In the discourse, Japan’s negative traits ascribed to her by the Western and domestic discourses of “unique negativity” are either marginalized or relativized as a “lesser evil” in comparison with the greater negativity of Russia. Alternatively, the sameness is used to narrate the difference, which locates both of the nations outside of the Western sphere, seen as a yardstick for measuring normality. In this case, Russian inferiority to the West is used to emphasize Japan’s superiority and unique position of being outside yet in crucial ways “more Western than the West.” Both nations are seen as sharing certain cultural similarities, like the spirituality, prevalence of the communal interests over the individual, uniformity and harmony in the community as the ultimate values. Even inferiority complexes vis-à-vis the West are seen as common features of both nations (Sankei 14.10.1993, Okazaki in *Voice* December 1993, 163-169 and *Yomiuri* 19.07.2000.) Both nations are also ascribed similar uniqueness in their developmental paths. Both are presented as haunted by the question of whether they belong to Europe or Asia, embarked on the road to modernization in mid-19<sup>th</sup> century with the abolition of serfdom in Russia and Meiji Restoration in Japan. In both nations, high levels of industrialization and mass education were achieved by the 1930s. Furthermore, both nations perceive each other as rivals in attempts to reach the developmental level of the West (Kawato 1995, 227-229.) In the conception of the norms or human rights and democracy, Russia and Japan are also brought together as representing a communalism different from the West and unable to adopt the precise Western model of civil society, democracy and capitalism (Hakamada 1996, 55.) However, these similarities are used to underlie the difference between the national essence of the two nations. Contrasted with

Russia, Japan is presented as a pluralistic democracy of an ideal type where the political chaos caused by competition among political parties is avoided. Japan's model is described as superior to other two Western models: one of the US and UK where two main parties alternate in power and the other of France and Italy where there are too many political parties that often lead to political instability (Kimura 2000b, 64.) The "amazingly homogenous and harmonious" Japanese society where "peace, harmony and stability" prevail, is contrasted with the Russian jingoism, instability and conflict (Kimura 2000a, 26.) Japan is portrayed as a historically small, peaceful "merchant" nation that relies on the US for protection, and perceives its role as a great power in purely positive terms as a contributor to the peace and prosperity in Asia Pacific (Shiba [1986] 2002, 74-119.). This image of Japan is contrasted with autocratic and nepotistic Russia, with its vast territory and rich natural resources, where the basis for state power is military and its rationale purely political. Russia is described as still suffering from the "Cold War thinking" and convinced in her ability to force her opinion on others. Derived from this tendency are the strong elements of threat and propaganda in Russian diplomacy and lack of respect for laws (Kawato 1995, 221-230 and Shiba [1986] 2002, 199.)

To summarize, the identity discourse that constructed Japan through "Russia" emerged from a nexus of a traditional "otherness" and continuous need for self-definition of both nations' in the Western-centric system, the Cold War structure and the immediate socio-political and economic environment of the 1970s and 1980s. The continuity of Japan's economic superiority after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the lack of significant progress on the territorial issues and of significant interaction between the people of the two nations and the absence of alternative identity discourse have in turn sustained the validity of discourse as the only provider of a general image of Russia till the present day. Unfortunately the annual governmental public opinion polls do not ask the respondents about Russian national identity but only confirm the persistently negative image. However, a brief survey of Japanese images of today's Russia, the dominant images of Russia are of "undeveloped country", "expansionist and military threat," "communist" (this more than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union!) and "lawless" (Ide in Yokote ed. 2004, 255-268.)

## **2. Japan's policy towards post-Soviet Russia**

In the previous section I demonstrated that the identity discourse on Russia emerged within a particular political, economic and societal environment. Hence, it could be argued that the identity discourse belongs to (but should not be reduced to) the same discursive formation as the political agenda of the 1980s. Furthermore, it developed in the context of basically non-existent relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. However, while the hierarchical identity construction of the two nations has remained unchanged (emphasizing the persistent nature of national character), Russia, as a state, and her relations with Japan have changed considerably since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In spite of the continuous stalemate on the territorial dispute, and since the emergence of, what in the Japanese discourse has been referred to as “newly born Russia”, Japan’s policy has “thickened”, becoming much more diversified.

In this section I examine the foreign policy discourse along three dimensions: economic, military and the territorial dispute, arguing that identity functions differently in all three cases. Identity does not matter for the economic sphere, where the search for profits overrides concerns related to territory and history. Identity is, slightly visible in the security discourse as seen in the lack of long-term trust of Russia’s intentions among the members of the security community. However, it is in the context of the Northern Territories that the role of national identity is most visible. Below I will argue that identity shapes and, at the same time, is shaped by the policy related to this dispute.

### **Economic policy**

Kimura Hiroshi has argued, with a slight sense of dissatisfaction, that politics do not affect the business sector, as Japanese business people are eager to pursue a business opportunity anywhere in the world driven only by the will to make a profit (1999, 231-232.) The empirical evidence supports this argument.

In the economic discourse, post-Soviet Russia was perceived as a “special country”, resembling the construction of “abnormal” Russia conducted in the identity discourse. However, the conception of “special” refers only to the unsuitable investment environment, while the transformation of Russia into a “normal” country is perceived as stemming from various investment-related legal reforms (Takaki 2002, 12 and Imoto 2003, 6-7.)

By 2003, Japanese investment in the Russian Far East and Zabaikal regions had grown almost eight times from \$103.61 million in 2000 to \$820.8 million (in Bury 2004, 12.) In the same year, the overall trade volume reached \$6 billion, an increase of 41.8% from the previous year (Hattori 2004, 41-42.) In the following year, it reached \$8.8 billion dollars for the first time ever and was expected to reach \$10 billion in 2005 (Lavrentiev 2005, 5.)

Also in 2004, reflecting the recovery of the Japanese economy and appreciation of the Japanese yen, Japanese cumulative investment in Russia totaled \$1.9 billion and direct investment was at \$1.35 billion, putting Japan in sixth place among the nations investing in Russia (Bury 2004, 12.) In the same year, Japan's imports from Russia almost doubled from 108 billion yen in 1998 to 204 billion yen (Japan Statistics Bureau database.) Russia's growing economic stability and the numerous legal reforms in the customs duty and tax administration, as well as the creation of legal mechanisms to protect foreign investment, are seen as the main factors in the growth of economic relations (Takagaki 2002, 8 and Ivanov 2005, 10.)

To summarize, the business sector's conception of Russia's "normalcy" and business relations have been unrelated to the discourse on Russia's national character and have focused solely on the nature of the investment environment and the expected profit to be made. Furthermore, specialists on both sides are optimistic about the future of the economic relationship. For example, one of the leading Japanese economic journals *Keizai Trend*, in its September 2004 issue, had a special focus on Japan-Russia economic relations and included a number of articles and interviews by Japanese executives and specialists on bilateral trade and investment issues. All of the contributors noted the favorable trend of deepening Japanese economic involvement in Russia and predicted further growth in Japanese investment.

As of 2005, Japan-Russia economic relations and the volume of the bilateral trade are still very small compared to Russia's trade with Western Europe and Japan's trade with China or the US. However, in the context of this specific bilateral relationship, Japanese economic involvement in Russia has grown and expanded significantly and is expected to continue to grow. Hence it can be argued that neither the identity construction of the Japanese "self" and the Russian "other", nor the lack of progress in the territorial dispute, influences the policies of the Japanese private business sector.

On the state level, in spite of the lack of considerable changes in perceptions and the continuous stalemate in the territorial dispute, a number of state-level bilateral agreements aimed at enhancing economic ties have been concluded in recent years. The institutional and legal framework for bilateral investment cooperation was established in 1998 during the visit of the late PM Obuchi to Moscow and the signing of the Russo-Japanese Investment Protection Agreement. Further development was achieved by the signing of the Japan-Russia Action Plan during PM Koizumi's visit to Moscow in September 2003, in which further cooperation in trade and investment based on the principals of trust, action and mutual benefits was affirmed. Hence, the bilateral economic ties are getting deeper and proceeding independently from the territorial dispute, which has not experienced any significant progress.

The recent developments in Japan's energy policy vis-à-vis Russia also show that the identity lens does not play an important role in the conception of important economic interests and policies. In the policy discourse regarding the diversification of suppliers of energy resources, Russia has been designated as the most important potential alternative supplier of oil and natural gas (for example, Togo and Kayama in Ivanov 2005a.) The development of oil fields and related infrastructure in Russian Siberia are noted as the most important policy in the effort to diversify sources and to achieve stability in the energy market (Agency for Natural Resources 2004, 165 also METI Vice Minister Hosaka at House of Representatives, Committee on Economy and Industry, House of Reps, 11.6.2004.) The potential of Russia as an alternative to Middle East oil has been discussed continuously in the Diet commissions since 2002. On none of the occasions has the question of the Northern Territories, Russia as a potential threat, or anything else that can be related to perceptions or the construction of the "self" and the "other" appeared in the debates. The parliamentary debates regarding economic relations with Russia, especially over oil, gas and the construction of a pipeline that will deliver Russian oil to the Pacific Coast, have evolved purely around economic cost/benefit calculations.

Furthermore, energy is becoming increasingly tied to the issue of national security (for example the *Defense White Paper* 2005). In this sense, Russia, which has been constructed as a persistent threat to Japan in the identity discourse, is perceived as a contributor to Japan's "energy security" (for example, Minister of Economy, Trade and

Industry Hiranuma, at House of Representatives, Committee on Economy and Industry 30.5.2003 and Toichi Tsutomu at Economy and Trade Commission, House of Representatives, 2.7.2002.) In terms of the actual implementation of policy, as of 2005 Japan has been providing investment support for the Russian Sakhalin oil and gas projects (Sakhalin I and II.) The Japanese utility companies have proved their strong interest in the projects by committing themselves to purchasing annually 3 million tons of LNG from Sakhalin II, expected to start producing in 2007 (Toichi 2004, 8.)

### **The Threat from the North**

This section examines the perceptions of Russia in the Japanese security establishment. In general, it can be argued that during the post-Cold War years the perception of Russia as a military threat diminished greatly as compared to the Cold War discourse on the Soviet Union. Russia and Japan did not become close allies and Japan's relations with Russia cannot be compared to the intimate security partnership of the US-Japan alliance. However, the open animosity of the Cold War years has disappeared and given way to a limited, but consistently growing, cooperation in the security area. It can be plausibly argued that the security experts and relevant policy makers believe that, in the foreseeable future, the Russian Far Eastern military will not pose a threat (Nakano in Iwashita ed 2005, 43.) However, the residual long-term mistrust of Russia still exists in the security discourse. Its presence could be at least partially attributed to the identity discourse, in which Russia is constructed as an inherently jingoistic and irrational nation. The change in perceptions of threat from Russia can be traced to a number of factors, besides obviously the most important one - the collapse of the Cold War structure. The changes in the international security environment (mainly the growth of threat perception from China and North Korea, the events of 9.11 and the war on terror), the Russian reduction of troops in the Far East and the continuously growing bilateral "defense dialogue" are probably the main factors that account for the change. Due to lack of space, I will not engage in a detailed evaluation of the new security threats but limit myself to outlining the changes in Japan's security discourse and policy on Russia.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Russian military in the Far East has undergone significant reductions. The withdrawal of troops and weapons from the disputed islands had already started during the last two years of the Soviet Union. By 1997 the Russian

military presence on the islands had been cut to 3,500 troops (Valliant in Ivanov and Simth eds 1999, 159.) The Russian military build up in the Far Eastern mainland has also undergone significant reductions. As of 2001, the ground forces have been reduced by over 30%, the navy by half and the air force by 60% compared to 1992 (Kan 2001.) The Russian reduction of troops has been continuously mentioned in the security discourse as a sign of positive change in the Russian military posture (for example, *Defense White Paper 2004.*)

Over the period of 2005 to 2009, as part of the new defense doctrine introduced in the *National Defense Program Guidelines for Financial Year 2005 and After* and the *Mid-Term Defense Program*, Japanese troops in the Northern Military District are scheduled to be reduced as well. In general, the new defense doctrine emphasizes the low probability of a direct invasion of Japan and stresses the emergence of new acute threats to Japan's security, namely terror, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the stationing of ballistic missiles in the region. In geographical terms, the defense priorities have been shifted from "defending the North" to remote (and rich in natural resources) islands in Southwestern Japan, where the interests of Japan and China clash. The reduction of troops facing Russia is to include a one third reduction of tanks and artillery and reduction of the 11<sup>th</sup> brigade (7200 troops) stationed on Hokkaido to the size of a brigade (2 to 4 thousand troops) (*Asahi Shimbun* 11.12.2004, 4.) After this reshuffle of troops, the actual Japanese military posture is going to correspond to the security discourse, which does not perceive Russia as an imminent threat.

While the reduction of the Japanese military is only about to be implemented, the "defense dialogue" between the two militaries had already started to develop in the 1990s. It gained momentum in 1997 after the Tokyo visit of Russian Defense Minister Rodionov and the Krasnoyarsk summit between PM Hashimoto and President Yeltsin. The "defense dialogue" was institutionalized in a memorandum signed by Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev and Head of Defense Agency Norota during the latter's visit to Moscow in 1999. It was re-affirmed in the Action Plan signed by PM Koizumi and President Putin in 2003.

Between 1996 and 1998, there were two visits by the Head of Japan's Defense Agency (equivalent to Minister of Defense) and one by the Chief of Staff to Russia. Furthermore, in 1996, Japanese navy (MSDF) vessels participated in a tri-centennial

celebration of the birth of the Russian navy and the visit was reciprocated by the visit of a Russian destroyer to Japan the following year. The two navies have also conducted two joint exercises. This exercise was very symbolic, being the first time that the Japanese navy has conducted exercises with a foreign navy besides the US (Izuyama 2001, 17.)

Since 1998, the exchange of visits has steadily continued. It has included visits by the Russian Chief of General Staff, commander of the Russian Pacific fleet, and reciprocal visits of Head of Defense Agency, Chairman of the Joint Staff council, goodwill visits by Russian and Japanese naval vessels, participation in bilateral search and rescue exercises, and defense research exchanges (*East Asian Strategic Review*2000, NIDS 2000, 254-255.)

In Japan's security community, these developments have been interpreted as positive and important steps in the normalization of bilateral relations (for example, Ogawa et al 1999, 30-35 also Head of Defense Agency Kawara at House of Reprs, National Defense Committee 13.4.2000.) Furthermore, since 2003, mutual visits between military personnel from Ground SDF of the Northern Military District, which is the one that is facing Russia and "traditionally" the most suspicious of Russia<sup>2</sup> and Russian Far Eastern Military District officers have been implemented. In 2004, an unprecedented visit of the Head of the Northern Military District to the Russian Far East and a meeting with his counterpart has taken place (*Defense White Paper* 2005.) As such, the dialogue between the two militaries has continued to progress steadily from symbolic visits by top officials and navy vessels to reach the level of commanders of the military units that would be immediate enemies in the case of any military clash. In light of these developments it can be argued that mutual trust between Japan and Russia in terms of military relations has reached a historical high, especially compared to the animosity of the Cold War years. However, the suspicion of Russia's long term policies still resides in the background of security discourse. In 2002, Moriya Takemasa, Head of the Defense Bureau, Defense Agency, in his evaluation of the Russian military posture, emphasized that the Russian army still maintains a large buildup in the Far East, including a nuclear capability. He positively noted the significant military reduction compared to the Cold War Years and pointed out that the probability of the Russian military returning to the size and posture

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<sup>2</sup> This was pointed out in conversations with National Defense Academy staff conducted in July 2005 and NIDS researcher, conducted in February 2006.

of the Soviet Army during the Cold War years is low. At the same time, Moriya noted that the Defense Agency has a “great interest” in the developments related to the Russian military in the Far East. This interest was attributed mainly to Russian cooperation with China combined with the lack of clarity regarding the domestic political and economic situations (House of Councilors, Committee on Okinawa and NTs 18.03.2002.) Furthermore, one of the recently published National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS affiliated with Defense Agency) analytical papers, that provide possible scenarios for the long term changes in Russian military stance in the Far East, even mentions the possibility of a Russian confrontation with the U.S in the Far East (and by implication also with Japan) resulting from a clash of interests in the region (Mii 2003.) To summarize, the threat perception from Russia has been significantly weakened over the years. The emergence of more acute security threats and the growing defense dialogue with Russia has resulted in her almost disappearing from the security discourse. The long-term mistrust of Russia and anxiety regarding her future policies still resides in the background of the security discourse. It could be attributed to the untrustworthy image of Russia constructed within the identity discourse or to the remnants of the Cold War mentality. However, this long-term suspicion does not define or Japan’s immediate security policy.

### **The territorial dispute**

The territorial dispute over the four islands has continued to be the main stumbling block in the final normalization of bilateral relations and the central issue in the political agenda of Japan’s relations with Russia. This section examines the conception of the problem by the Japanese foreign policy establishment and some of the policy initiatives directly related to the territorial issue. It argues that the problem and its related policies has been conceived through the cognitive lens of the identity discourse and, simultaneously aimed at preserving the national identity construction.

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been a number of plans proposed by the Japanese government as the possible solution to the territorial issue. The Japanese position has changed from the Cold War era “return of all the four islands at once” (*yon to ikkatsu henkan*) demand to less harsh wordings of the official position. However, in

spite of variations in wording and approaches, not once has the Japanese side considered the possibility of a compromise on the return of all four islands.

The Japanese media recently revealed that as early as 1992 the Russian side came up with a secret proposal for the solution of the territorial dispute. The proposal was conveyed by the Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev during his visit to Tokyo and included a proposition to conclude a peace treaty for the transfer of the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan.<sup>3</sup> It also included plans for continued negotiations regarding the remaining two islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu. This proposal constituted not only a radical departure from the Soviet position of “no existence of the territorial issue”, but also a concrete plan for the solution of the dispute and complete normalization of bilateral relations. Furthermore, during this period, the US administration pushed Japan towards finding a solution for the territorial dispute as part of the broader policy of Russia’s integration into the world economy. However, in spite of the favorable change in the Russian position and the American pressure, the Japanese side declined this proposal, persistently insisting on Russian a priori recognition of the Japanese sovereignty over the other two islands (*Asahi* 21.5.2002,4 and 29.05.2002,4.)

Since 1993, a number of general concepts were introduced in bilateral agreements and in unilateral declarations that were supposed to guide the solution of the territorial problem. In the Tokyo Declaration, which since its conclusion in 1993 by Russian President Yeltsin and Japan’s Prime-Minister Hosokawa has been perceived in Japan as the basis for the resolution of the territorial dispute and the conclusion of peace treaty, the two sides have agreed to work towards the resolution of the dispute regarding sovereignty over the four islands, based on historical and legal facts, bilateral agreements and the principles of law and justice. In 1997, PM Hashimoto introduced the policy of “expanded equilibrium” and the three principles of trust, mutual benefit and long term perspective to guide Japan’s policy vis-à-vis Russia. In 2001, during the Irkutsk summit between PM Mori and President Putin, the Japanese position changed to a “two islands first” (never meaning giving up the other two) scenario promoted by the Suzuki trio. However, after the explosion of the “Suzuki affair” during which the “two island first” solution was

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<sup>3</sup> A promise envisaged in the 1956 Joint Declaration, four years later revoked by the Soviet government as a protest against what was seen in the Soviet Union as Japan’s military alliance with the US against the USSR and China.

portrayed as undermining the national interest, the Japanese foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia entered the period of hibernation and the position returned to the Cold War era simple demand of “return of the four islands” (Iwashita 2005a, 10-14.)

However, notwithstanding this variety of new concepts and plans, the demand for Russian acceptance of Japanese sovereignty over *all* of the four islands has never been dropped (*Asahi* 22.5.2002, 4 also Sato 2005a, 65.) As Iwashita Akihiro of Hokkaido University convincingly argues in his recent book on the Northern Territories problem (2005), compromise is possible when the two sides approach each other as equals and depart from the self-centered position. As an example, Iwashita cites the successful “fifty- fifty” solution of the border issues between Russia and China, whose relations were also dominated by three decades of mutual suspicion and hostility. One could argue that vital economic or strategic interests account for the Japanese lack of willingness to compromise. However, there is little evidence to support this argument. Cutting across the political spectrum in Japan, the return of the islands is portrayed as a national mission and hence there is no public debate regarding the strategic or economic benefits to be achieved as the result of restoring Japan’s sovereignty over the territory. As one of the leading activists stated, “we aspire for the return of the islands because we are Japanese. We do not expect to gain any material benefits from it” (interview with Fukiura Tadamasu, General Director of Tokyo Foundation 14.12.2005.) The lack of considerable economic benefits to be gained from the return of the islands was also confirmed by one of the leading Japanese academic experts on Russia, who criticized Japan’s rigidity and noted that it is cheaper for Japanese business to buy the marine products (that originate from the sea surrounding the islands) from Russia than to engage in fishing and collection of seaweed by themselves (interview with Professor Ueno Toshihiko 27.06.2003.)

In other words, the conception of the notions of law, justice and mutual trust by the Japanese policy makers never envisaged a possibility of compromise and understanding of the Russian position and Russian national sentiment. Hence it can be argued that the territorial dispute along with the guiding concepts was conceived through the cognitive lens provided by the hierarchical construction of the national identity discourse, in which Japan represents the universal values and the inferior Russia is located outside of the realm of universal normalcy.

In this context it is also interesting to examine the discourse around the so-called “no visa” visits. The ‘No Visa’ program, initially proposed by the Soviet President Gorbachev during his visit to Tokyo, provides for organized exchanges of visits between Japan and the Russian residents of the disputed islands without the need to obtain an entrance visa<sup>4</sup>. According to the MoFA website, as of November 2005, over 6,500 Japanese citizens and 65 Members of Diet have visited the islands and over 5,300 Russian residents have visited Japan.

The official purpose of the “no visa” visits was to enhance dialogue, mutual trust and understanding between the Russian residents of the islands and the Japanese people, and, through this, to foster the solution of the territorial dispute (<http://www.vizanashi.net/index01.htm>.) However, as can be seen from the parliamentary discussions, the “dialogue” and “mutual understanding” actually amounts to a monologue advocating the enlightenment of the Russian residents and their conversion to the Japanese understanding of history and truth. The main theme that dominates the parliamentary discourse on the program is the need to correct the misperceptions and the insecurities of the Russian residents of the disputed islands, and to bring the return of the “inherent territory” one step closer (Nomura, Head of Eurasia Bureau MoFA at House of Councilors, Okinawa and NTs Committee 02.06.1993.)

The theme of “mutual understanding” often appears in the discourse, but it is explained mainly in terms of “mistrust and misunderstandings” on behalf of the Russian residents of the islands (for example Nakanishi MP, at House of Councilors, Committee on Okinawa and NTs 7.5.1996.) This interpretation of the purposes of the program is also shared by local level organizers. As one of the Japanese delegation leaders noted, the cultural exchange envisaged in the program is important. However, the main purpose of the visit is to enhance understanding regarding the return of the islands among the Russian residents ([www.vizanashi.net/sub3/kisyakaken](http://www.vizanashi.net/sub3/kisyakaken).) In this conception of the problem, Japan is perceived as not only pursuing its national interest but also as representing the benefits and prosperity of the “free world”, which the Russians are expected to admire and learn from (for example, Arai Satoshi MP from Hokkaido, House

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<sup>4</sup> In case of Russian residents the visa waiver simply simplifies the procedures of travel. However, in case of Japanese nationals the visa waiver plays an important role as Japan does not recognize Russian sovereignty over the islands and officially prohibits visits to NTs as the act of obtaining a visa can serve as an implicit recognition of Russian sovereignty.

of Repts, Committee on Okinawa and NTs 27.03.1995) MP Sasano, who participated in the visit to the islands, has provided the most vivid illustration of the hierarchical construction of Japan and Russia. She has noted that the visit has made her realize the gap between Japan and Russia, not only in material terms, but also in culture and science. Hence, she stated clearly, it is much more important and meaningful for Russians to understand what Japan stands for, than for Japanese to understand Russia (Sasano MP at House of Councilors, Committee on Okinawa and NTs, 6.4.1998.)

Recently, one of the former key players in Japan's policy towards Russia has provided a theoretical explanation for this hierarchical construction and for the convergence of the national with the universal. He has argued that the "national interest" should be perceived as a medium for realizing "universal values" such as humanity, peace and love. As such, he argues, Japan's rigid position vis-à-vis Russia of the national mission for recovery of the islands is nothing less than a pursuit of universal values (Sato 2005, 80-83.) Obviously, the Russian national interests are located outside of the universal values and are located in an inferior realm.

To summarize, the conception of the territorial dispute and related policies has been closely related to Japan's national identity construction vis-à-vis Russia. It corresponds perfectly to Campbell's definition of foreign policy as a "specific sort of boundary-producing political performance" (1992, 69) which, in this case, is performed by the Japanese elites both domestically and internationally. The unwillingness to compromise on the return of the islands on one side and the introduction of principles such as history, truth, law and justice on the other, excludes Russia from the realm of the universal represented by such principles and sustains the hierarchical national identity construction of a superior Japan and an inferior Russia.

### **Conclusion**

Any overreaching conclusions about the nature of Japan's national identity or the relationship between national identity and foreign policy will go against the general epistemological and ontological framework that informed this case study. Though I believe that an inductive study into identity formation as constructed in discourses on "others" provides a more suitable framework for empirical inquiry than the search for cultural and normative meta-structures. The reason for this being simply the promise of

potentially rich and diversified findings carried by this (relative) ontological freedom as opposed to the dichotomous and essentialist boundaries of the totalizing search for militarist/pacifist, liberal/illiberal or democratic/totalitarian national identities.

In terms of the relationship between identity and conduct this case study seems to confirm Todorov's (1984) typology of the relations between the "self" and the "other" in which the value judgment about the "other", the knowledge of the "other" and the action vis-à-vis the "other" are located on different axes of relations between the "self" and the "other." In this article I argued that the knowledge of the Russian "other" was a product of multiple cognitive, socio-political and structural factors. However, I also argued that the cognitive lens that emerges from the construction of the national "self" and the "other" does not necessarily imply definition of national interests and policy. As it was shown in the second section, Japan has pursued a very pragmatic and rationalist economic policy vis-à-vis Russia, on both private and state levels. Furthermore, the changes in the international system combined with the practical confidence building measures taken on bilateral level resulted in an almost complete disappearance of the "Russian threat" from the defense discourse.

However, this study also shows that national identity is not irrelevant in the studies of international relations. The analysis of the Japanese conceptions and policies related to the territorial dispute shows that "foreign policy" (in its conventional meaning) and Foreign Policy (political practice of creation of borders between the "self" and the "other" through construction of hierarchical difference (Campbell 1992, 69) can constitute one discursive formation in which the boundaries and the meanings of the national "self" are created. Hence further inquiry into the nature of national identities carries the promise of a deeper understanding of the multifaceted nature of states' interactions.

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