

EU CIVIL PROTECTION AND THE NEW SECURITY ROLE OF THE UNION

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Abstract

This paper compares Spanish and Swedish civil protection with regard to three questions: 1.) Where in the more general security policy does civil protection belong? 2.) What are the national characteristics of the civil protection organisation? 3.) What is the national view on EU civil protection? Answering these questions it then argues that the differences between the two states can be understood thorough the use of the theory of regional security complexes (RSCs). Spain and Sweden belong to two different sub-regional security complexes, and EU work in the field of civil protection, with the aim to promote the safety and security of people, environment and property, strengthens these sub-RSCs (that sometimes are extended to states outside the Union itself). At the same time EU's work bring the sub-RSCs closer together, making differences between them visible and affecting the political negotiation of the future role of the EU in the civil protection field.

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Introduction

This paper contributes to the analysis of the new security role of the EU. Since the end of the Cold War the security landscape in the world has changed dramatically, which has been especially evident in Europe. This development is shown in EU's contemporary security thinking, and the Union is now acquiring a new security role where it increasingly is involved in the work of providing for safety and security of people, environment and property. This entails reverberations for the governance of European foreign policy space in a general sense, because efforts to enhance internal security are linked to the wider task of promoting peace and security beyond EU borders. The policy field of civil protection, which is the empirical focus of this article, is particularly interesting in this regard. Traditionally civil protection is a task for the member states but the EC started to work with the field in 1985 and in 2001 the Community civil protection mechanism, through which help can be required in times of an emergency, was created. This mechanism was primarily created to be used by EU's member states, but it has since become a means for the EU to co-operate with non-member states, not only by providing aid but also by involving them in the mechanism itself, and in training programmes. In this way it can be said that the EU is using civil protection to promote safety and security not only within its own border, but also in its vicinity.

An important aspect of the security creating capacities that the Union acquires through the work with civil protection is that these capacities not are the Union's own capacities, but are made available for the Union by the member states. In addition, recent research on EU civil protection hints at differences between EU member states' approaches of how to develop cooperation in this policy field.¹ There seems to be colliding visions of what EU civil protection should entail, visions that differ between northern and the southern EU member states. Some southern member states want to go further towards centralisation in the area. They would want the Commission to co-ordinate the member states through the MIC, today it is not mandatory to use the Community civil protection mechanism but some countries would favour such a development (D2). There are several reasons for this, a perceived

¹ Britz, M. (2006) 'Lost in Translation? The Solidarity Declaration in practice: A Nordic perspective on EU civil protection' Acta B 37 Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, Boin *et al* (forthcoming 2007) 'Institutionalising EU Protection Policies at the National Level: Variety or Convergence?' Acta B 37 Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College

pressure from the public for the EU to act coherently in times of crises, but also to increase visibility of the EU. It is a way to market the EU both internationally and internally, to show that EU does good (S4). In Laeken 2001 there were talks of creating a civil protection agency. This has not been uncontroversial but some member states have not forgotten about the issue and the question pops up from time to time. When it comes to conflicts over the status of the Commission in the civil protection field the north-south divide is also reflected (D2). The more “southern” view on development of EU civil protection was presented in a report by Michel Barnier in the spring of 2006.²

Differences in views on how EU civil protection should be developed highlight more theoretical questions of what kind of security role the EU is playing, and how it can enhance safety and security. This paper provides an explorative study based on a comparison between one northern EU member state (Sweden) and one southern EU member state (Spain). These two member states have different experiences of security problems. For the development of EU civil protection, and hence the security role of the Union, three questions of how civil protection is dealt with domestically become important. The first question is: where in the more general security policy does civil protection belong? The second question is: what are the national characteristics of the civil protection organisation? And the third question is: what is the national view on EU civil protection? The answers to these questions will show the national tradition of civil protection and whether the issue of civil protection is seen as part of the over all security policy (which would represent a more holistic view on security) or whether the national security policy is more traditionally divided into wartime/peacetime and civilian/military security policies. In this way the answers will show the national expectations of what role civil protection plays in security policy, expectations that might also affect the view on EU civil protection.

The empirical material analysed in this article is to a large extent based on interviews made with Nordic and Spanish civil servants working with civil protection in relation to the EU.³ In addition printed sources such as legislation and secondary

² Barnier, M. (2006) *Pour une force européenne de protection civile: europe aid* Available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/rapport_barnier_20060508_fr.pdf

³ The interviews with Nordic civil servants were made when material for the report “Lost in Translation? The Solidarity Declaration in practice: A Nordic perspective on EU civil protection”, Britz, Malena. (2006) Acta B 37 Swedish National Defence College, was collected. Telephone interviews with Spanish civil servants and civil servants at the European Commission were conducted in the spring and summer of 2007.

sources have been used. The paper proceeds by discussing the changes in the European security landscape and what consequences this has had for the security concept. It then presents EU civil protection before a comparison between Spanish and Swedish civil protection is made. The concluding analysis of the paper ends with a discussion of what this knowledge means for our understanding of the new security role of the EU.

The changed security landscape and consequences for the security concept

It is common knowledge to talk about a broadened security concept.⁴ As pointed out by Boin *et al* the new security thinking is based on changes along two dimensions: the increased number of perceived threats, and a broadening in the object requiring security from the state (and national borders) to individuals, societies or critical life sustaining systems. This broadened security concept includes the provision of public security to citizens, along with protective measures against all conceivable contingencies above a threshold level of routine accidents.⁵ This development is especially prominent within the European Union where the changed strategic environment after the end of the Cold War, and increased integration within the Union, have contributed to bringing the threat of war and the conduct of military operations in Europe under restraint and political control. This has meant that traditional security measures at the border and the Territorial Defence model, whether in national or allied shape, is losing ground.⁶

The frequency and magnitude of accidents, disruptions and catastrophes are on the rise,⁷ and increased integration in the European Union means mutual

⁴ E.g. Boin, A., Ekengren, M., and Rhinard, M. (2006a); Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J., (1998); Buzan, B (1991). However, this does not mean that there is a consensus in the academic debate on the benefit of such a broadened security concept. Adrian Hyde Price for example, has given a succinct presentation of the arguments against a widened concept of security suggesting a limited reference to the use of force with regard to a foreign enemy, Hyde Price, A. (2004).

⁵ Boin, A. Ekengren., and Rhinard, M. (2006a).

⁶ Gärtner, H (2003). 'European security: the end of territorial defense', *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, vol. 9, issue 2 (winter/spring 2003).

⁷ Sundelius, B. (2005) 'Disruptions – Functional Security for the EU', in Elbe, S. Luterbacher, U. Missiroli, A., Sundelius, B. and Zupi, M. (2005) *Disasters, Diseases, Disruptions: a new D-drive for the EU*, Chaillot Paper, no. 83, September.

interdependencies that bring shared risks and disturbances⁸. The London and Madrid bombings, extreme weather events, infrastructure breakdowns, articulated fear of possible pandemic diseases, and chain-reactions in Western Europe's electricity grid, reveal a haunting new spectrum of contingencies. In addition, globalisation implies that crises that take place far away from the Union also might affect the Union and its citizens, one example is the Tsunami in South East Asia in 2005, another might be the development of trans-national terrorist networks.

Consequently, new kinds of security and protection issues emerge, and in this changed security environment societal security emerges as a focus for security studies. Scholars speak of a blurred distinction between internal and external security⁹, which in turn facilitates the development of European societal security. Societal security is about the safeguarding of both the state and the individual, where threats can have their origins both internally and externally to a state. As suggested above, in Europe the integration process facilitates this development. When the EU and its member states simultaneously engage in a number of activities to create security, an interplay between domestic and European political processes emerges. This interplay, in analogy with globalisation, implies a de-territorialisation. This process does not only take place in a geographic sense but also in a political sense. In the security policy area it erases a conventional division between first and second order security. First order security is closely conceived of in relation to the territory and indivisible values: control over external borders, monopoly of violence in the territory, political sovereignty, and (in the case of the European states) by safeguarding democratic rule. Second order security is then concerned with internal security, with the safety of peoples and citizens. In this way an intermestic space is created¹⁰ where security concerns stem from threats to societal security, comprising aspects of both first and second order security. For example, a situation where there is a demand for measures of civil protection, primarily a second order security problem,

⁸Elbe, S. Luterbacher, U. Missiroli, A., Sundelius, B. and Zupi, M. (2005) Disasters, Diseases, Disruptions: a new D-drive for the EU, Chaillot Paper, no. 83, September, 2005.

⁹ Bigo, D. (2000) 'When two become one: internal and external securitisations in Europe', eds Kelstrup and Williams, *International Relations and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community* Routledge: London, 2000, Ekengren, M. (2007) "The External – Internal Dimension of Security and Terrorism" in Spence, David (Ed.) *The European Union and terrorism* London: John Harper Publishing.

¹⁰ Sundelius, B. (2005).

might lead to a first order security problem, i.e. difficulties in securing the state, if the effort to provide necessary means fails.

Moreover, theoretical approaches dealing with regional security stress the importance of adjacency when analysing security dynamics.¹¹ Accordingly, also in an increasingly globalised world, security dynamics are primarily structured in regional clusters or *regional security complexes* (RSCs). RSCs are defined as constellations of states: ‘whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from another.’¹² How regional security dynamics are structured is thus necessary to reflect upon when analysing the concept of security in a European setting, because the blurring of the distinction between external and internal security is not only visible within the European Union, or in developed states in the western world. A situation where a second order security problem creates a first order security problem is difficult for a stable state to handle, but might be fatal for a more instable or weak state. This has been realised by the EU, which has created several ways of exporting stability to its neighbours and to other parts of the world. One is conscious policies towards EU neighbours and states in its “near abroad” for which a future membership is not foreseen. Another is state-building efforts with a focus on the security sector, such as the recent focus on Security Sector Reform (SSR).

Contemporary EU security thinking

Contemporary EU security policy is particularly manifest in one strategy, one declaration, and one policy: *the European Security Strategy*, *the Solidarity Declaration*, and *the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Together these documents show the overlapping security concerns that the EU and its member states have, and how internal and external security are interlinked.

The European Security Strategy¹³ from 2003 states that internal and external security are “indissolubly linked”. Terrorism and organised crime are mentioned as two of five key threats, and conflicts in EU’s neighbourhood are identified as a source of problems for Europe. In order to achieve its security objectives the EU should become more active, capable, and coherent. In this way the Security strategy

¹¹ Buzan, Barry & Ole Waever (2003) *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.12

¹² Ibid. p.44

¹³ *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003.

highlights a variety of security creating measures. In the declaration on solidarity against terrorism (“The solidarity declaration”) EU’s heads of states and governments stated their shared intention to “mobilise all the instruments at their disposal, including military resources, to prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of one of them; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State or an acceding State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack”¹⁴. This declaration was framed after the bombings in Madrid in 2004, and it builds on the “Solidarity Clause” in the (non-ratified) Constitutional Treaty. It expresses a strong political will at the highest level to provide assistance when a member is subject to terrorist harm and in times of other major crises.¹⁵

Together the Solidarity declaration and the Security strategy confirm how the pooling of sovereignties has laid one foundation for a Union-wide appreciation of security interests. These security interests are pursued both inside and outside the EU, and their focus are not primarily traditional hard security. In this way, conditions in the neighbouring areas are linked to stability and domestic tranquillity in the EU. One effort to that end is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which can be read as an externalisation of some of EU’s soft security policies. Some of these neighbouring states might not ever become members of the Union. The ENP offers a deepened political relationship and economic integration for both immediate neighbours and for states in the Southern Caucasus that share borders to the EU’s candidate countries¹⁶. The ENP is also explicitly linked to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in the sense that the ENP is said to: ‘contribute to develop further regional integration, building on the achievements of the EMP, notably in the area of trade... [and] it will reinforce efforts to meet the objectives of the European security strategy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East’.¹⁷

¹⁴ “Declaration on Solidarity Against Terrorism” in European Council “Declaration on Combating Terrorism” 25 March 2004, p.18

¹⁵ Ekengren, M., Matzén, N., Rhinard, M., and Svantesson, M. (2006); Britz, Malena (2006).

¹⁶ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” Brussels, 11.3.2003. COM(2003) 104 final. Communication from the Commission. “European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper” Brussels, 12.5.2004. COM(2004) 373 final. European Commission official web site about the ENP [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm] accessed 9 October 2006.

¹⁷ Communication from the Commission. “European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper”, p.4. For an analysis of Euro-Mediterranean relations based on the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), see Bremberg Heijl, N. (2007) ‘Between a rock and a hard place: Euro-Mediterranean security revisited’ *Mediterranean Politics*, vol.12, no.1, pp.1-16

This brief analysis shows that contemporary security thinking within the Union increasingly seems to rest on a notion of societal security, rather than on a division between traditional hard (territorial) and soft (economic) security. In the notion of societal security the conventional division between first and second order security shifts, as discussed above. This is also very much in line with the argument that the over-all European regional security complex, dominated by the bigger EU member states alongside the Union's supranational institutions, is characterized by mainly non-military security concerns.¹⁸ Cooperation between states in the EU is highly institutionalized (at times described as post-modern or post-sovereign), which implies that it is hard to describe the inter-state relations in Europe as anarchic.¹⁹ The focus on societal security provided here sheds light on the features of the European security complex, in the sense that it shows how internal/ domestic and external/European security concerns get increasingly blurred and intertwined. In our view this focus enhances the insights derived from theories on regional security, and make it possible to improve these theoretical insights by our knowledge of societal security.

Thus, contemporary EU security thinking (as expressed in the above analyzed policies) reflects the changed security landscape and the structure of regional security in Europe. However, at the same time as the security landscape and the security thinking has changed, the organisation of EU foreign and security policy still rests on the more traditional notion of foreign and security policy, with a clear division between EU external and EU internal security. In practice however, this division seems to be increasingly difficult to maintain and this difficulty is exemplified in the area of civil protection.

EU Civil protection

EU civil protection can theoretically be undertaken both outside and inside the EU. Civil protection as a field for co-operation within the European Community was

¹⁸ Buzan & Waever (2003), p.352ff

¹⁹ However, on a theoretical level, developments in Europe can be said to pose problems to the conceptualization of Europe as a regional security complex, since in the case that the EU member states become so integrated that the Union eventually takes on actor qualities, then Europe will stop being a region and become something more akin to a global power (see Bretherton, C. & J. Vogler (2006) *The European Union as a Global Actor* (2nd Ed.) London: Routledge and Hallenberg, J & K. Engelbrekt (forthcoming) *European Union and Strategy: An Emerging Actor* London: Routledge).

brought up at a ministerial meeting in Rome in May 1985.²⁰ There is no special title in the treaties on civil protection but it is mentioned in Article 3 in the Rome Treaty (the reason why it belongs to the first pillar). At the same time all activities and decisions have to be made under Article 308 in the Amsterdam treaty, which means that all decisions are taken in consensus. PROCIV, the Council Working Party is a legislative Working Party, and it is within this working party that negotiations on proposals from the Commission on civil protection take place. On ministerial level it is mostly ministers in the constellation of Justice and Home Affairs that take the decisions.²¹

An important instrument of EU Civil Protection is the Community Mechanism which was established on 23 October 2001. The Mechanism increased the activity in the civil protection area and presently the PROCIV has meetings more than once a month, whereas in the beginning of the 1990s there were only a couple of meetings a year (F1). The Mechanism is mobilised through the Commission DG Environment's Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). Requests to the MIC are made by the country that asks for assistance, and can be called upon for natural disasters, man-made or industry disasters and accidents.

According to the Commission's web-site there were 14 requests for assistance in 2005 only. Examples of when the mechanism has been used are the Prestige accident (2002); earthquakes in Morocco (2004) and Pakistan (2005); in the Tsunami in South Asia (2004/2005); forest fires in Portugal (2003/2004/2005); floods in Romania and Bulgaria (2005); and in the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the USA (2005).²²

In contrast to civil protection, what in EU language is called civilian crisis management are instruments to be applied outside the EU, either as part of the ESDP

²⁰ Vincent (2002) Vincent, Gilles (2002) "The EC Programme in Civil Protection" in Colombo, Alessandro G. & Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano (Eds) NEDIES PROJECT Proceedings, NEDIES Workshop – LEARNING OUR LESSONS Dissemination of Information on Lessons Learnt from Disasters. European Commission Joint Research Centre 24-24 June 2002.

²¹ Jönsson & Jarlsvik (2005: 53-54). Jönsson, Thomas & Helén Jarlsvik (2005) "Krisberedskapsmyndigheten och Europeiska unionen : en analys av hur KBM skulle kunna delta i EU" Stockholm : Försvarsanalys, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI).

²² Commission (2006) Commission (2006), Commission Official Web Site [<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/mechanism.htm>] Latest access 15 September 2006. , Boin et al (2005) Boin, Arjen, Ekengren, Magnus & Mark Rhinard (2005) "Functional Security and Crisis Management Capacity in the European Union. Setting the research agenda." Draft report. February 2005. Appendix pp.54-57, Jönsson & Jarlsvik (2005), pp.32-33.

or as a Commission activity. Civilian crisis management within the ESDP has been specified in four priority areas: police, rule of law, civilian administration *and civil protection*; but new areas such as monitoring have been added over time.²³ The Civil Protection mechanism can thus be used as a part of the ESDP, although that has not happened yet. The activities undertaken by the Commission in civilian crisis management mainly “relate to provision of humanitarian assistance, through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) or the provision of longer-term technical assistance and aid for institution-building and post conflict reconstruction efforts”.²⁴

One Danish civil servant has pointed out that the complex character of civil protection is a result of difficulties to find a suitable place, organizationally speaking, for the co-operation (D1). The present mix where civil protection belongs to both the first and the second pillar is not perceived as optimal. The question is if the civil protection missions that take place outside the EU, and those that take place inside the EU, should have different organizational homes (when it is the same member state capacities that are used in either case) and what role the commission should have. One Finnish civil servant has pointed out that it is theoretically possible to use the MIC for the ESDP in specific situations. How this would take place has been agreed by the Council and the Commission in a Joint Declaration (29 September 2003). However, this option has not been activated so far. Civilian crisis management operations are an intergovernmental area where the Commission is fully associated but does not have a voice as such (F3). One Swedish civil servant has pointed out that the last years’ terrorist attacks, natural disasters and catastrophes have meant that the development of the community mechanism has become big politics (S2). As stated by another Danish civil servant there has been a discussion to move the whole civil protection co-operation to the second pillar since there already is co-operation of national resources there. Another possibility would be to move the whole civil protection area in under ECHO if it is to be kept under the Commission (D2).

Also important in this context is the fact that the need to further strengthen cooperation around the Mediterranean basin in the field of civil protection and natural

²³ Boin et al (2005), Annex p.44, 56, Gourlay, Catriona (2004) “European Union procedures and resources for crisis management” in *International Peacekeeping* (Frank Cass), Autumn 2004, Vol. 11 Issue 3, p404-421..

²⁴ Gourlay (2004), p.406

disaster prevention was recognized during the Barcelona Summit in November 2005. As a confidence building measure civil protection was deemed particularly relevant for the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration (political & security partnership).²⁵ As a consequence, a long-term project (2008-2013) will be carried out in order to develop an effective and sustainable Euro-Mediterranean Civil Protection System to ensure the mitigation, prevention and management of natural and man-made disasters, with a specific focus on the sub-regional dimension of cooperation.²⁶ The Commission's aim is that the system will be fully operational and completely compatible with the EU civil protection mechanism and the MIC (COM1).

Taken together, this highlights the role that civil protection plays within the political and security dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Not only in the sense that the EU and the member states provide assistance in the case of disasters (such as the earthquakes in Algeria 2003 and in Morocco 2004) but also, and perhaps more importantly, because civil protection cooperation might foster south-south confidence-building measures due to its low-key and hands-on profile. For instance, civil protection cooperation brings Israeli and Palestinian civil servants together and thus serves a wider purpose of initiating a process which might lead to a more stable and less-conflict ridden southern Mediterranean (D2). Moreover, according to one civil servant in the European Commission, the countries in the southern Mediterranean (North Africa and the Middle East) see a clear benefit in an enhanced cooperation in civil protection since it may improve their crisis management capabilities in general (COM1).

Civil protection in Spain and Sweden

The intergovernmental character of the civil protection field, and the indications in earlier research on a North-South gap in the view on EU civil protection, has led us to compare civil protection in one Southern and one Northern EU member state in order to highlight more theoretical questions of what kind of security role the EU is playing. In order to structure the comparison three questions have guided the analysis. The first

²⁵ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Tenth Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A work programme to meet the challenges of the next five years http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/barcelona_10/docs/10th_comm_en.pdf

²⁶ European Commission (2007) 'European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and Regional Indicative Programme (2007-2010) for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_euromed_rsp_en.pdf (Accessed 2007-05-16)

question is: where in the more general security policy does civil protection belong? The second question is: what are the national characteristics of the civil protection organisation? And the third question asks what the national view on EU civil protection is? Answers to these questions are discussed in a comparative analysis in the following section.

The Spanish civil protection concept

The origins of the Spanish civil protection concept dates back to the period right after the Spanish Civil War in the 1940s, when the concept of civil defence was introduced. The concept of civil defence was generally developed as a response to the Second World War and the main threat was conceived to be bombings against the civilian population. Civil defence in Spain (in relation to NATO:s concept of Civil Emergency Planning) concerns mainly provision or mobilisation of civil resources and services that are needed to meet the demands of national defence, namely: defence of the nation, protection of the population and protection of specific resource sectors.²⁷ Conceptually speaking civil protection is somewhat different from civil defence and nowadays civil defence has been more or less completely replaced by civil protection (ES1). This can be seen as a consequence of the changed role that the Spanish military is assigned in peace-time crisis management in the current Spanish law on National Defence.²⁸ Civil defence is not mentioned at all in the law but article 28 of the same law stipulates that the Council of National Defence will, in war time, coordinate the civil protection system. Article 15 stipulates that, in peace time, the Armed Forces shall, together with other state and public authorities, preserve the security and well-being of the citizens in cases of grave risks, catastrophes and calamities.

Spanish civil protection was codified in 1985 when the law on Civil Protection was enacted and the concept has evolved since then.²⁹ Civil protection is defined as: ‘the physical protection of the population and goods in cases of severe risk, public calamity, or extraordinary catastrophe in which the lives and physical integrity of the people are endangered’.³⁰ The law also stipulates that civil protection constitutes a comprehensive policy for security. The concept can be said to apply a

²⁷ CEP Handbook (2006) *International CEP Handbook: Civil Emergency Planning in the NATO/EAPC Countries* SEMA’s Educational Series 2006:1 Swedish Emergency Management Agency p.170-171

²⁸ Ley Orgánica 5/2005 de 17 de noviembre, de la Defensa Nacional (BOE núm. 276 de 18/11/2005).

²⁹ Ley Orgánica 2/1985 de 21 de enero, sobre protección civil (BOE núm. 22 de 25/1/1985).

³⁰ Ibid, I. *Fundamentos*

generic definition of threats since it concerns the protection of persons and goods in cases of severe risk or calamity where the security and lives of persons are threatened. The object of protection is thus persons and (to a lesser extent) goods. However, when it comes to natural disasters there is a sort of catalogue of risk areas where different kinds of disasters are identified (floods, earthquakes, forest fires, volcanic activity, etc.). Within the concept of civil protection there is an explicit reference to the principle of auto-protection (*autoprotección*), which entails the notion that the citizens' ability to protect themselves in situations of emergency is paramount not least in the early phases of a crisis. Although the citizens shall receive appropriate protection from public authorities in case of emergency, educating and enhancing the participation of the citizenry are also conceived to be important tasks for civil protection.³¹

The Swedish civil protection concept

The Swedish Total Defence concept includes military defence and civil defence. It primarily relates to wartime, with the idea that modern warfare is total, which requires a total defence. The civil defence part of the total defence includes all non-military functions in society that are needed in warfare. However, civil defence also relates to peacetime when it includes activities that enhance the ability to resist an armed attack. In peacetime, the concept of Protection and Preparedness against Major Emergencies during Peacetime is important for the work to avoid, and prepare for, major emergencies in peacetime. There is no straightforward translation of the concept civil protection into Swedish. It would be possible to use the term *civilt skydd* [civilian protection] but in general Swedes would not know the meaning of that. In Sweden civil protection is often translated into rescue services. Other translations have been discussed, such as protection and preparedness (*skydd & beredskap*) and protection and security (*skydd & säkerhet*). One of the Swedish civil servants pointed out that the translation of civil protection causes difficulties for Sweden primarily because of the way in which Swedish agencies, The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) are organised. Especially SEMA uses the concept of protection and preparedness rather than rescue services, because rescue services might lead the thoughts in the wrong direction (Interviews S2, S3, S4.). One complication that arises when civil protection is translated into rescue

³¹ Ibid, *IV Autoprotección*

services is that according to the Swedish law, the concept of rescue services is much narrower than what is included in the EU's civil protection community mechanism, and to what might activate it. For example, according to Swedish law the necessity to provide people with generators in case of a long-term power cut would not be rescue service, but it would definitely be civil protection in the way that the concept is used in the EU.

Organisation of civil protection in Spain

As an over-arching legal principle, the Spanish state is responsible for organizing civil protection in Spain³² and the Spanish national government is the superior management and coordinating organ.³³ However, the Spanish state's main responsibility lays in monitoring the development and implementation of regional civil protection preparedness plans. In case of a major emergency the state might perform a coordination function between administrative bodies on a sub-state level, but the government may delegate this function. The delegation is made on request by the minister of interior and on the initiative of a president of an autonomous region or local authority, to regional or local authorities when circumstances allow for such a procedure.³⁴ The Department of Civil Protection and Emergencies (*Dirección General de Protección Civil y Emergencias*, DGPCE) is placed under the Ministry of Interior (MoI), performs a support and coordinating function between the MoI and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the relevant regional civil protection authorities in case of large-scale emergency. DGPCE also maintains the Operative Coordination Centre (SACOP, *Sala de Coordinación Operativa*), runs crisis exercises and provides training to senior personnel responsible for handling risks and emergencies (fire brigades, rescue and sanitary services, law enforcement and security agencies).

Spain is divided into 17 autonomous regions (*comunidades autónomas*), 50 provinces, and approximately 8,000 municipalities. According to the Spanish Civil Protection law every administrative level (state, region, local) shall prepare general civil protection preparedness plans (*planes territoriales*) and also plans for eight specific risk areas (*planes especiales*); nuclear emergencies, war, floods, earthquakes, chemical accidents, transports of dangerous goods, forest fires, volcanic activity.

³² Ley Orgánica 2/1985, *II Organización*

³³ *Ibid*, article 15.1

³⁴ *Ibid*, art. 15.2

Establishing and executing preparedness plans for nuclear emergencies and war is an exclusive competence for the Spanish state, whereas plans handling the rest of the risk areas are established on a regional basis.³⁵ Thus, the decentralized and semi-federal character of the Spanish state is reflected in the organization of civil protection, in the sense that the actual performance (i.e. the actual response to contingencies provoked by earthquakes, chemical accidents, transports of dangerous goods, forest fires, volcanic activity, etc.) shall be carried out through the planning, coordination and direction of the distinctive public services (that is the fire brigades, rescue and sanitary services, and so on) responsible for handling of the emergency at hand. Most of these public services (as well as the resources and capacities) are situated on and managed by authorities on regional or even local levels.

It is also interesting to note, in line with the above mentioned changes in the Spanish law on national defence, that a decision to create the Military Emergency Unit (*Unidad Militar de Emergencias*, UME) was made in 2005. The UME will be fully operational in summer 2007 and the idea is that the UME will serve as a rapid response unit giving support to other civil protection units. It will act on request by the government or delegated ministries. The unit will remain under military command during operations though its actions shall be coordinated with relevant civil protection authorities.³⁶ The UME was activated during the forest fires on the Canary Islands in July-August 2007 where some 12.000 persons had to be evacuated.³⁷

Organisation of civil protection in Sweden

It is the Ministry of Defence that has the overall responsibility for civil protection in Sweden. The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) are the two authorities that primarily work with civil protection issues and they both sort under the MoD. SEMA has a co-ordinating role and is supposed to activate and support activities in other authorities that help reducing vulnerability and that increase emergency management capacity. Planning and allocation of resources for both peacetime emergency preparedness, and for civil

³⁵ Real Decreto 407/1992, de 24 de abril, por el que se aprueba la norma básica de protección civil (BOE núm. 105 de 1/5/1992).

³⁶ Real Decreto 399/2007, de 23 de marzo, por el que se aprueba el protocolo de intervención de la Unidad Militar de Emergencias (UME) (BOE núm. 131 de 1/6/2007).

³⁷ El Mundo (2007) "Más de 12.000 personas evacuadas por el fuego en Gran Canaria y Tenerife" <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2007/07/31/espana/1185864933.html>

defence, is organised into six areas of which *protection, rescue and care*, is one (CEP Handbook 2003: 168-172).

The SRSA is the Swedish authority responsible for the practical work in the area of civil protection. It has an international department, which is responsible for international humanitarian missions, and to a certain extent also aid. They have a preparedness of personnel, equipment and finances. In the 1980s the focus for the department's activities was to save lives, but at the end of the 1980s the UN asked for help with less acute situations such as refugee camps in order to help the victims of a catastrophe once the immediate threat to their lives was over. This is a competence that SRSA has increased since then. The Balkan wars in the 1990s also meant that the mission was expanded and other Swedish authorities were involved. In the 1990s the SRSA developed a capacity to act very quickly, something that has become its niche and most sought-for competence internationally. Financing for SRSA's missions comes from the MFA via the MoD. SRSA also co-operates with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (S1).

The Swedish rescue service is decentralised and primarily works on regional and municipal level. Therefore the SRSA is the point of contact for the EU, and the EU work has become a kind of add-on to what was already done. SEMA is a relatively young agency and in the latest bill on collaboration in a crisis situation ("Samverkan i Kris") a merge of SEMA and SRSA was proposed. One reason that organisational change is pushed for has to do with the relationship between the two main agencies in the area, and the other is the Tsunami catastrophe in 2005. According to one of the Swedish civil servants SEMA's problem is that it is supposed to co-ordinate without operative activities or an active role in the EU. No one wants to be co-ordinated and the Agency lacks "anchoring" further down the system. It was also pointed out that the organisation of the civil protection area does not matter that much further down the rescue services system when the operational work is very decentralised. However, the Swedish authorities are actively part of co-operation in the EU within their respective areas, especially within the committees for implementation of EU directives. Here the development of the civil protection area in the EU has affected the SRSA, partially because EU's capacity has increased. The increase in EU's capacity is for example shown in the fact that when the MIC (the Monitoring and Information Centre, located at the Commission's DG Environment) was put in place in 2000 the EU system was up to four days slower than the UN

OCHA system, whereas now the difference is substantially smaller, more likely four minutes (S1, S2, S4, S5).

Spain and EU Civil Protection

The DGPCE is responsible for preparing requests for assistance to the EU Community mechanism for civil protection and it is at the same time the Spanish contact point for the mechanism and the Monitor and Information Centre (MIC). Spain has had several experiences of receiving assistance through the EU Community mechanism over the past few years. For instance, the MIC was contacted by the Spanish authorities during the Prestige incident in November 2002 when an oil tanker sank off the Galician coast. Several EU member state provided assistance such as ships, airplanes, equipment and experts. Moreover, Spain also requested assistance through the MIC when forest fires ravaged Galicia in August 2006. Italy, Portugal and France were among the first Member States to provide assistance (consisting chiefly of vehicles, personnel and four aircrafts). Interestingly, Spain did not ask for assistance in the immediate aftermath of the 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid even though several EU Member States offered assistance through the MIC, such as for example field hospitals.³⁸

Within the Community mechanism there is a reinforced cooperation on fighting forest fires between Spain, France, Italy and Portugal under the project heading 'EU F.I.R.E. 4' and it aims to develop a cross-border module composed of both personnel and equipment. Another six EU Member States are also associated with this project: Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.³⁹ Furthermore, there are also bilateral agreements relating to Civil Protection between Spain, France, Portugal and Morocco (ES2).

No major legal or organizational changes have been brought about in Spanish civil protection as a consequence of the developments at the EU level (ES2). However, there is an explicit reference to the developments within EU civil protection and the need to meet the requirements of enhanced coordination within the Community mechanism in the decree on disaster support units (*Unidades de Apoyo*

³⁸ Ekengren, M., N. Matzén & M. Svantesson (2006) *The New Security Role of the European Union: Transnational Crisis Management and the Protection of Union Citizens* Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, p.65

³⁹ See DG ENV 'Cross-border pilot projects', <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/crossborder.htm>

ante Desastres, UAD).⁴⁰ MoI, through the DGPCE, will take on the expenses derived from operations undertaken within the framework of the community mechanism. On request from the Community mechanism, the DGPCE will coordinate with the MIC, as well as with the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the logistical support shall be coordinated with the MoD (DIGENPOL) particularly with respect to transportation. Operations undertaken by the UADs within the Community mechanism framework shall be financed through the MoI whereas actions outside the EU shall be financed through the MFA. Whether this is truly a sign of an increasing ‘internalisation’ of European crisis management is perhaps too early to judge but the above does suggest some steps in such a direction.

Sweden and EU civil protection

As mentioned above, it is the SRSA which is the Swedish authority that is the point of contact for the EU civil protection community mechanism. When it comes to the possibility to receive help from the community mechanism, the SRSA has informed the government about the difficulties that Sweden has experienced as a host-nation and has received a commission to investigate this. The storm Gudrun in the winter of 2006 showed that the Swedish system was not prepared to receive help because when Sweden needed portable generators there was no money to pay for transport of these. In the beginning it was stated that the local municipalities had to promise to pay part of the cost of transport, which would have been a very complicated solution. In the end the electricity company Sydkraft paid. This showed deficiencies in the Swedish system to receive help. Here the structure with the community mechanism affects how Sweden thinks about the possibilities to receive help in future (S1, S5).

In the development of EU civil protection Sweden would like to distinguish between EU activity inside and outside the union’s borders. This could be done by letting the community mechanism and the MIC deal with crises inside the union, leaving ECHO to deal with crises outside the union. Sweden has also pointed out the importance of increased consular co-operation within the EU (S3, S5). The positive thing with ECHO is that it has a lot of room for manoeuvre since it has to be impartial and neutral. Such an arrangement would not be very different from how this is handled in the member states (D2). Here there clearly are different views. One

⁴⁰ Real Decreto 285/2006, de 10 de marzo, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 1123/2000, de 16 de junio, por el que se regula la creación e implantación de unidades de apoyo ante desastres (BOE núm. 70 de 23/3/2006).

Swedish civil servant stated that when the legal basis for the work and the added value of EU activities in this area is unclear, there is a tendency that focus is more on what resources there are, rather than the needs that are to be met. So far, the MIC has been used to ask for specific resources, not for EU co-ordination. Here there is a difference between missions within and outside the EU. Outside the EU it is possible for the EU to co-ordinate activities, but not inside. Sweden wants the Commission to help and support member states to build networks and exchange experiences (as is what happens in the action programme), but the Commission was not perceived to be that interested. In these kinds of activities the Commission has a limited role, and therefore does not own the results in the same way as when there is development in the community mechanism (S2).

CONCLUDING ANALYSIS

In relation to the first question of where in the overall security policy civil protection belongs, there seems to be noticeable differences between Spain and Sweden. In Spain, civil protection (*protección civil*) defined as ‘the physical protection of the population and goods in cases of severe risk, public calamity, or extraordinary catastrophe’ serves as the main organizing concept for Spanish authorities dealing with risk prevention and preparedness. As we saw in the analysis above the older Spanish concept of civil defence has been replaced by the wider concept of civil protection, and the concept has changed focus from the protection of civilians in times of war to a focus on peacetime crisis management. Changes in the legal framework regulating the Armed Forces has also led to a possibility for the military to play a bigger role in peace-time crisis management. This is somewhat unexpected due to ‘authoritarian legacy’ that the Spanish military can be said to carry as a consequence of General Franco’s regime, but it shall perhaps be seen as an indication of the stability of the Spanish democratic system. The Spanish civil protection concept is more part of a general security policy than the Swedish idea of civil protection. In Sweden civil protection and its related activities such as rescue services are not seen to be part of a national security policy in the same sense as seems to be the case in Spain. In this sense, Sweden seems to have a more traditional view on these capacities whereas the Spanish view is more in line with the thinking on societal security and the new security challenges.

In answering the second question, about the national organisation of civil protection, there seems to be at first sight less differences between Spain and Sweden. Naturally, geographical size and location, demographic figures and state structure differ between the two countries but both Spanish and Swedish civil protection is primarily de-centralized, in the sense that capacities and responsibilities are usually placed on local and regional levels. However, in Spain, the state is legally stipulated to act as the highest coordinating organ in civil protection and there are various means by which risk and crisis management can be up-scaled to national authorities (for instance, the national government or the minister of interior). The semi-federal structure of the Spanish state entails a mix between state, regional and local authorities in civil protection and depending on the scale and magnitude of the crisis at hand different authorities on the three levels will be engaged. At times, then, the coordination of Spanish civil protection could be characterized as centralized. Sweden, on the other hand has a more pure decentralised system where both the ownership of the resources and the responsibility for coordination are placed at a municipal or regional level.

The third question about the national views on EU civil protection reveals perhaps more differences than similarities between the two countries. First and foremost, Spain has had a legal definition of ‘civil protection’ as such, at least since 1985, something that Sweden has not had. This could perhaps be conceived of as an advantage for Spain in relation to EU civil protection, in the sense that there is less confusion in the Spanish administration about what civil protection means. However, this is not necessarily the case since it is still somewhat of a contested matter what exactly EU civil protection should entail. Some of our findings actually suggest that due to the fact that civil protection is clearly conceived of in one particular way, Spain might have a harder time accepting that EU civil protection is not defined in the same way. Furthermore, Spain has had a rather long experience, compared to Sweden, of receiving assistance through the EU Community mechanism and Spain is also an active participant in cross-border civil protection cooperation within the EU (such as EU F.I.R.E 4) as well as a strong promoter of enhanced cooperation on civil protection with the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Sweden, on the other hand has a completely different tradition in this area. Swedish authorities, such as the SRSA, are not used to receive help (something that lately has raised the issue of what kind of capacity and administrative systems are needed to be able to accept

help). However, they very much used to send out help, but through the UN rather than the EU. Therefore, there is quite a lot of scepticism amongst Swedish civil servants on the usefulness of the EU system.

Let us now turn to how we can understand the differences between Spain and Sweden presented here. The theory of regional security complexes can inform our understanding. In the EU, it seems as if there is in fact a multi-level version of the security complex, in which Spain and Sweden belong to different sub-regional security complexes. In these sub-regional security complexes the security issues and concerns converge even more than in the over-all European security complex. The conceptualization and national organisation of (in this case) civil protection are closer to each other within such a sub-RSC. This would however need to be researched further, but it seems as if these sub-RSCs within the EU give rise to different national conceptualizations of what EU civil protection should entail, due to divergent administrative traditions and different contemporary security out-looks. Spain belongs to a southern sub-region within the EU, a region which is increasingly tied together with the neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean in terms of threats and security challenges. Sweden, on the other hand belongs to a Scandinavian sub-RSC, with different traditions especially when it comes to international co-operation in the area of civil protection, but also when it comes to co-operation in education and training in the area. The North-South divide within EU civil protection seems to consist of diverging conceptualizations of what the EU should do and what civil protection actually comprise. The southern conceptualization is broader and based on inter-state solidarity, with financial and technical assistance on a EU level, whereas the northern conceptualization is narrower and based on a notion that the EU should provide added-value through enhanced coordination but not establishing something similar to EU civil protection corps (ES3).

The EU plays a role in this process in two ways, first it supports the development of the different sub-RSC (through its different civil protection programmes), and secondly it brings the sub-RSC closer together. The EU community mechanism can be said to give an 'added value' in these sub-RSC cooperations in the sense that it provides a comprehensive 'legal cover' and additional multi-lateral coordinating mechanisms, even though these countries would almost certainly have cooperated in some way had not the mechanism existed. In this way the EU becomes a security strengthening actor *at the same time* as its development of the area changes

what the member states have to relate to. The findings in this article suggest that this process is easier for states such as Spain where civil protection is a more “natural” part of the national security policy, than for states such as Sweden where this is not the case. However, this is a second issue that would need further study.

Through EU’s promotion of safety and security in the work with civil protection, the EU strengthens sub-regional security complexes, complexes that might be extended beyond the Union’s borders such as in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. At the same time, while different sub-RSCs are brought closer together through the general EU framework, the differences between them are made visible and affect the political negotiation of the future of EU civil protection.

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Interviews

Code: Country: Area of expertise and workplace: Number of people

COM1: European Commission: Political and security cooperation in the EMP at DG Relex: 1

D1: Denmark: Representatives in PROCIV from the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA): 3

D2: Civil Protection at Danish MoD: 1

ES1: Spain: Civil Protection at Spanish MoI (DGPCE): 1

ES2: Spain: Civil Protection at Spanish MoI (DGPCE): 1

ES3: Spain: Representative in PROCIV from Spanish MoI (DGPCE): 1

F1: Finland: Representative in PROCIV from Finnish MoI: 1

F3: Representative in CIVCOM from Finnish representation to the EU: 1

S1: Sweden: Manager of the Humanitarian operations department (internationella avdelningen) at Swedish Rescue Services Agency (Svenska räddningsverket): 1

S2: Sweden: Representative in PROCIV from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (Svenska räddningsverket): 1

S3: Sweden: Representative in PROCIV from the Swedish representation to the EU: 1

S4: Sweden: Civil protection issues at the Swedish MoD: 1

S5: Sweden: Civil protection issues at the Swedish MoD: 1