

**Coupling EU's normative and military power
in
peace support operations.**

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Introduction

This paper challenges the understanding that the European Union's ability to exercise soft, normative powers to influence international relations rests on its lack of military capability. Recent peace operations conducted by the EU reveal that the Union now is prepared to extend traditional soft foreign policy methods, to also include hard powers, such as military threats as well as military force to successfully manage conflicts and promote peace. To what extent is this compatible with the Normative Power Europe self-images of the EU? How can normative and military power co-exist and be exercised in parallel? Is it possible for the EU to continue to exercise 'normative power' when using military means in international peace operations? The EU's experiences in the Western Balkans, Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur compel us to think anew about the use of different kinds of power in conducting peace operations i.e. the use of military means in combination with defending, upholding and promoting international norms pertaining to human rights, democracy and sustainable peace.

The argument put forward here is that the EU needs to couple its traditional normative powers with its newly developed military capacity in order to meet the security challenges and expectations from conflict-ridden societies around the world. In most violent conflicts human values and norms, promoted by among others the EU, are threatened and violated. In order to be a credible normative power, this paper claims that the EU ought to be able to defend and uphold the norms it champions, such as norms pertaining to human rights and sustainable peace. In this aspect, military forces can become a useful tool also to promote norms, deter violations and ensure compliance. Peace support operations therefore provide a potential for combining the use of both military and normative powers.

The ambition of this paper is to move beyond the 'Normative Power Europe' as it does not uncritically accept and reproduce the idea that the normative influence of the Union rests on its lack of military capability. Rather than rejecting the concept of normative power outright, it will be explored in this paper in order to provide an understanding of how various forms of powers can be coupled in international peace operations. The key to understanding the EU's potential and possible role in preventing violent conflict and preserving international peace is to investigate whether the "soft model of hard power" now developed by the EU is a contradiction in terms or if there are potential synergies to be gained by exercising normative power and military power in parallel, simultaneously or sequentially (c.f. Matlary 2006). This

raise a number of interesting theoretical research questions concerning if and how humanitarian values may guide the use military force. What are the advantages and the disadvantages? Can the EU use peace operations as a means to externalize the values that guide EU's internal relations such as, peaceful conflict resolution, democracy, rule of law, human rights and sustainable peace and thereby contribute to the establishment of an international order based on these normative convictions? This paper maps out five dimensions where the EU efficiently may couple values and military means in peace operations. This is a first step in an investigation into how and to what effect the EU may exercise both normative and military power in conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building operations. To my knowledge few scholarly work have theoretically and empirically evaluated the extent to which the EU has been successful in combining military and normative power i.e. used ethical motivations to ensure the appropriate use of military force to defend and uphold highly respected norms and the use of military forces as a channel for norm diffusion and thereby contribute to establish sustainable peace.

Selling Normative Power short?

Historically, the EU has exercised an economic, civilian and normative power to influence world affairs. Because history supported it, political will dictated it, and lack of capability in any event necessitated it, the EU has been committed to contributing to international peace and security by non-military means (Cooper 2002; Kagan 2002). In fact, it was regarded as a paradox that the “the continent that once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms” (Rosecrance 1998: 22). The most important factor providing the EU with an influence in world affairs it has been argued “is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners 2002: 252). According to Thomas Diez (2005: 620), the representation of Europe as a force for peace is nearly consensual. Clearly, the EU has provided a model of democratic, peaceful relations that has inspired other regional groupings. It has also been eminently successful in exporting the values and norms that guide the EU's internal relations and structuring the new democracies of Eastern Europe through political conditionality, with either membership or close trade and cooperation agreements as incentives (cf. Carlsnaes, Sjurgen and White eds. 2004; Tonra and Christiansen eds. 2004).

Yet, the lessons from the secessionist conflicts of the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990's were that diplomacy, economic sanctions or moral condemnation were of little value without the

backing of decisive military power (Ignatieff 2000; Bildt 2000). Consequently, it is important to think anew about the use of military force as an instrument of statecraft within a comprehensive approach to the evolving EU security agenda. Increasingly, the Union demonstrates a readiness to extend traditional, soft foreign policy methods such as persuasion, offering and granting awards, and norm diffusion to also include hard powers, such as military coercion, the threat of punishment as well as deployment of military force in its efforts to contribute to international peace and security (cf. Holsti 1995; Nye 2002, 2004). Yet, the EU needs develop a coherent approach to how to use both values and weapons in its external relations. On the ground, the normative powers of the EU have created expectations that the EU would be prepared to defend the norms and values it so resolute attempts to spread. In practice, there has been a wide gap between what conflict-ridden societies have expected from the EU and what the EU actually has been able to do in terms of conflict management. The previous lack of military capacity to support its normative approach weakened the influence the EU could exert in crisis situations and limited its ability to manage violent conflicts and defend threatened human values. Developing a capacity to conduct independent peace operations, or to contribute to the United Nations' operations may therefore also contribute to closing the gap between the rhetoric and the actions of the EU.

Even if one assumes the position that European peace operations by necessity require both normative and military power, this in itself does not solve the tensions between these two kinds of power. This tension is present between the various kinds of powers and the question of their legitimacy, between the internal developments of the CFSP and the ESDP and their external impact in the international arena, and between the ideas, norms and discourse of European foreign policy and the Union's actions. European peace operations are subject to a number of contradictions and tensions about the boundaries of normative and military power brought to the fore by the actual or impending acquisition of military capacity and the use of this capacity in peace operations. Among the many questions prompted by the new thinking on European foreign policy, the following stands out: What kind of 'power' is the EU and how is this power articulated, exercised and perceived in the world? The EU and its member states will increasingly have to confront the implications of EU's power, international status, impact and role in international peace and security.

Tensions between normative and military power

There is a need to continue to critically evaluate how we think about power in world politics in general, and in peace support operations in particular. To do so, the analysis of the power of the EU needs to be positioned within a wider theoretical context (cf. Manners 2002; 2006, Hyde-Price 2006; Sjursen 2006a). This, however, does not mean that an elaborated discussion on conceptualizations of power or an in-depth meta-theory of power will be provided here (c.f. Guzzini 2005). Instead, the ambition is to confront the distinction between normative and military power and explore alternative understandings of these powers, their boundaries, relationship and means. This analysis will be conducted by dividing the discussion concerning power into three subcategories. First, power will be explored from an identity perspective i.e. as describing a particular type of actor as a small power or superpower. Second, power will be discussed from a relational perspective, i.e. how power characterizes a relationship between actors. Third and finally, power will be examined in terms of the means of exercising various types of powers.

Normative and/or Military Power Europe

The concept of ‘civilian power Europe’, which was developed in the 1970’s, is the foundation for the concept ‘Normative Power Europe’ coined by Manners (2002). These two concepts of power could be seen as part of the same discourse, a discourse that establishes the EU as a positive force in world politics (Diez 2005). The Normative Power discourse constructs a particular international identity of the EU based on the ‘soft’, civilian power of attraction and lack of military capability. The normative power concept connotes the characteristic of the EU as an *actor*, similar to the use of concepts such as ‘superpower’ to characterize the US in contemporary world politics. In that sense, normative power carries connotations of the EU’s moral superiority based on the understanding that the ‘soft’ powers of the EU are to be preferred to the ‘hard’ powers of the USⁱ.

Most existing conceptualizations of the EU as a normative, civil or civilizing power are contested on the grounds that they “lack precision and are normatively based” (Sjursen 2006: 235). Clearly, when discussing the distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power one cannot take for granted that one is bad and the other is good for the EU or for the international community. Second, as normative power has been seen to embody the core values many of us believe in it has been difficult to achieve the necessary critical distance to the object of study according to Hyde-Price (2006: 218). Third, the notion of normative power suffers from

‘almost total neglect of power’ (Carr 2001, cited in Hyde-Price 2006: 218). The normative power concept is a contradiction in terms because the power of influence exerted by the EU and other such civilian actors is conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control (Bull 1982, in Hyde Price 2006: 218).

Despite the criticism, many scholars and practitioners alike have been hesitant or skeptical to the new trend towards a ‘military power Europe’, which represents a reconstruction of the international identity of the EU that challenges the self-image of the EU as a civilian, normative power. The new developments termed the ‘military turn of the EU’ have been criticized as weakening the EU’s ‘distinct profile’ on the international arena (Zielonka 1998). In fact, the lack of military capability is often regarded as constituting the very source of EU’s normative power (cf. Manners 2006; Hyde-Price 2006; Sjursen 2006a; b). The new ambitions of the EU are found in the commitment to forging a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and in the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Whitman 1998; Hyde-Price 2004; Matlary 2006). Through the EU, the European governments are becoming a collective military actor.

Power and the relationship between the EU and others

The concept of power also characterizes a *relationship* (i.e. that actor A has the power to make B do what A wants). In this sense normative power is “a kind of hegemonic power”, i.e. the power to change the normative convictions of others (Diez 2005: 614, 616). This can roughly be done in two ways: through providing an attractive model to be imitated and through promoting appealing norms that resonates with others. The EU’s influence on others was traditionally based on exercising the ‘soft’, civilian, normative power and on the power of attraction and the unwillingness to develop and deploy military means to project its power on a global scale (Wallace 2007). The ‘Normative Power Europe’ attempts to alter the identity of others by providing an attractive model of good governance and peaceful relations to be imitated by others. Over the past fifty years the EU has successfully been able to diffuse and institutionalize peace norms among its members, and according to Sjursen, the EU has “successfully domesticated security within the Union” and it is therefore highly unlikely that a member state would use military force against another member (Risse-Kappen 1995; Waever 1998). Here the source of the EU’s normative power or the ability of the EU to exert a normative influence in world politics is derived from what it *is* – a security community and a model of good, democratic governance, cooperation and prosperity (c.f. Manners 2002: 252).

Furthermore, the EU also attempts to externalize these values that guide the internal interaction of the EU Member States and works actively to spread its particular norms through its various external policies.

By developing a military capability the EU's ability to exert an influence on others is altered. In a broad peace support perspective the EU, through its ESDP-missions may for example be able to export its successful model of reconciliation to previously conflict-ridden societies through various peace-building initiatives. In this sense the EU, here represented through its ESDP-missions, is a unique security actor and provides an added value to the discussion about peace support operations.ⁱⁱ In reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe', Ian Manners (2006: 183; 194) argues, "that militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU's normative power", but "it is increasingly risking its normative power". What is significant to the 'Normative Power Europe' conceptualization of power is the absence of physical force. There is a limited understanding of hard power and the military dimension present in the EU literature. Robert Cooper (2002), however, has discussed the need for military force in his vision of the EU as a post-modern security order based on cooperation, shared values and peaceful relations. His argument is that as long as there are a modern and a pre-modern world outside the EU's postmodern zone of peace there will be a need for military power to defend the values of this order. While maintaining a skepticism towards the 'militarization' of the EU Manners rightly insist that normative power is not the opposite of military power. From a different perspective Richard Youngs (2004: 415) observes that "security concerns and normative values inform each other", and he is concerned that "the focus on the ideational dimensions of the EU's international presence has... diverted attention away from the persistence of power politics..." despite the general recognition that these elements co-exist". Although focusing on combining normative and military power it is important to note that normative power is a separate category of power and it is something different and irreducible to economic or military power.

The means to exercise power

We can also regard power to refer to certain *means*. Clearly, normative and military powers are to a large extent exercised through different means. The instruments of normative power are often defined as soft, non-coercive and positive in contrast to hard, coercive and negative military tools. Normative power is neither military nor purely economic but one that works through ideas, values and norms (Manners 2002). These ideational phenomena are in

themselves able to achieve what otherwise are accomplished by military actions or economic incentives. Norms are here perceived to have independent power to alter the interests, identity and actions of other actors. According to Ian Manners (2002) normative power can be described as an ability ‘to shape conceptions of the “normal”’, i.e. to define what is normal. One strategy to exercise normative power is to construct and diffuse norms in order to change the normative convictions of others (Björkdahl 2005).

In the EU context, hard power and its military means such as military force is a relatively under-explored and inadequately theorized phenomenon among EU-scholars. Clearly, the use of military force has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. “Throughout the Cold War, force was needed to deter the other side from doing bad things outside its borders. Today, force is needed to compel the other side to do good things inside its borders (Prins 2002 cited in Hyde-Price 2006). To a large extent this evolution has motivated the governments of the EU to develop a military capability through the ESDP to strengthen the EU’s capacity to act in international peace and security matters. In 1999 the governments of the EU Member States agreed to the “Helsinki Target Goals” to establish a force of 60.000 troops deployable outside the EU for conflict prevention and crisis management purposes by 2003. Although the target was not met, this process has since been supplemented by the development of some 13 battle groups where 1.200-1.500 troops are to be organized and ready for deployment in 2007 (Wallace 2007). The development of the ESS, the Battle Groups and the European Rapid Reaction Corps demonstrates the EU’s greater political willingness to exercise also hard military power and the Union has proved its capability by conducting 14 military and civilian crisis missions mobilized as part of the ESDP since 2003 (Duke and Ojanen 2006). Despite the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in Thessalonica in 2003, these governments lack a coherent approach to the use of force and often their actions are decided on an ad hoc basis.

Clearly, normative and military means are possible to combine. Thomas Diez (2005:616) however, argues that normative power can work alongside other forms of power in international relations, “notably military and economic forms of power. Indeed, the latter two may underpin normative power.” According to Diez (2005: 621) it is “entirely conceivable that military force is used to back up the spread of civilian values...”. Yet, the more normative power relies on military force, the less it becomes distinguishable from other forms of power as it no longer builds on the independent power and attraction of the diffused norms (Diez 2005:

621). Others have observed that “norms established through coercion lack legitimacy” and do not reflect authentic norm adoption, because in the absence of forced compliance the actors would not adhere to the norm (Crawford 1993:52; Björkdahl 2002). Indeed, the imposition of norms through military force cannot be equated with successfully changing the normative convictions of others.

One attempt to move the debate one step further is to suggest that the common distinction between on the one hand military means associated with exercising military power and on the other normative means to exert normative influence is restraining. Instead, means traditionally utilized for projecting military power, such as military forces may be utilized for exercising normative power. Deployment of military troops in ESDP-operations for example, can actually be regarded as a way to exercise normative power. In such operations, the use of military force is heavily restrained and deployed for humanitarian purposes. By acting guided by, in accordance with and/or in defense of EU norms also outside the EU territory such military forces may strengthen the robustness of these norms within the EU as well as around the world and contribute to their evolution (Björkdahl 2006). In this sense military forces may be “forces for good”.

Social constructivist and realist perspectives on power

To better grasp the potential to couple normative and military power in peace support operations we need to draw on different theoretical perspectives. Traditional realist approaches to the study of international politics, give priority to material power and capabilities, and provide important insights to the conventional use of military power. Yet, such approaches fail to account for, or underestimate the importance of normative power and provide limited understandings of the appropriate use of military forces as ‘forces for good’. Using military power for humanitarian purposes is quite different from classic war fighting. Research in the social constructivist tradition, on the other hand, examines ideational rather than material conceptualizations of power, which may better capture normative power and thereby bring a deeper understanding to the mechanisms and channels for exercising this power. Through a social constructivist perspective we are able to explore the *appropriate* use of force in peace operations and whether the use of such force is compatible with the ambition to diffuse, defend and uphold norms pertaining to sustainable peace. This approach may complement traditional realist approaches or compel us to seriously reconsider either social constructivist or realist insights to the ability and limitations of the EU to conduct peace

operations. Just war theory also offers some an important framework for understanding the justifiable use of force in peace operations. The early thinkers in the just war tradition were concerned with the restoration of moral order, and the protection of others was an important element linked to the just cause of war (cf. Waltzer 1977). Not until the Treaty of Westphalia did self-defense become the only just cause of war and non-intervention the overarching principle of international relations forcing contemporary humanitarian interventions to protect others into a straitjacket.

Towards an EU approach to peace support operations

Only gradually has the European states begun to recognize the challenges posed to “Normative Power Europe” by issues such as peace operations, failed states, proliferation and international terrorism. Consequently, the EU – the archetypal civilian power, as Hyde-Price (2006) puts it, has moved to equip itself with the capacity to undertake autonomous military crisis management and peace operations and it now possesses the operational capacity and the political will to intervene abroad for humanitarian, peace-keeping, crisis management and peace enforcement purposes (Duke and Ojanen 2006). The bulk of these new missions fall in the grey zone between peace and war. Traditional peacekeeping tends to emphasize peace before human rights, and military intervention tends to place military victory before human rights. The distinguishing features of contemporary peace support operations are that they involve both the appropriate and the robust use of coercive military power short of war for the purpose of protecting civilians and establish order (Hyde-Price 2004: 333, Kaldor 2007).

In 2003 the EU launched its first military operation Concordia to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)ⁱⁱⁱ, followed by EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2004 (Björkdahl 2006). In addition, the French-led EU operation Artemis in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the summer of 2003, and the EUFOR RD deployment in support of the UN mission MONUC in 2006 demonstrate an expanding capacity of the EU (Duke and Ojanen 2006; Kaldor *et al* 2007). At the time of writing the EU has around 10.000 personnel deployed in 13 missions on three continents, with Aceh, Sudan and the DRC added in the past year and plans for a major new engagement in Kosovo.

These peace operations clearly have both an ethical side that is of significant political importance and a traditional realpolitik side that involves national interests and strategic choices, making the two sides at times difficult to unify. This has posed a challenge to the

development of the ESDP, and a major problem has been the lack of a clear conceptual framework and a practical approach to guide the EU's use of both values and weapons peace operations (cf. Kaldor *et al* 2007). The ESS adopted by the European Council at Thessalonica in December 2003 constituted an important first step on developing a guiding framework for the EU's role on the world stage and on outlining concepts governing when, how and where the EU will use military force. Yet, it leaves unanswered key questions about why the Union should intervene beyond its borders and according to what criteria and how to couple normative and military powers.

Obviously, the EU cannot simply 'borrow' Nato's doctrine for peace support operations or 'copy' the UN's peacekeeping policy. Instead, a Human Security doctrine for Europe has been brought to the fore by the Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, presented to the High Representative for the CFSP in 2004. It has been suggested that the notion of Human Security could work as an umbrella under which central concepts and ideas developed in the CFSP and the ESDP such as conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building can be combined in a coherent manner to provide guidance for EU peace operations (Kaldor *et al* 2007). It could also easily incorporate the notion of 'sustainable peace', which emphasize the stress the EU places on addressing the root causes rather than just managing the symptoms of conflict (Manners 2006: 186). Any doctrine on how to conduct European Peace Support Operations needs to consider how to gain synergies when exercising military and normative power in parallel. One modest attempt to think about this are the five key dimensions where normative and military powers interact in ESDP operations that are mapped out and discussed with some brief empirical examples below: projecting EU-power on a global scale in defense of its core values; the timely deployment and appropriate use of military force for humanitarian purposes, the avoidance of casualties and respect for human rights, multilateralism and ESDP-operations as channels for norm diffusion and defense of highly respected norms.

External projection of military power in the name of EU core values

As Europe itself is stable and secure, the ESDP is not about creating a 'European Army' designed for collective territorial defense. Instead, the EU's normative and military power will be used to manage security threats that will emanate from outside Europe (Hyde-Price 2006). Eurobarometer polls suggest that Europeans are supportive of the European Security and Defense Policy and the public also in the most EU skeptical Member States are supportive of

costly and risky interventions carried out as EU operations in defense of European core values (Youngs 2004:417). The ESDP has been interpreted as a further component of normative legitimation of the EU's role in world politics, which turn is crucial to the European identity formation (Youngs 2004: 418). To some ESDP-operations reflects the 'collective conscience' of the EU (Aybet 2000: 10 cited in Youngs 2004: 417). Hence, the military dimension gains legitimacy mainly from the external projection of military power in the name of certain values rather than defending European territory.

The EU's ability to reach beyond Europe and conduct ESDP-operations in Africa demonstrates that the EU is a global actor also in terms of military power. The three consecutive operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Artemis, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUFOR RD Congo) also demonstrate the combination of exercising EU's normative and military power in parallel. The deployment of military force in Operation Artemis and in EUFOR RD Congo was guided by and in defense of some of the core values of the EU such as sustainable peace, peaceful conflict resolution and democracy. Artemis, led by France as a 'Framework Nation', was to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and to the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003. Although geographically limited and of short duration, Artemis successfully established a secure environment for refugees return (Martinelli 2006: 384). This operation also proved that the EU had the operational readiness and capability to act outside its neighborhood with out the use of NATO assets. This operation was clearly an effort guided by the ambition to prevent human suffering and contribute to establish sustainable peace in this conflict-torn society. Efforts like these are perceived to increase the political and normative credibility of the EU as a global actor (Martinelli 2006: 380).

"Forces for good" and Responsibility to Protect

When exercising military and normative power in parallel the use of military force is radically different from the classical use of military. The role of military force in peace operations is neither war fighting nor peacekeeping. It should rather be seen as civilian protection as framed under the concept 'responsibility to protect' (Kaldor 2007). Appropriate use of military force is norm guided and relies on a clear ethical or humanitarian goal and could mean deployment to prevent not only ethnic cleansing or genocide, but also gross human rights abuses and large-scale human suffering. These goals can be framed within a Peace Support

Operation doctrine for EU, as suggested by the study group that produced the Barcelona report, 'A Human Security Doctrine for Europe.' In order to successfully combine military and normative power, the EU's use of military force must be regarded as "forces for good" guided by just cause and right intentions. The emerging norm pertaining to the 'responsibility to protect' promoted by the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel and endorsed by heads of state and government at the UN summit 2005 can be argued provides such just cause. According to this rising norm military force may, if necessary, be used by the international community in order to protect civilians where a state fails to protect its citizens from large-scale violence and widespread suffering (2004/A59/56). The 'responsibility to protect', however, seems to clash with just war theory's emphasis on military as a last resort. Postponing military action until all other means have been tried may be a recipe for disaster and incompatible with the objectives of the normative power. However, if we interpret last resort as logically last i.e. when other options are judged unlikely to succeed not necessarily temporarily last after trying all other preferred options it is possible to discuss the appropriate use of military force for preventive actions as well such as protect civilians from suffering and loss of life. Fisher (2007:113) argues that if the grounds for military action "are humanitarian – for example, to prevent the widespread suffering being carried out by a brutal dictator– that might suggest the need for action sooner rather than later".

The belated response by the EU and the international community to the long-standing humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, Sudan demonstrates the weakness of the emerging norm pertaining to 'responsibility to protect' and the strength of the principle of non-intervention. In addition, it also illustrates the discrepancy between the EU's declaratory politics and its practices. The ambition to prevent the crisis through the use of alternative means has proved inadequate and military force is now perceived as the last resort, which cannot be regarded as coherent with the preventive aspect of the notion of the 'responsibility to protect' notion. The passivity also illustrates the EU's lack of political will to provide appropriate military force to limit and deter what has been defined by some as genocide. The EU Council managed to adopt a joint action in 2005 that established the AMIS EU support action that were to support the African Union's mission AMIS II (Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP). In Darfur the credibility of the EU as a normative power prepared to defend humanitarian values and human rights are challenged, as the EU so far has not been allowed, willing and ready to deploy sufficient military forces to back up its normative agenda.

Little acceptance for collateral damage and military casualties

In peace operations fought for explicit humanitarian and moral motives, there is little public acceptance for collateral damage (i.e. non-combatant casualties, human rights abuses) and military casualties due to the values attached to human life and human rights in EU member states. Hence, military actions need to bring about more good than harm if they are to be compatible with the 'Normative Power' self-image of Europe and if it is to strengthen rather than weaken its influence. Consequently, the EU will use coercion not brute force in peace operations i.e. force that is in proportion to the goal of defending and protecting civilians and of apprehending those accused of committing gross human rights abuses and war crimes. Under these circumstances, the appropriate use of force means respecting human rights and humanitarian values. If ESDP-operations are perceived to act against these norms and use more force than necessary, the applicability, robustness and universality of these norms will be eroded.

Furthermore, some ESDP-peace operations may be more risky than traditional peacekeeping and crisis management as the core values of the EU pertaining to human rights broadly speaking entail minimizing all loss of life. Although fighting for a higher moral cause, public opinion in most European states will be sensitive to national, military casualties in peace operations and body bags will be hard to justify in operations initiated for the purpose of 'saving strangers' (Wheeler 2000). Force protection will therefore be imperative in peace operations. The ESDP-operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003 was authorized under the UN Charter Chapter VII. Consequently, the EU-peacekeepers were allowed and proved capable to use force to restore a secure environment. Evaluations of operation Artemis suggest that decisive, yet not extensive military force was used to achieve the objectives of the UN mandate such as "promote the national level peace process" and "facilitate the early establishment of an inclusive transitional government" in the DRC (UNSCR/1484; Interview may 2007 ESDP desk officer at Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs). Yet, the low intensity violence in the mission area, the limited geographical scope of the mission and the short duration facilitated the undertaking and may have contributed to the limited civilian and military casualties.

Multilateralism and legitimacy

Effective multilateralism is a key term in the EU discourse and crucial in combining the normative and the military dimensions of power since multilateralism is closely related to

legitimacy. Multilateralism is key to what distinguishes ESDP-peace operations from national-led, self-interested interventions, as well as from historic, European colonialism and contemporary neo-imperialism. The collective use of force by the EU Member States will be given greater legitimacy and be acknowledged by Europeans as well as others as lacking the kind of 'dubious national interests', driving some previous nationally led interventions (Ortega 2001:117). In addition, the novel interpretation of 'effective multilateralism' coined by the High Representative and the Secretary-General for the CFSP, Javier Solana in the ESS provide a new dimension of inter-institutional collaboration to multilateralism. Operation Artemis was deployed and EUPOL was set up at the request of the UN Secretary-General. Operation Artemis as well as EUFOR RD in the DRC also demonstrated the quest for 'effective multilateralism' as these operations can be regarded as a sign of successful EU-UN cooperation. It is a testimony to the tangible collaboration between the two institutions in accordance with the EU-UN joint declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management. EUFOR RD was an autonomous EU-led operation conducted within the framework of the ESDP, but it was deployed for the explicit purpose of supporting the UN mission MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in the DRC.

Peace Support Operations as channels of norm diffusion

ESDP-peace support operations in the field need to translate the declaratory politics of the EU into action, in order to close the gap between the EU's rhetoric and practice. In order for the EU to be true to its internal norms also in its external actions, ESDP-operations must reflect the values of the EU. If the military forces' and the individual peacekeepers' actions are guided by and in compliance with the norms championed by the EU. In a sense the peacekeepers can provide an example of norm-guided practice and may thereby function as a channel for norm diffusion by setting an example for others to follow (Björkdahl 2006). The EU crisis management operation Concordia illustrates this additional function of peace support operations. Concordia's was mandated to prevent the escalation of inter-ethnic tensions and instability. By creating a stable and secure environment, this EU-operation created the conditions for the EUSR to negotiate the Ohrid Framework Agreement for Peace in Macedonia that has managed to prevent the reemergence of violence between the ethnic groups. Conflict prevention was at the core of the mission's mandate and practice. By acting in a preventive manner the military force demonstrated one of the core norms of the EU in practice. In that sense Concordia provided both a model to be imitated and a channel for promoting and spreading the norm pertaining to the prevention of violent conflict to the

Macedonian society (Björkdahl 2006). EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPAT in Macedonia are interesting illustrations of police missions as channels for norm diffusion where individual police officers contribute to the spread of human rights norms as they monitor, mentor and advice the Congolese Integrated Police Unit (IPU) according to international best practice. This illustrates norm diffusion as a process of teaching and learning (Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP; cf. Checkel 1999; 2001).

Concluding reflections

The balance between normative and military power – between the use of values and weapons– in EU peace support operations will become clearer as lessons learned in the field are gathered. Practical experiences from conducting independent crisis management operations and from collaborating in international peace operations have brought important insights and lessons have been learned from the diversity of mission ranging from EU BAM monitoring borders in Rafah, Gaza to monitoring a peace process in Aceh, Indonesia and support the AU and the UN in DRC and Sudan. These experiences, insights and lessons learned are building a foreign policy capable of informing future external security policy and conduct of peace operations, where relevant historical experience are lacking and the European heritage may contribute to perceptions of neo-colonialism and ‘mission civilatrice’. The EU and its Member States are increasingly coming to understand that peace support operations implies a need to improve coordination and coherence between the use of military means and the normative tools to establish sustainable peace in conflict-ridden societies. Yet, there are a number of issues outstanding. In peace support operations, military and normative powers are closely coupled and how may we disentangle the effects of these in order to evaluate the effect and consequences of normative v s military means. How can we assess the potential for synergies when exercising the various kinds of powers in parallel? To what extent will the EU’s development of a military capability affect other issue areas? More research is needed to explore the reconstruction of the self-image of the EU but also on how the deployment of ESDP-missions will affect others perceptions of the EU.

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ⁱ It is a common pitfall to view the EU as a normative power and the US as a military power, but historically the US international engagement has had strong normative undertones. For example, Woodrow Wilson's aim was to spread peace to avoid interventions in the future, and the idea was to do so without military force, but through the changing of normative convictions. Even the 2002 National Security Strategy invokes norms and the commitment to spreading these norms, which are held to be universal (Diez 2005: 621).

ⁱⁱ The EU has different representations around the world and it may difficult to define which EU we refer to. Here, the ESDP-missions and their activities in promoting international peace and security are in focus.

ⁱⁱⁱ From here on referred to as Macedonia.