

Violent Globalisms¹

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Abstract

The mere labeling of the incidents of Madrid and New York as terrorism do hint to an understanding of the current world system as marked by imperialism: Terrorism can be understood as a violent action from within a societal order against the very same in order to attack or even overthrow the ruling elites. So, the term terrorism itself does refer to a presumed hierarchic structure with a commonly acknowledged elite. This interpretation of terrorism would approve the notion of imperialism (according to Galtung) with conflict as the outcome of structural violence. Imperialism of the West, especially of the United States within the Middle East, is expressed in the five dimensions of Galtung. The opposition – though – does not take place within states, but must be described as global, transnational phenomenon. Hence we can speak of a globalism of violence – structural and material – in the present world. Additionally, with their state-centered Counterterrorism strategies, the United States attempt to recreate a realist's world. Failing in that, they inspire even more of this new transnational opposition to imperialism instead.

¹ This article is part of the introduction chapter of C. Beyer, Cornelia 'Violent Globalisms – Conflict in Response to Empire' (London: Ashgate, forthcoming).

Introduction

The age of globalization is not over². It might just have begun. We have to take a look at globalization before turning to globalism. Globalization means more than the older concept of interdependence, which describes a situation of mutual dependence between states. Normally, interdependence is based on trade relationships. Globalization, rather describes a process, within which the world is developing into an integrated global sphere of interaction³. As a result of this process, the difference between relations within and without – which is essential to the concept of interdependence – is dissolving⁴; the state is transforming. Kudrle is describing different forms or manifestations of globalization. He distinguishes „market globalization“, „communication globalization“ and „direct globalization“. Globalization did start with communication, improvements in transportation and particularly in communication made international trade and investment linkages more organic than was possible in previous periods. This was resulting in an unprecedented degree of functional integration between internationally dispersed activities⁵. The cultural effect describes changes in lifestyles and cultural consumption that result from possibilities of information across borders. The „comparison effect“ is as well a result of communication globalization. This means that due to improved information about for

² J. Rosenberg, 'Globalization Theory, A Post Mortem', *International Politics*, no. 42 (2005): 2 – 74, 3.

³ M. Zürn, 'Global Governance', in *Governance-Forschung. Vergewisserung über Stand und Entwicklungslinien*, eds. G. F. Schuppert (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung, 2005), 121 – 146, 122.

⁴ Zürn, 'Global Governance', 122.

⁵ R. Kudrle, 'Three Types of Globalization: Communication, Market and Direct', in: *Globalization and Global Governance*, eds. R. Vayrynen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 3 – 23, 3.

example the social and political settings in foreign nations peoples of 'unfree' states might increase their wish and demand for reforms, equality, rights and justice. Kudrle is citing the globally strengthened movement for democracy: communication globalization in many places will increase the demand for democracy⁶. As will be shown below, the comparison effect might also have a causing influence on terrorism. Market globalization describes the increase in trade, liberalization and mobility of capital. They lead to competition and a „race to the bottom“ with the concerned states as well as increased gaps between the rich and the less well off. Direct globalization describes the externalities of the other two forms. Examples of direct globalization include climate change and pollution. But psychological externalities can also be counted as direct globalization. I argue that violence – especially in its new forms of transnational terrorism – can be understood as one element or form of globalization, as it shows all its distinctions: individualisation, transnationality, international presence and effects, and network structures. It can also be understood as an externality of globalism, as will be shown in the following. So, when speaking about globalization, we are thus describing something qualitatively and quantitatively new and ongoing.

Globalism can mean different things. First, it can describe the realization of the state of globalization⁷. The situation of fully realized globalization would be the ideal form of globalism”, but cannot generally be observed so far. As Michael Zürn describes, transnational trade is observable especially within and between the three big actors EU, NAFTA and ASEAN. More than 91 percent of all foreign direct investment in the 1980ies was directed to the OECD world and the ten leading states

⁶ Kudrle, 'Three Types of Globalization', 8.

⁷ J. S. Nye Jr., 'Globalization versus Globalism', online:
<http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2392>, 07.07.06.

of the non-OECD world. Flows of communication are showing a similar pattern with concentration in the OECD nations⁸. For this reason Zürn and other authors use the term “denationalisation”. Full denationalisation is described as the state of total dissolution of borders, there is no difference of the thickness of interaction patterns between within and without. Full denationalisation is not generally observable yet⁹. Al Qaeda - the opponent that is addressed in the Global War on Terror - is globalized: the organization of Al Qaeda is itself existing in various states over the world. Branches exist in over 60 countries, the network acts disregarding borders, and it seems ever expanding. Al Qaeda’s fight is directed at the global level as well, it is not restricted to certain states.

Second, the term globalism describes the will and action to support and promote globalization. Here, it will be employed to designate the attempt to manage, structure or dominate globalization. From sides of the United States administration globalism is pursued by promoting – sometimes installing by violent means – free trade and democracy around the world. The will to actively spread these markers of globalization is detectable in the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies. Clearly the will to impose a global order on the world is stated. Already global is the US military presence, with troops stationed and bases in every world region. We also have to deal with the employment of this overarching military might in order to further the thus defined national interest of the United States. Interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and possibly Iran are pursued under the intent to structure the world according to safety and economic interests of the United States. Both states were seen as threatening the security of the US and all states play an interesting role in

⁸ Zürn, ‘Global Governance’, 123.

⁹ Zürn, ‘Global Governance’.

the infrastructure of global oil supply¹⁰. In conclusion, we have not only to deal with globalization of violence, but with distinct forms of violent globalism. They are coupled in a struggle about different concepts of world order.

What is violence? Whereas most IR scholars equal violence with power Hannah Arendt describes them as their opposite¹¹. Violence according to Arendt is not just an extreme form of power. Power instead is understood as a group phenomenon, whereas violence can be individual. This is based on an understanding of power close to the concept of soft power, as termed by Joseph Nye, existing only due to consent, support, even legitimacy of those affected by it. There is no power of an individual without a group that attributes this power to this individual and supports it. Power can be interpreted as the situation “all against one” whereas violence refers to “one against all”. Whereas power is leadership resting on support, violence is a mere tool used to achieve aims and generally shows itself just where power is lacking (as otherwise there would be no need for violence). It can principally be defined as the use of physical, but also other forms of, force used to reshape the behaviour of others according to one’s own intention. Generally, violence is lacking consensus and does confront opposition.

Is there violence in international relations? Of course there is! On the one hand we can detect unipolarity. And the unipolar power uses violence in order to pursue its aims of order and stability. On the other hand, this form of violence – that cannot be equated with power, as consensus is lacking – is answered with new forms of violence by substate, transnational actors. These actors can be subsumed under the rubric of ‘international terrorism’. Transnational terrorism is not necessarily a new

¹⁰ Z. Brzezinski, *The Global Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

¹¹ H. Arendt, *Macht und Gewalt* (Munich: Piper, 1996).

phenomenon, even if its organizational forms and strategies have evolved over time. It has attracted attention following the attacks in New York, London, Madrid and Bali. Transnational terrorism can be defined as politically motivated violence¹², and it can be interpreted as aiming at a hierarchy which is understood as globally encompassing.

The new scourge

International Terrorism is mainly directed against the United States and is not a 5 year old phenomenon, even if it has gained increasing attention since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001. In terms of numbers of casualties, the WTC event was of course unprecedented. Nonetheless it should be placed within a history of other serious events like attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Transnational Terrorism – which is a specific form of international terrorism – is directed especially against the United States and their economic representations in the world. Causes and motivations of terrorism have changed within the past century and a discussion of its development is needed to understand the motivations for what is called ‘new terrorism’.

Terrorism after World War II started with anti-colonial and nationalist struggles. This was replaced by ethno national terrorism in the 1970ies, like ETA, IRA and PLO, which was oftentimes due to tactical reasons accompanied by extreme leftist ideology¹³. This ideological component dissolved in the following decade with the increasing importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its motivational power for

¹² U.S. Department of State, *United States Code*, Title 22, Section 2656f(d), online:

<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/index.html>.

¹³ H. Henderson, *Terrorism* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2001), 13ff.

terrorism, as well as with the Islamic revolution in Iran. With the intervention of the Red Army in Afghanistan, the struggle of the Mujahidin was evolving into an international struggle: fighters were increasingly recruited from other countries, the struggle was declared to be a jihad of whole Islam¹⁴. The development of international terrorism was not linear and was inspired by certain events, two of which are of major importance for the recent problem of transnational terrorism: with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the ideological blocks disciplining the participating nations, intrastate conflicts were facilitated and are on an increase ever since¹⁵. These intrastate conflicts do now serve as a recruiting factor and haven for transnational terrorism. Bin Laden integrated different groups into one international terror association called Al Qaeda in 1988 and the Gulf war and the following presence of American soldiers on the Arab peninsula did inspire him to direct it against the US. He was from this point on uniting these groups under an ideology directed against the West and the United States in particular¹⁶. Al Qaeda in the following decades developed into a truly global organization with sections in Europe, Middle East and Asia¹⁷. The home nation state increasingly played a role only as a retreat, but less as a target of ideological and violent activities¹⁸.

Organizational forms of transnational terrorism can be explained by looking at

¹⁴ H. Frank, K. Hirschmann, *Die weltweite Gefahr. Terrorismus als internationale Herausforderung* (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2002), 34.

¹⁵ M. Shaw, The contemporary mode of warfare? Online: <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/hafa3/kaldor.htm>, 03.03.05.

¹⁶ Frank, Hirschmann, *Die weltweite Gefahr*, 38.

¹⁷ T. Philipp, 'Islamische Fundamentalistische Bewegungen', in *Im Schatten des Terrorismus – Hintergründe, Konsequenzen und Prognosen des 11. September*, eds. P. Bendel, M. Hildebrandt (Wiesbaden: Opladen, 2002), 57 – 69, 67.

¹⁸ T. Philipp, 'Islamische Fundamentalistische Bewegungen', 68.

Al Qaeda to show why this is a form of globalization. They are marked by the transnational coordination of attacks and their preparation, the development of an internationally networked infrastructure, international fundraising and financial activities, and the recruitment and training of terrorists all over the world¹⁹. The group led by bin Laden, but also PLO and Hezbollah, can be seen as prototypes of this new form of terrorism and enable us to describe its transnational nature. It is marked by the overcoming of territorial forms of organization and by deterritorialization²⁰. Al Qaeda is a private enterprise which organizes a worldwide network for support and financing of terrorism using management and marketing methods resembling these of modern economy²¹. The centre is organized around bin Laden himself and was situated in Afghanistan and Sudan interchangeably. From here, numerous interconnections were formed to other branches of the organization²². These interconnections are formed spontaneously and cancelled due to functional considerations. Hubs and nodes of the network can be destroyed without serious consequences for the network itself²³ and the network resembles the organization structure of a transnational enterprise²⁴. The role of state sponsors is debated. Schneckener even introduced the concept of the 'terrorist sponsored state' to

¹⁹ H. Behr, 'Neue Organisationsformen des Terrorismus und Ordnungstypologien transnationaler Politik', in *Im Schatten des Terrorismus. Hintergründe, Strukturen, Konsequenzen des 11. September 2001*, eds. P. Bendel and M. Hildebrandt (Wiesbaden: Opladen, 2002), 109–130, 110.

²⁰ U. Schneckener, *Netzwerke des Terrors. Charakter und Strukturen des transnationalen Terrorismus* (Berlin: SWP, 2002), 19.

²¹ Behr, *Neue Organisationsformen des Terrorismus*, 112.

²² Behr, *Neue Organisationsformen des Terrorismus*, 112.

²³ Schneckener, *Netzwerke des Terrors*, 26.

²⁴ R. Mayntz, *Organizational Forms of Terrorism. Hierarchy, Network, or a Type sui generis?* (Köln, Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2004).

describe possible interrelations²⁵. This new form of terrorism cannot be understood by employing the concept of sovereignty and it only partially addresses sovereign states. It is directed against a general structure of perceived hierarchy.

But why is violence emanating from hierarchy? Terrorism can be understood as responding to the global hegemony (or Empire, Imperialism, as will be discussed below) of the United States. The United States have pursued their role as a world leader specifically towards the Middle East. Their behaviour towards this region was often marked by political or military violence and formal or informal interventions (for example 1953 in Iran, 1979 in Afghanistan, 1983 in the Lebanon, 1992 with operation 'Desert Storm' in Iraq, 1998 with operation 'Desert Fox' in Iraq, 2001 in Afghanistan and again 2003 in Iraq)²⁶. Frequent interventions of the United States in foreign countries in general possibly lead to terrorism. According to the Pentagon's Defense Science Board there is a strong causal connection between the involvement of the United States internationally on the one hand and the increase of terrorist attacks against the US as a result. President Clinton had acknowledged this fact²⁷. Ivan Eland could show causality of interventions in foreign countries for terrorism in 65 cases between 1915 and 1998²⁸. And finally Osama bin Laden himself had stated: „The answer to that question [why we attack] is very simple. Because you attacked

²⁵ Schneckener, *Netzwerke des Terrors*, 35.

²⁶ S. L. Richman, "“Ancient History”: U.S. Conduct in the Middle East Since World War II and the Folly of Intervention', Cato Institute, online: <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-159.html>, 30.03.06, N. Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle* (Cambridge: South End Press, 1983) and others.

²⁷ I. Eland, 'Does US-Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism? The Historical Record', Cato Institute, online: www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-050es.html, 30.03.06.

²⁸ Eland, 'US-Intervention Overseas'.

us and continue to attack us“²⁹.

Hegemony and Empire

But apart from this very obvious argument, let us turn to a structural explanation. Structure is a set of elements with an accompanying set of relationships. For the past decade, the structure of international relations was one of unipolarity in a system of increasing globalization and transnationalisation: Within the military sector the overwhelming capabilities of the United States and their deployment served for the provision of international ordering capability. The economic strength enabled global trade and the growth of a global economy, and its technological leading position resulted in the spread of a global infrastructure and technological development. In conjunction with the promotion of liberal ideas, democracy and free trade after the end of the bipolar system these factors characterised the era of globalisation, with its increasing transnationalism and previously unknown harmony, at least in the West. Globalisation and democratization themselves thus are markers of the U.S.'s global supremacy and Empire³⁰. The promotion of democratic values and free market ideology and practices as well as the provision of public goods can be subsumed under the term „soft power“³¹. Soft power is the basis for a consensual and commonly beneficial hegemony, which is termed benign. The success of benign hegemony depends on the US's liberal policies built on the belief that properly

²⁹ M. Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror*, (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2004), 131, see also Osama bin Ladens fatwa 1998.

³⁰ J. N. Pieterse, *Globalization or Empire?* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

³¹ J. S. Jr. Nye, 'The Decline of America's Soft Power', *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 3 (2004), 16 – 20.

directed globalisation is beneficial in 'reordering' the world. As a result of the failures of globalization American hegemony is developing into a less benign one. This has become a predominant feature of the new millennium giving rise to this other form of violence. The difference between benevolent or benign hegemony and what we can currently observe lies in the adoption of unilateral power politics against multilateralist strategies in order to exert dominance accompanied by the application of violence in the pursuit of political ends. Lebow and Kelly referred back to Thucydides and his description of the antique Athens. He had a „complex and nuanced understanding of political authority that distinguished between hegemonia (legitimated leadership) and arkhe (control) and emphasizes ideology as much as it does material capability“³². Thus, hegemony is defined according to three core characteristics: legitimated leadership, ideology and material capabilities, and control. In 2001 Kelly and Lebow did state that „the striking feature of the contemporary American situation is the extent to which American leaders claim hegemonia but deny any interest in arkhe. Rightly or wrongly, the rest of the world has the reverse perception“³³. This argumentation does refer to the question of control and legitimacy and explains why we can speak of Empire instead of Hegemony.

Hegemony based on control but lacking consent or legitimacy might be understood as informal Empire³⁴. This refers to a broader concept of imperialism than just the act of conquering foreign countries. Especially with regards to the Middle

³² R. N. Lebow, R. Kelly, 'Thucydides and hegemony: Athens and the United States', *Review of International Studies* 27, no. 4 (2001), 593 – 609, 593.

³³ Lebow, Kelly, 'Thucydides and hegemony', 594.

³⁴ G. J. Ikenberry, 'Liberalism and empire: logics of order in the American unipolar age', *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004), 609 – 630, M. Mann, 'The first failed empire of the 21st century', *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004), 631 – 653, 633.

East, we can thus speak of imperialism of the United States. The United States might be a selectively violent Empire with regionally imperialist behaviour.

Legitimated Leadership

„American society shares the fundamental values on which the new world order is to be based.“³⁵

According to Lebow and Kelly, legitimacy requires more than myth. Hegemons need to behave in a manner consistent with their claims or professed values in order to secure and maintain the voluntary compliance of allies or subjects³⁶. In reference to the United States during the Cold War, Lebow and Kelly state that they had made good on some of their ideological claims which helped to legitimize them in the eyes of their allies.³⁷ They shared an ideology of democracy and held themselves out as model to be imitated by others and increasingly adopted and shared around the world. The reference to democratic values in respect to the ideology of the United States may hold even for the post-Cold War phase, where the United States still promoted democracy around the world. Democracy and liberalism have spread around the world after the end of the Cold War. The Freedom House – a non-profit agency concerned with the global development of political rights and civil freedoms - counted 89 democracies for our times, twice the number of 20 years ago. Legitimacy

³⁵ Ernst-Otto Czempel, 'Europe's Mission: Pushing for a Participative World Order', online

<http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/paxamericana/TABELLE CZEMPIEL>,

07.11.02.

³⁶ Lebow, Kelly, 'Thucydides and hegemony', 595.

³⁷ Lebow, Kelly, 'Thucydides and hegemony', 604.

of this process was based on an increasingly shared ideology that glued the nations together in a web of friendly and nonconflictual relations. William Wohlforth adequately explains the role of ideology in enabling and promoting this progressive process:

„Political liberalism is an ideology that seeks to uphold individual autonomy and prescribes a particular set of domestic institutions as means to that end. No coalition has formed to counterbalance U.S. power because political liberalism constitutes a transnational movement that has penetrated most potential challenger states at least to some degree.“³⁸

In more recent years American hegemony has been eroded by a score of poor international policies up to the new unilateralism of the Bush administration³⁹. Increasing willingness to go it alone did raise serious concerns about the legitimacy of the United States as a leading state and it led to what can be described as soft balancing on the part of numerous states – a behaviour that was not observed before. Soft balancing describes the possibilities of weaker states to signal dissent from the hegemonic or leading state and the attempt to prevent the latter's actions and policies. Soft balancing can be conducted by employing economic or diplomatic means and it has especially been observed since 2003⁴⁰. The dissent that is

³⁸ J. M. Owen IV, 'Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy', *International Security* 26, no. 3 (2001), 117 – 152, 120f.

³⁹ S. G. Brooks, W. C. Wohlforth, 'American Primacy in Perspective, from strength to strength', *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2002), 20 – 33, 21f. As stated above, hegemony refers to ideological dominance, here understood as legitimated leadership.

⁴⁰ R. A. Pape, 'Soft Balancing against the United States', *International Security* 30, no.1 (2005), 7 – 45.

expressed by means of soft balancing is an indicator of increasing lack of legitimacy of the United States.

Ideology and material capabilities

What I called ideological and integrative power refer to two different but interdependent characteristics of the United States. First, the ideological power of the United States is a trait that stems from its success in the global struggle between communism and liberal democracy in the Cold War, from which the United States emerged triumphant. It gave it the credible power and legitimacy to promote peace and democracy around the world, as was practiced in the following decade. The ideological power of the United States lies in American ideas based on capitalism and democracy⁴¹. Second, power does not solely stem from its ideological attractiveness, its integrative power lies in its ability to provide with material leadership. This second tier of power thus is referring to its material capabilities. Economically, the United States is still one of the most potent actors on a world scale⁴². Power as well does have its expression within the military sector, the economic realm and in a technological dimension. Within the military arena, the United States is the leading power globally and thus has the capabilities for military control. It is poised to spend more on defence in 2003 than then next 15-20 biggest spenders combined. It as well purchases its military prominence with only 3,5 percent of its GDP. As Paul Kennedy notes, being Number One at great cost is one thing;

⁴¹ W. LaFeber, 'The Post September 11 Debate Over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation', *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 1 (2002), 1–17, 2.

⁴² J. S. Nye Jr., *Amerikas Macht*, in *Empire Amerika*, eds. A. Bacevich et al. (München: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 2003), 156 – 172.

being the world's single superpower on the cheap is astonishing⁴³. This not only raises fear, it leads to respect for the US's potency and power. The former explanation, resting the predominant position of the United States on their liberal ideology and their liberal project does explain the hegemonic character of leadership. Beyond ideological progressivism, economic, military and technological supremacy serve as compelling evidences of success and attract 'vassals'. Material capabilities might as well in the long run lead to balancing behaviour on the part of other states that feel threatened by the only superpower. This was long expected⁴⁴ and transnational terrorism might only be a subnational substitute of this phenomenon. Balancing thus might be conducted by a transnational actor independent of states and might possibly just be the result of lack of balancing within the states system.

Control

Unfortunately, Lebow and Kelly do not elaborate on how the concept of control can be concretely measured. Control may be measured in terms of capability to project power and thus ordering capability in the world far from the home state. It can thus be understood as materializing in military action. Control may be as well measured in terms of ideological control and indirect control by means of soft power.

„Empire, we should recall, is not the same as omnipotence. Nor did America always get its own way, even with its most dependent allies. Nonetheless, it still managed to achieve a great deal. The results moreover

⁴³ Brooks, Wohlforth, 'American Primacy in Perspective', 21f.

⁴⁴ C. Layne, 'Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise', *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993), 5 - 51.

were quite remarkable. Indeed, in a relatively short space of time, ... it managed to build the basis for a new international order “⁴⁵

The long observed absence of balancing or opposition resulting in chaos might thus be an indicator of control – by means of hard and soft power combined – from the United States, but increasingly also military enterprises are used to exert control. Military enterprises in foreign parts of the world undertaken by the United States were also a common feature of post-Cold War world politics. Just lately, the unique and powerful position of the United States did express itself in increasing violence with higher frequency than before with the response to the attacks of September 11th. With this response, it did show the ability to project its power far away from its borders – especially in the Middle East - in a manner that finally did raise serious opposition from the international community. This manner was not entirely backed by a United Nations resolution nor was the proceeding entirely compelling in terms of sensibility, rationality and morals. It first left NATO out and attacked an already war-torn country even without having compelling proof that the terror attacks did stem or were coordinated from there. This is clearly cannot be regarded as a case of „benign behaviour“. Moreover, no other country even if attacked could have done so. With the second invasion of Iraq the consent on the part of the international community was diminished. This lack of consensus or legitimacy could be observed for example in the fact that 15 of 25 European states that were opposed or undecided about the war. Some states openly challenged the United States in their approach (for example France and Germany) and pursued soft

⁴⁵ M. Cox, 'Empire, imperialism and the Bush doctrine', *Review of International Studies* 300, no. 4 (2004), 585 – 608, 600.

balancing⁴⁶. The same behaviour as well was detected in some Asian states and broadly in the Middle East.

Imperialism as a cause of conflict ...

To elaborate further on the concept of Empire – which I equate with the state of realized imperialism - I will here use Johan Galtung's definition of imperialism. He uses three criteria, two mechanisms, five types and three phases to distinguish Empire or imperialism. Imperialism generally can be observed in five dimensions: economic, political, military, communication and cultural. It resembles a feudal structure, in which a centre and a periphery are connected to each other in a relation of dominance of one over the other.

„It is a general structural relationship between two collectivities, a system that splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of interest, and other parts in relations of disharmony of interest, or conflict of interest“⁴⁷.

Generally a relation of dominance is not necessarily conflictual; it can also be harmonious. Conflict is evolving when periphery and center are coupled together in such a way that the gap in living conditions between them is increasing. Imperialism then is marked by this inequality in which the periphery is at disadvantage and the center profits from the arrangement⁴⁸. The center is representing the elite and the

⁴⁶ Pape, 'Soft Balancing against the United States'.

⁴⁷ J. Galtung, *Peace and world structure. Essays in Peace Research, Vol. IV* (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1980) 438.

⁴⁸ Galtung, *Peace and world structure*, 461.

structure is one of hierarchy.

Structural violence is at work, whether expressed as dominance or imperialism⁴⁹. Galtung used the term structural violence originally to refer to any constraint on human potential due to economic and political structures. Forms of structural violence, or examples, are thus unequal access to resources, to political power, to education, to health care, or to legal standing. It can be expressed as *repression* (or uniformity; as the opposite of diversity, pluralism, freedom) and *exploitation* (or the opposite of equity)⁵⁰. Structural violence is of course an ethical problem, but beyond that it is dangerous as it frequently leads to direct violence. The chronically oppressed often resort to direct violence to end their oppression. These structural elements and possible causes of terrorism are generally ignored in the recent debates about terrorism. This is a serious mistake. Let us resume what imperialism is: imperialism can be defined as structural violence accompanied by political, military and economic control and intervention.

Control of the United States versus the Middle East is expressed in the five dimensions of Galtung. There is a strong one sided relationship in the economic sphere: While the US is demanding free trade and acknowledgement of the WTO principles it is at the same time providing relatively little structural aid to the region. 15,79 million dollars were given to the region within the year 2003, the most of which was given to Israel and Egypt. At least half of it was used for military buildup and maintenance. About 60 million dollars for military sorties in Iraq and Afghanistan are opposed to this. In the military sphere, the presence of the United States is one motive for Osama bin Laden's call for Jihad. The US has 7.000 troops only in Saudi Arabia (up to 2003). These troops were to be withdrawn in 2003 but so far this has

⁴⁹ Galtung, *Peace and world structure*, 107.

⁵⁰ Galtung, *Peace and world structure*, 107.

not been completed⁵¹. Additionally, there is a clear inequality in terms of power. The United States is disposing of an army of 1.427.000. troops, while Saudi Arabia is disposing of an army of 124.500 troops. And finally, the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with the following presence of American military and military cooperation with states like Egypt and Jordan do raise resentment. Politically, the United States is confronting the region as a “pedagogue”⁵², demanding democratization and political restructuring (e.g. vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority, Afghanistan and Iraq). At the same time there are strong interlinkages with absolutist monarchies like Saudi Arabia. There are attempts on the part of the United States to spread liberal values in the region in the sphere of culture and communication. This might be the causes why the superpower is regarded as arrogant and resentment against the US in particular is fueled.

... and structural violence

Second, I will now go one step further and elaborate more on the concept of structural violence. Structural violence principally both denotes and derives from the existence of gaps in life chances (resources) between two different groups of people which are interconnected as centre and periphery with the ‘centre’ willingly exploiting the imbalance. As said, structural violence is a frequent cause of direct violence

⁵¹ According to an article of the Schweizer Wochenzeitung, 40.000 civilians and a troop of 400 men are deployed as a training mission. The recent data provided by the US government (Department of Defense) differ in comparison to others (for example the homepage of the 54th Signal Battallion, which is stationed on site). According to unofficial accounts, four bases are in existence further on in Saudi Arabia, the homepage of for example the Eskan-Village-Basis in Saudi Arabia is not officially accessible.

⁵² T. Barkawi, ‘On the pedagogy of ‘small wars’’, *International Affairs* 80, no. 1 (2004), 19 – 37, 19.

directed against the center. It can be described as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual⁵³. Tensions are emanating from this difference and tension leads to aggression leads to conflict⁵⁴. Direct violence is emanating from structural violence and is directed against the asymmetric structures of interaction. It is caused by:

„relative deprivation of which [the periphery] is constantly reminded because its rank-disequibrated situation is a part of its day-to-day social existence; this is experienced as basic social injustice“⁵⁵.

There are a number of preconditions to be met for direct violence to emanate from structural violence. There is first the need for an ideology oriented on change based on values, data and hypotheses. An image of the desired future is created out of values, data are used to support the image of the rejected present and can subsume personal experience, and hypotheses are paving the possible way from the rejected present to the desired future⁵⁶. Normally there is also need for a charismatic leader that can bind these resources and provide with orientation. And finally, frustrated expectations are a motivating factor for violence. There has of course to be an increase in the standard of living in the beginning to create expectations to start with. Frustration develops if these life chances are reduced and the growth rate is falling⁵⁷. I think this explanation of violence – even if developed to explain revolution

⁵³ J. Galtung, 'Violence, peace and peace research', *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969), 167 – 191, 168.

⁵⁴ J. Galtung, *A structural theory of revolutions* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974), 67.

⁵⁵ J. Galtung, *Peace and social structure. Essays in Peace Research, Vol. III* (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1978), 280.

⁵⁶ Galtung, *Peace and social structure*, 298.

⁵⁷ Galtung, *Peace and social structure*, 303.

in Latin America – is applicable to the phenomenon of terrorism: Relative economic power (measured in forms of GNI) of the Middle East compared to the United States as well as Europe has been on a dramatic decline within the last century. Whereas in the 1820s the Middle East achieved 49% of the Western GNI nowadays it is stuck with mere 20 percent. This might be attributable to an unequal interaction structure with the West and the United States (but also Europe) in the ‘center’. It is made a part of the daily experience through the constant possibilities of information about life chances in other parts of the worlds, especially the West, through globalizations information infrastructure. Further, a charismatic leader is given with Osama bin Laden, promoting an ideology striving for change. And as Pamuk⁵⁸ is showing, frustrated expectations clearly come into the picture: the per capita growth of GNI in the Middle East had its height in the early 1970s. Since then it has steadily declined. Even if many terrorists are not impoverished themselves, these economic factors are seen as a reason to fight⁵⁹.

Also LaFeber analyses the problem of terrorism as a result of fragmentation within globalization, and as resistance against uneven globalization. Globalization here itself is a result (among others) of the liberal policies of the United States and these are regarded as partly imperialist. The problem of terrorist violence stems from globalization; not from its excesses but its limits. Globalization could produce wealth. But it cannot distribute it either evenly or justly⁶⁰. Globalization is thus understood as a paradoxical process that only partially leads to integration and wealth; it also spreads military presence of the United States and causes fragmentation by

⁵⁸ S. Pamuk, ‘Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East since 1820’, *The Journal of Economic History*, forthcoming.

⁵⁹ Compare Osama bin Ladens 1996 fatwa.

⁶⁰ LaFeber, ‘Post September 11 Debate’, 11.

generating national or local resistance. And because the benefits of globalization are either doubtful or badly distributed, one result is a terrorism that exploits both the globalization and fragmentation⁶¹. Terrorism, beyond that, uses fragmentation as space for development and haven; it also uses support that is to be found within these spaces. Advantages of globalization are used for transnational networking, communication and financing⁶².

„American global primacy is one of the causes of this war“⁶³.

But why is there terrorism especially rampant in the Middle East? The described features match more regions than that. Possibly this can be explained in the longstanding political conflicts – apart from direct interventions - that accompany the situation of imperialism and structural violence. These political reasons do serve as “trigger” events for direct violence and provide justification for violence based on resentment and frustration. The political causes of the conflict between United States and the Arab world are not new.

The conflict is fuelled by support for authoritarian regimes in the region. The Jihadi movement started as opposing the regime in Egypt. Only secondly it turned against the United States which was seen as supporting the regime⁶⁴. This trigger is additionally defined for example in the support for Israel that is seen as occupier of

⁶¹ LaFeber, 'Post September 11 Debate', 12.

⁶² LaFeber, 'Post September 11 Debate', 3.

⁶³ R. K. Betts, 'The soft underbelly of American primacy: Tactical advantages of terror', *Political Sciences Quarterly* 117, no. 1 (2002), 19–36, 20.

⁶⁴ F. A. Gerges, *The far enemy. Why jihad went global* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

the Palestinian lands⁶⁵. Ivo Daalder states that the unsolved conflict between Israel and Palestine, wherein Israel is heavily supported by the United States, is one reason for Anti-Americanism in the Arab world. Terrorism against the US needs Anti-Americanism as environment, as well for recruitment as for support. So, strong and one-sided support for Israel is directly fuelling this phenomenon⁶⁶.

„American involvement in the Middle East is clearly the main impulse of the hatred that has been directed at America. ... by the subsequent American support for Israel and its treatment of the Palestinians, as well as by the direct injection of American power into the region“⁶⁷.

The United States are supporting Israel with military and economic aid to great extent. Since 1976 Israel has been the greatest beneficiary of US foreign aid. Within the past five decades Israel has received more than 80 billion dollar, according to the Congressional Research Service. Until today Israel is remaining the main beneficiary of military and economic aid, which account for 3 billion dollar per year, two thirds of which are for military aims. To groups like Al Qaeda, the United States is the enemy

⁶⁵ D. B. Bobrow, 'America and Terrorism', in *Im Schatten des Terrorismus. Hintergründe, Strukturen, Konsequenzen des 11. September 2001*, eds. P. Bendel, M. Hildebrandt (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002), 185 – 195, 186: „The major sources of terrorist attack were seen as Middle Eastern and North African. ... The motives were arguably to achieve political gains in this world (e.g., a Palestinian state and the isolation and eventual elimination of Israel“ and J. Wanandi, 'A Global Coalition against International Terrorism', *International Security* 26, no. 4 (2002), 184 – 189, 188.

⁶⁶ I. H. Daalder, J. M. Lindsay, 'Nasty, Brutish, and long: America's war on terrorism', *Current History*, Dezember (2001), 403 – 409, 407.

⁶⁷ Z. K. Brzezinski, 'Confronting Anti-American Grievances', online: http://www.aaiusa.org/news/must_read09_01_02.htm, 03.02.02.

because American military power dominates their world and backs Israelis against Muslims⁶⁸. One of the underlying structures of the conflict is thus based on the military and political predominance of the United States outside their own territory, a trait that makes scholars term the US an Empire.

Dynamics of the conflict

So, how is the conflict evolving? The Counterterrorism policies of the United States have been described elsewhere⁶⁹. It can be observed, that the United States has been the most active state in the military sphere over the last couple of years. In its strategy against terrorism three pillars can be detected. They can be described as a military, potentially unilateral one, a multilateral, civil pillar and a national pillar. To varying degree all of these three pillars or dimensions serve the United States' strategy against terrorism. After analysing the United States policy, a strong preference for the unilateral military pillar can be discerned. This includes interventions and the increase of military power. Interventions are especially directed against states that belong to the so called "axis of evil", or are termed "haven states". The military approach is getting clear when looking at the budget of the United States administration: The overall military budget encompasses 419,3 billion in 2006⁷⁰,

⁶⁸ R. K. Betts, 'The soft underbelly of American primacy: Tactical advantages of terror', *Political Sciences Quarterly* 117, no. 1 (2002): 19–36, 29.

⁶⁹ A. C. Beyer, *Die Strategie der Vereinigten Staaten im „War of Terror“* (Berlin: LIT Verlag, forthcoming).

⁷⁰ Budget of the Department of Defense.

military interventions account for 85 billion dollars⁷¹. The Department of Homeland Security receives 34,2 billion. There are 18,5 billion dollars in foreign aid, 5,7 and 3,1 billion for the FBI and the Department of Justice respectively⁷². The measures to counter terrorist financing are worth 100 million dollar. The United States did have a multifactor approach on terrorism. They were getting active in many fields: foreign aid was delivered; there was cooperation with international organizations to counter terrorist financing and to improve international policing and intelligence cooperation as well as border security. Still, the Global War on Terrorism is mainly pursued militarily; the most prominent actions have been the Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. How can a transnational phenomenon be fought this way, i.e. by employing realist assumptions about threat and resolution? The result of these hard power strategies has been a failure of the war on terror. The strategy is supposedly aiming at reduction of terrorism, but results in its increase. These developments are shown by looking at the empirical data.

The data published by the State Department of the United States in (2004) have to be corrected (and this was openly stated by Rumsfeld). The international attacks had tripled in the year 2004 compared to 2003, from 175 attacks to 655⁷³. New numbers so far have not been published, but members of the State Department and the National Counterterrorism Centre are said to have referred to these numbers as “dramatic uptick“. The National Counterterrorism Centre, which was installed by

⁷¹ With ascending tendency, based on L. Bilmes and J. E. Stiglitz, ‘The economic costs of the Iraq war: an appraisal three years after the beginning of the conflict’, online:

http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/cost_of_war_in_iraq.pdf, 02.07.06.

⁷² Budget for programmes connected to homeland security.

⁷³ S. B. Glasser, ‘U.S. Figures Show Sharp Global Rise in Terrorism’, online:

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/26/AR2005042601623.html>, 30.03.06.

President Bush, has counted 3,192 attacks with 28.433 victims. Finally, the data from the RAND Corporation have to be cited. According to this base, there have been 104 international terrorist attacks in 2000, 298 in the year 2002 and 302 in 2005. These data are showing a decrease in the late 1990ies and a strong increase after 2001. I conclude that we can firmly assume that terrorism is on the rise and not decreasing. Experts as Bruce Hoffman additionally refer to a growth in the supporting basis of terrorism since 2001, which can be used for recruitment⁷⁴. Why is that so?

Al Quaida is a global organization and is free of state management or domination. It is a transnational actor that can be classified as a network⁷⁵. Transnational Networks are not only independent from, but also unconfined to any specific state. They are mobile and interconnected. Hubs of the network can be easily moved from one state to another or replaced in case they have been eliminated. Transnational Terrorism thus cannot be effectively countered with the current strategies⁷⁶. Secondly, the war on terror results in a logic of expansion. While networks of resistance can and do operate transnationally, the struggles and the identities of resistance are often born through activists' sense and experience of place - locally⁷⁷. Just this supporting resistances that form a base for transnational terrorism and recruiting potential are increased by military interventions. As causes of terrorism are not addressed, violence to counter it only results in more violence. The

⁷⁴ World Economic Forum, 'Outlook on Terrorism in 2005', online:

http://www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/_S12468?open&event_id=, 02.07.06.

⁷⁵ A. Kuhlmann, 'Terroristische Netzwerke. Bekämpfung mit Netzwerken', in: *Aspekte der nachrichtendienstlichen Sicherheitsarchitektur*, ed. G. Korte (Brühl: Fachhochschule des Bundes für öffentliche Verwaltung, 2005), 113.

⁷⁶ N. Ettliger and F. Bosco, 'Thinking Through Networks and Their Spatiality: A Critique of the US (Public) War on Terrorism and Its Geographic Discourse', *Antipode* 36, no. 2 (2004), 249 – 271.

⁷⁷ Ettliger and Bosco, 'Thinking Through Networks', 258.

personal and motivational resources of terrorism are not being limited as it is alleged. Instead they are increasing. Thus the conflict and violence that is attempted to be eliminated is growing and intensifying.

Conclusion

There are two forms of violent globalism to be detected in current world affairs. One is pursued by the strife for hegemony by violent means from sides of the US. The other can be understood as the reaction to this especially stemming from the Middle East in form of transnational terrorism. Whereas the one is described as “Empire” the other is named “new terrorism”. Both are using violence instead of power to shape and refigure the state of the world as we can currently observe it or as is intended from the opposing side. Thus both are responding to each other, communicating with each other and pushing each other forward. These globalisms are less end states than processes and they might be a natural outcome and feature of globalization, as the long held thought that globalization would be free of violence is naïve. Violence is thus becoming a part as well as driving and shaping force of globalization. History does not tend to evolve in a strictly linear fashion and we should not expect globalization to depart from this general rule. Violence has shifted and changed too, but has become now much more visibly an externality and part of it. Violence as an element of Empire might produce more counter violence as expressed in international terrorism. Social movements might join and eventually trigger some kind of global change, maybe revolutionary⁷⁸. We don’t know. But we as well might need benign hegemony to secure a stable world.

⁷⁸ A. K. Webb, ‘The Calm Before the Storm? Revolutionary Pressures and Global Governance’, *International Political Science Review* 27, no. 1 (2006), 73 – 92.