

Hegemonic Governance

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This article reflects on the United States within a system of global governance, a role which I understand as one of a hegemon. I will define hegemony in the first part, as well as how to measure it. Secondly, the concept of global governance will be looked at, and finally the arguments for hegemony within global governance will be presented.

Hegemony

Hegemony according to the Greek root of the word 'egemon' is the dominance of a state over another¹, it means literally the "leader, ruler, often in the sense of a state other than his own"². Hereby, already an international perspective is implied, to which we will return after looking at the also very common use of the term according to Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci describes hegemony as "a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership. It is the organisation of consent."³ Gramsci first thought about the hegemony of the working class and how it be achieved, yet later shifted to analyzing the hegemony of the bourgeois class⁴. Within this later use of hegemony he introduced the idea of oppression or coercion, hegemony being based on "a combination of force and consent"⁵. The hegemon would always attempt to make his leadership to appear consensual, even if it was based on force⁶. He mentions that the application of force without the provision of leadership (i.e. with the lack of consensus) does not qualify as hegemony but is a form of 'dictatorship', an argument which later on will lead us to the concept of 'Empire': "It is one of the cases in which these groups have the function of 'domination' without that of 'leadership': dictatorship without hegemony." I

¹ Gilpin, Robert (2004): A Realist Perspective on International Governance, in: Held, David; Anthony McGrew (eds.): Governing Globalization, Cambridge: Polity Press, 237 - 248, 116.

² Williams, Raymond (1985): Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Revised Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 144.

³ Simon, Roger (1991): Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction, London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, 22.

⁴ Engel, Susan (2006): Where to Neoliberalism? The World Bank and the Post-Washington Consensus in Indonesia and Vietnam, paper presented to the 16th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Wollongong 26 June - 29 June, online:

<http://coombs.anu.edu.au/SpecialProj/ASAA/biennial-conference/2006/Engel-Susan-ASAA2006.pdf>, accessed 21.01.07, 2.

⁵ Ibd.

⁶ Cuneo, Carl: Hegemony in Gramsci's Original Prison Notebooks, online: <http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/soc/courses/soc2r3/gramsci/gramheg.htm>, accessed 21.01.07.

will therefore in the following understand hegemony as the exercise of power by a superior actor. I speak of hegemony as long as it is based on consensus, but will in a later chapter argue that we deal with Empire as soon as the consensus is lost.

Different from the usage proposed here, Gramsci used hegemony basically to describe relations within the national state even if he was not totally restricted to the national state in his analysis. It was the Neo-Gramscian approach developed by Robert W. Cox which transferred the idea of hegemony to the international level.

In his article “Whatever Happened to American Decline? International Relations and the New United States Hegemony”⁷ he develops a ‘security-based theory of hegemony’. He bases hegemony on military and economic power, it is exerted by control, yet not absolute control, and implies the provision of stability: “There were limits to its power, but it is inconceivable to imagine the restoration and maintenance of international stability in the post-war period without it.”⁸ Hegemony of the United States contributed to world order by opposing the enemies of capitalism in the Cold War via containment, it rebuilt post-war Europe by providing financial aid with the Marshall plan, it stabilized Asia and aided prosperity in the region. Apart from that, the United States created and essentially maintained a new international financial system and promoted the liberalization of markets on a global scale⁹.

The United States as hegemony after the end of the Cold War are described by Cox in terms of unipolarity which is expressed in surmounting economic and military capabilities:

“If the establishment of a unipolar world without serious opposition within it to the United States laid the basis for American self-confidence in the 1990s, the long boom which began in 1992 and continued more or less without disturbance until the ‘troubles’ of 2001 gave it material meaning. ... [This was accompanied by] the collapse of the idea of the ‘Pacific Century’ and with it the almost complete disintegration of the once popular (or unpopular) view that Japan represented a serious threat to US economic hegemony. ... Finally, any assessment of the new American hegemony has to take account of that most important instrument of power - the military capabilities needed to deter enemies, control allies, preserve influence

⁷ Cox, Michael (2001): Whatever Happened to American Decline? International Relations and the New United States Hegemony, in: New Political Economy, Vol. 6, No. 2, 311 – 340.

⁸ Cox 2001, 315.

⁹ Ibd.

and, if needs be, win wars. Here the collapse of the USSR and the inability of other countries to justify military spending to sceptical publics only emphasised the extent of US preponderance. ... In comparison to its many dependent allies (and largely backward rivals) it was simply in a league of its own.”¹⁰

Apart from – before and since - Cox, a great number of scholars refer to the United States as a hegemon¹¹. As one of the few scholars Wilkinson rejects the hegemony thesis.

Wilkinson contends that “the current power configuration of the world system is unipolarity without hegemony”¹². He understands hegemony as inequality in a relationship of influence that might be based on coercion or consensus, commerce or legitimacy. His argument, that there is unipolarity (which he defends) but not hegemony is based on the observation that the ‘preponderant capability’ is not matched by ‘predominant influence’. To measure this non-existence of ‘mastership’ he proposes the following criteria: investiture, installation, appointment and deposition of local governments; adjudication, maintenance of order in the international system; convocation, command, veto, subsidy, tribute and conversion¹³. It derives from these criteria, that for example local governments would have to be legitimized and even appointed by the hegemon, he would have to be a ‘stabilizer’ in the sense that he suppresses or solves local wars and conflicts by his intervention and the hegemon would train local elites and have high command over the collective actions of the armed forces of the states. This obviously is a very demanding and overly thick description of hegemony, according to which hegemony rarely has been achieved by

¹⁰ Cox 2001, 329 – 331.

¹¹ Robinson, William (1996): *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Evans, Tony (1996): *US hegemony and the project of universal human rights*, New York: St. Martins Press; Weber, Cynthia (1999): *Faking It: U.s Hegemony in a "Post-Phallic" Era*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Wade, Robert (2002): *US hegemony and the World Bank: the fight over people and ideas*, in : *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 215 – 293; Posen, Barry (2003): *Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony*, in: *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 5 - 46; Foot, Rosemary, Neil MacFarlane, Michael Mastanduno (eds., 2003): *US Hegemony and International Organizations*, New York: Oxford University Press; Owen, John (2003) *Why American Hegemony is Here to Stay*, online: fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/PAXAMERICANA/OWEN.PDF; and Bromley, Simon (2003): *Reflections on Empire, Imperialism and United States Hegemony*, in: *Historical Materialism*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 17 - 68, to name a few.

¹² Wilkinson, David (1999): *Unipolarity without Hegemony*, in: *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, *Prospects for International Relations: Conjectures about the Next Millennium*, 141-172, 141.

¹³ Wilkinson 1999, 143f.

unipolar states before¹⁴. Even if regarding to some criteria the US qualifies sometimes and in some regions as a hegemon, according to Wilkinson it is not understood as a system-wide hegemon. His conceptualization and discussion of hegemony is indeed interesting, but differs vastly from the common usage of the term (see above). Thus it will not be taken into further consideration for this work.

If we reject Wilkinson's concept, we will have to find other measurements of hegemony. What exactly now is hegemony based on? It can be understood as a combination of a set of structural features as well as actors characteristics and behavioural features. The structural feature refers to the position in the world system and according to the normal use in the literature is clearly based on unipolarity (within a certain regional frame or even within the whole international system). Unipolarity implies domination (i.e. the command of great power, but not necessarily outright control by itself¹⁵). But further unipolarity is enacted in certain ways.

Power is exerted by means of soft power – such as ideology - or the application of 'sticky' and hard power and force. Whereas soft power use results in influence and thus the capacity to 'affect policies and behaviours of other states', sticky and hard power result in control meaning force and coercion or the 'ability to achieve goals even in the face of opposition'¹⁶. I will in the following refer to Wartenberg in order to explain my use of the term power. Wartenberg distinguishes in force, coercion, and influence to describe forms of power and understands domination as the continuous exert of power over another actor.

Domination

In international relations thinking domination is based on the command of superior power resources (capabilities) that imply the possibility but do not in itself lead to control¹⁷. The structure of domination is commonly referred to in terms of polarity in order to describe the centre of domination and the number of dominating powers. With regards to the current world system it is generally spoken of as unipolarity, meaning that there is one dominant power in the whole system (i.e. the United States). Unipolarity is neither the only possible configuration nor will it be

¹⁴ Wilkinson 1999, 153.

¹⁵ Wartenberg, Thomas (1990): *The Forms of Power: From Domination to Transformation*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 91.

¹⁶ I want to thank the anonymous reviewer for very valuable clarification at this point.

¹⁷ The resource must be used in order to exert power, this then can result in control.

everlasting¹⁸. We have already lived through different constellations of polarity.

Unipolarity is generally measured in terms of relative capabilities resp. the distribution of capabilities in the system: “The structure of the system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units”¹⁹. Capabilities in the Waltzian understanding exclude factors such as ideology, propensity to peace, aggressiveness and so forth. They refer to issues such as “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”²⁰. According to these measurements, it is generally assumed that the United States are a unipolar power.

“The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s transformed the international system from one of bipolarity to unipolarity. ... the post-Cold War order has been marked by the preponderant power of the United States.”²¹

„American global power – military, economic, technological, cultural and political – is one of the great realities of our age. Never before has one country been so powerful and unrivaled. ... The world has entered the age of American unipolarity.”²²

„If today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will.”²³

Unipolarity is generally equalled with superior power. Capabilities²⁴ are thought to directly translate into power, yet not necessarily absolute control²⁵. For debating different forms of application and exertion of power, I will apply the conceptualizations of Wartenberg here. Wartenberg in his book “The Forms of Power” argues for the use of the term domination in case power is applied in a habitual way. “‘Domination’ refers not to a single exercise of power but to a *relationship* between two social

¹⁸ As some authors argue, for example Immanuel Wallerstein.

¹⁹ Waltz, Kenneth (1979): Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House, 97.

²⁰ Waltz 1979, 131.

²¹ McInerney, Luke: Unipolarity in post-Cold War International Politics, online: <http://www.anselm.edu/NR/rdonlyres/FC460641-E210-4AC7-9401-E470E25B9FAC/1259/20021.pdf>, accessed: 21.01.07, 1.

²² Ikenberry, John (2005): Power and liberal order: America’s postwar world order in transition, in: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 5, No. 2, 133 – 152, 133.

²³ Brooks, Stephen; William Wohlforth (2002): American Primacy in Perspective, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, no. 4, 20 – 33, 21.

²⁴ Keohane and Nye refer to ‘resource power’ to describe the possession of resource that allow one actor to achieve his aims. Keohane, Robert; Joseph Nye (2001): Power and Interdependence. New York a.o.: Longman, 220.

²⁵ Waltz 1979, 130.

agents that is constituted by the existence of a power differential between them”²⁶. Power itself according to Wartenberg can be distinguished in three forms: influence, coercion and force.

Force

“An exercise of power by an agent *A* over an agent *B* is an exercise of *force* if and only if *A* physically keeps *B* from pursuing the action-alternative that *B* wishes to pursue or causes a certain behaviour to apply to *B* that *B* would avoid if possible. Force achieves its ends by keeping an agent from doing what she wishes. An exercise of force relies on the physical ability of an agent to keep another agent from doing what she would prefer to do or to get something to happen to the agent that she would prefer did not.”²⁷

Force thus equals the application of hard power. It can be found in international relations in the form of interstate war (intrastate wars by definition are not a form of international force, even if international involvement is possible and international effects are frequent) or intervention (one state wages war against another without the other states responding in kind). Terrorism can be discussed as a form of international force; it usually implies the perpetrator not being a state²⁸ but the application of force being political, thus it is often directed at a state. Of course, a number of alternative constellations are possible, ‘state terrorism’ being one of them. Force further can be equalled with violence²⁹. Whereas most IR scholars equal violence with power Hannah Arendt describes them as their opposite (Arendt 1996). Violence according to Arendt is not just an extreme form of power. Power instead is understood as a group phenomenon, whereas violence can be individual. This is based on an understanding of power close to the concept of soft power, as termed by Joseph Nye, existing only due to consent, support, even legitimacy of those affected by it. There is no power of an individual without a group that attributes this power to this individual and supports it. Power can be interpreted as the situation ‘all against one’ whereas violence refers to ‘one against all’. Whereas power is leadership

²⁶ Wartenberg 1990, 117.

²⁷ Wartenberg 1990, 93.

²⁸ Hoffman, Bruce (1998): Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 43.

²⁹ Compare Arendt, Hannah (1996): Macht und Gewalt, Munich: Piper.

resting on support, violence is a mere tool used to achieve aims and generally shows itself just where power is lacking (as otherwise there would be no need for violence). It can principally be defined as the use of physical, but also other forms of, force used to reshape the behaviour of others according to one's own intention. Generally, violence is lacking consensus and does confront opposition.

Coercion

“Coercive power ... targets the set of action-alternatives that constitutes one aspect of an agent's action environment. When an agent is in a position to threaten to use a resource or ability [and by these means affects] the action-alternatives of another agent, then the agent can exercise coercive power.”³⁰ Coercive power is exercised if inequality in power resources can be used to threaten another actor and if this threat results in adaptation or behavioural change in the threatened actor.

We thus only speak of coercion when compliance from side of the affected actor can be observed. Both force as well as coercion is oftentimes responded to with resistance³¹. Keohane and and Nye describe coercion (interestingly they do not speak of force in their discussion of power) as a form of behavioural power, hard power. Hard power can be exerted by the use of military or economic means and it is understood as the “ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do through threat of punishment or promise of reward”³².

Influence

“In general, the distinctive feature of influence is that it occurs through the acceptance by the subordinate agent of something that the dominant agent tells her. In moving from force through coercive power to influence, one moves from a non-discursive form to a purely discursive one. Influence is a pure form of communicative interaction, one in which no non-discursive action is involved.”³³

Influence results in compliance while it is matched by acceptation or consent from

³⁰ Wartenberg 1990, 96.

³¹ Wartenberg 1990, 102.

³² Keohane and Nye 2001, 220.

³³ Wartenberg 1990, 104f.

sides of the affected actor. Power here thus is used in a 'legitimate' way. It has the approval of the affected actor. If this approval is based on misperception or is well-informed does not matter for the concept of influence (even if it seems clear which form of power is the ethically superior form). Influence in IR terms can be described as 'soft power'. The term was coined by Joseph Nye to describe power resting on "attraction rather than coercion. ... because the others want what you want"³⁴.

All of the forms of power mentioned can be found in global politics and particularly within global governance.

I will now give a short elaboration on how global governance can be understood and will then go on to establish in how far control, domination and influence by the US are to be found within this new configuration of international politics.

Global governance – a definition

The term global governance does have many authors and protagonists. Among them is for example James Rosenau, who together with Steve Smith and Ernst-Otto Czempiel 1992 published an edited volume under the title „Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics“³⁵. Rosenau is the most popular protagonist of a „diagnostic concept of Global Governance“³⁶. Overall the concept remains empirical, is not normative or prescriptive and provides with a description of real processes of change in the international system³⁷. Rosenau differentiates in his analysis between government and governance. Whereas government is based on formal power, legally defined and having the monopoly of force, governance describes a system of rules that – given the absence of a central power – is carried out by a diversity of actors on different levels. The concept of global governance thus refers to more than the formal institutions and organizations that have been established in order to regulate international relations. It encompasses informal and formal structures and systems of order on all levels of human action. A criterion to subsume these structures and systems of order under global governance is, that it

³⁴ Keohane and Nye 2001, 220.

³⁵ Rosenau, James, Steve Smith, Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1992): Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³⁶ Brand, Ulrich, Achim Brunnengräber, Lutz Schrader (2000): Global Governance: Alternative zur neoliberalen Globalisierung?, Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 29.

³⁷ Ibd.

does exert control and that this has a transnational effect³⁸.

Another important point of reference when writing about Governance without Government is the Commission on Global Governance (CGG), which was founded in 1990 after the initiative of Willy Brandt and worked under the umbrella of the United Nations. It produced the report „Our Global Neighbourhood“³⁹. This publication together with the book by Rosenau is the most important early contribution to the discussion on Global Governance and is cited even today.

The CGG in its report first did describe the processes of transformation of the preceding decades. It describes the end of Cold War bipolar confrontation as one of the major changes, decolonialization and the revolution within the communication sector, immense growth within the worldwide productivity and tendencies of integration to a common world market. The existing institutions are considered inadequate in order to solve problems as poverty, instability, environmental degradation and violence effectively. Global governance there is understood as the sum of the regulatory processes that are pursued by public and private institutions and individuals regarding their common problems. Global governance thus encompasses as well formal institutions and systems of rule as informal regulations. It can be described as a continuous process which is marked by balance of interests and cooperation.

Both concepts were the basis for the further debates on global governance, from which as a working definition Volker Rittberger will be cited here:

‘States, international organizations ... participate at different levels and in different constellations in the complex process of creation and implementation of international rules with global claim for validity’⁴⁰

In the common understanding actors within global governance can be states, international organizations⁴¹, state-member clubs, non-governmental organizations⁴², transnational companies and so forth. As institutions of global governance usually

³⁸ Brand et al. 2000, 30.

³⁹ Commission on Global Governance (1999): Our Global Neighbourhood, New York: Oxford University Press.

⁴⁰ Rittberger, Volker (2003): Internationale Organisationen – Politik und Geschichte. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 245.

⁴¹ States and international organizations are generally understood as the main actors within global governance.

⁴² For a discussion on the possible role of NGOs in global governance see: Beyer, Cornelia (forthcoming): NGOs as Motors of Change, in: Government and Opposition.

count: international law, general and specific norms, and international regimes. Finally, forms of conduct within global governance can be unilateral policies⁴³, multilateral resp. intergovernmental policies, public-private cooperations and purely private forms of cooperation.

Global Governance in International Relations Theory

Global governance refers as well to concept as to a reality. The concept deals with considerations on how international governance should be established and which form it should take. Of course, different theories of International Relations have different views and perspectives on this issue. Realism does not know global governance as such⁴⁴. It assumes anarchy in international relations and the only way to establish order apart from Neorealism's 'balance' is a hegemon that provides for stability⁴⁵. Apart from this, Realism does not know global governance as anarchy is dominating the international system of states. States face each other in unregulated relations and thus states generally have to fear and defend against each other. There is no superior power or authority or possibilities of cooperation in order to get away with anarchy. Anarchy is the state of nature and it cannot be replaced just by the interactions of states alone. However, there is one possibility that anarchy might be transformed. Transformation is taking place, when one state is getting powerful to an extent so that he can control other states and sanctionize aberrant behaviour. In this case we can speak of hegemony⁴⁶. Hegemonic stability explains that if there is one very powerful state in the system, other states will follow suit and can be sanctioned, positively and negatively⁴⁷. Gilpin in his writing about hegemony explicitly uses the term 'governance of the international system'⁴⁸.

Another very influential approach for the study of global governance is Institutionalism or Functionalism. These approaches see order that provides security

⁴³ Woods, Ngaire (2004): Global Governance and the Role of Institutions, in: Held and McGrew 2004, 25 – 45, 38.

⁴⁴ Gilpin, Robert (2004): A Realist Perspective on International Governance, in: Held and McGrew 2004, 237 - 248.

⁴⁵ Jervis, Robert (1978): Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, in: World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 167 – 214, 167.

⁴⁶ Jervis here refers to a 'sovereign', thus a world state, which would transform the international system. Jervis 1978, 167.

⁴⁷ Kindleberger, Charles (1981): Dominance and leadership in the international economy, in: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, 242 – 54, and Gilpin, Robert (1981): War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 29.

⁴⁸ Gilpin 1981, 29.

as an outcome of institutions that are created to cope with interdependence. Institutions thus take over the role of the hegemon (known from Realism) but are also characterized by functions that we know from security communities. For example, they stabilize expectations, ensure compliance and form identities. Institutions – so institutionalists – can enable order and regulate the cohabitation of states⁴⁹. Within Functionalism, the concept of ‘security communities’ became prominent. The concept was developed for example by Karl Deutsch and Emanuel Adler⁵⁰. It describes that states develop rules from the interaction with each other, these rules provide with security and stable expectations and thus anarchy is transformed. Within a long process of socialization and mutual learning, rules get established and common identities formed, which are the basis for peaceful relations among states. Finally, liberal approaches assume that conflict is not a necessary attribute of international relations. A special motivating factor for peace is trade as well as interdependence. In the case that states are coupled to each other in webs of mutual dependence and exchange, violent conflict would violate their cost-benefit-calculations and is thus not to be expected⁵¹. Also, the bottom-up processes in democratic societies would be opposed to wars and thus promote peace. According to these assumptions, liberals would argue that global governance is a rational outcome of interdependence, trade and democracy.

Concepts of Global Governance

Principally, all concepts of global governance rest on the idea of regulation beyond the nation state. Within these concepts, different levels are focused at and different actors are described as regulators. In order to separate the concepts regarding their systemic description, Brühl and Rittberger are a point of reference. Brühl and Rittberger⁵² do differentiate in three different versions of Global Governance:

⁴⁹ See also Imber, Mark (2004): Functionalism, in: Held and McGrew 2004, 305 – 324.

⁵⁰ For a discussion of the evolution of Adlers ideas see: Beyer, Cornelia (2005): A Presentation of Emanuel Adler’s Concepts of Integration, in: Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1 – 20, online: <http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume4/number3/beyer.pdf>, accessed 21.01.07.

⁵¹ See for example Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 4, Special Issue on Trade and Conflict. Some authors argue to the opposite that trade-related disputes might induce wars.

⁵² Brühl, Tanja, Volker Rittberger (2001): From International to Global Governance: Actors, Collective Decision-Making, and the United Nations in the World of the Twenty-first Century, in: Volker Rittberger (ed.): Global Governance and the United Nations System, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1–47.

'authoritative coordination by a world state', 'hierarchical though not authoritative coordination: Governance under the hegemonic umbrella' and 'order as a result of horizontal self-coordination: Governance without world government'.

Authoritative coordination by a world state

This concept connects the term global governance with the idea of a world state. Its supporters argue that coordination and cooperation cannot be expected under the condition of anarchy that marks the international system. As long as states within anarchy have to fear for their security and there is no mutual expectation of peaceful change, cooperation will be the exception. The system of anarchy thus can only be transformed by a system of negative sanctions which have to be imposed by a superior authority – a leviathan. This leviathan would have a certain protective function vis a vis the states and by his negative potential of sanction would control the behaviour of the states. Thus, it would create stable expectations and thus enable cooperation. A well known model how this leviathan can be imagined and thought about – not as a centrally organized entity or marked by top-down processes but characterized by regional formation and subsidiarity – was provided by Otfried Höffe⁵³. Usually the model is criticized as follows: a common leviathan – if the problem of his establishment could ever be solved – would most likely fail to meet democratic standards. For one, there is no global demos that could serve as a legitimizing basis for global rule. In the medium term, too, this demos will in all likelihood fail to develop. Also the question of accountability – Who could take over this superior power position and be legitimate? – and the question of possible misuse – How such superior power could be checked against? – are posed. Yet, Alexander Wendt argues that the development of a world state – at least in the long run – is inevitable⁵⁴.

From other authors, the possibility of world government – in analogy to national governments – is negated: „world government during our lifetimes seems highly unlikely, at least in the absence of an overwhelming global threat that could only be dealt with in a unified way“⁵⁵. This is justified with the lack of support from sides of the

⁵³ Höffe, Otfried (1999): *Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*, 2.nd. edition, München: Beck.

⁵⁴ Wendt, Alexander (2003): *Why a World State is Inevitable*, in: *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 491 – 542.

⁵⁵ Nye, Joseph, John Donahue (2000): *Introduction*, in: Nye, Joseph, John Donahue (eds): *Governance in a Globalizing World*, Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1 – 44, 13.

national populations for such an idea. Global governance much more was to be understood as a 'networked minimalism'⁵⁶, not as a set of hierarchies. Minimalism also refers to the fact that global governance never could go beyond the nationally accepted.

Order as a result of horizontal self-coordination: Governance without government

This is the most common model for global governance. It refers to the possibility of coordination out of the logic of appropriateness alone. There does not need for control or sanctioning mechanisms by a superior power, states will be rational enough to cooperate: „In this model, the coordination of international activities is affected by states agreeing, for their mutual benefit, upon norms and rules to guide their future behaviour and to create mechanisms which make compliance with these rules and norms possible (i.e. in each actor's self-interest)⁵⁷

Hierarchical but not authoritative coordination

This model describes – just as the model of the world state – that there is one superior power that takes over leadership and provides with security in order to facilitate cooperation. The difference to the former model of world stateness is that the authority here is not exercised by a sovereign world state (that would have to be created) but a hegemon (already in existence, I argue). This hegemon as well does have the power of negative and positive sanction and can thus establish stable expectations. He would thus be an equivalent (yet a weaker one) to supranational authority. International relations under a hegemon are not institutionalized, centralized and hierarchic to an extent comparable to a world state. Yet, due to his superior power resources the hegemon has at its disposal, he provides over the means to establish international norms and rules and can enforce compliance⁵⁸. Problems with this model (or reality, as I argue) are apparent. Of course the hegemon will serve his own interests first. This implies that the objectively optimal result will generally not be achieved, but partially optimal results will be pursued. Ideally, the hegemon would have to understand the solution of international problems

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Brühl and Rittberger 2001, 27.

⁵⁸ Brühl and Rittberger 2001, 26, here referred to in abstract terms.

and the promotion of global governance as being in his own interest. And finally, the problem of stability is posed: Hegemony in general is a temporary phenomenon in international affairs⁵⁹. Hegemons develop according to cycles, including formation, growth and decline. So, the stability of this model is endangered.

Hegemonic Governance

I will refer to 'hegemonic governance' when speaking about global governance. With this term I try to give credit to the power relations that are present within global governance. Hegemonic governance therefore implies that international or global governance is not free of asymmetries but is marked by hierarchies and the application of power. How power, particularly by the United States, is exerted within global governance will be described in the following.

Unipolarity as the Foundation for Domination

The United States have reached a position in the international political system that no other state has known before⁶⁰. Kupchan writes about the 'unipolar moment'⁶¹, Ikenberry about the 'American unipolar age'⁶². Unipolarity in the following is measured according to different criteria proposed by Waltz.

Size of population and territory

The United States is the "world's third-largest country by size (after Russia and Canada) and by population (after China and India)"⁶³. It is located between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean which makes it less vulnerable to conventional military attacks. Its huge population is overall very well educated and provides for a very effective and competitive workforce with about 60 percent of women participating⁶⁴. The competitiveness of the workforce is also based on the fact that United States

⁵⁹ Compare Wilinon 1999 and Gilpin 1981.

⁶⁰ Ikenberry, John (2001): American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy, in: Review of International Studies, Vol. 27, Supp., 191 – 212, 191.

⁶¹ Kupchan, Charles (2003): The end of the American era: US foreign policy and the geopolitics of the twenty-first century. 2.nd. edition, New York: Knopf, 58.

⁶² Ikenberry, John (2004): Liberalism and empire: logics of order in the American unipolar age, in: Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, 609 – 630.

⁶³ Central Intelligence Agency (2007): The World Factbook: United States, online: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html>, accessed 21.01.07.

⁶⁴ Karoly, Lynn; Konstantijn Panis (tba): The 21st Century at Work, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 11.

attracts the elite of foreign students and scientists⁶⁵. Apart from human resources, the United States also provide over natural resources:

Resource endowment

The United States are tremendously dependent on natural geologic energy resources such as oil, gas and coal. In the year 2004, it used more than 7 billion barrels of oil, for example, and forecasts predict the need for resources will continue to grow.⁶⁶

The United States itself is estimated to provide over 47 billions of barrels of oil, 622 trillions of cubic feet of Gas and 11 billions of barrels of liquid Gas⁶⁷. In comparison: China provides over 16 billions of barrels of oil and 53 billions of cubic feet of gas⁶⁸. The US further imports large amounts of resources, particularly oil, from Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq and Angola (among others⁶⁹). This amounts up to nearly 10 million barrels per day, compared to 3 million barrels that are imported by China.

Economics

“The US has the largest and most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of \$43,500.”⁷⁰ Its economy is essentially based on services (estimated 78.6% of the GDP in 2006) which give it a competitive edge over other industry-based economies. In comparison: China produces 40% of the GDP with industrial production and only 48% in the services sector. The total estimated GDP of the US for 2006 was \$13.22 trillion compared to \$ 2,5 trillion for China⁷¹.

The United States hold 27% of the world’s production, which equals the sum of the three next biggest economies: Japan, Germany and France. 59 out of the hundred biggest enterprises in the world are based in the United States (compared to 31 in Europe and 7 in Japan). 219 of the biggest 500 enterprises worldwide are American,

⁶⁵ For a critical discussion of this issue see National Science Foundation: United States Still Leads in Science and Engineering, But Uncertainties Complicate Outlook, online: http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=100377, accessed 21.01.07.

⁶⁶ U.S. Department of the Interior: The U.S. Geological Survey Energy Resources Program, online: <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3128/>, accessed 21.01.07.

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of the Interior: 2005 Assessment Updates, online: http://energy.cr.usgs.gov/oilgas/noga/ass_updates.html, accessed 21.01.07.

⁶⁸ Central Intelligence Agency (2007a): The World Factbook: China, online: <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html>, accessed 21.01.07.

⁶⁹ Energy Information Administration: Crude Oil and Total Petrol Imports Top 15 Countries, online: http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import_t.html, accessed 21.01.07.

⁷⁰ Central Intelligence Agency 2007a.

⁷¹ In purchasing power, China and the United States GDP interestingly are roughly the same.

compared to 158 European and 77 Japanese⁷².

The United States foreign investments as well as foreign investments in the US double the share of investments in and from the next largest country in this regard, Great Britain. Half of the ten leading investment banks are American. The American E-Commerce is three times as large as the European one and the seven biggest software firms are American⁷³. The majority of big brands as well as the leading business schools are American. The list goes on like this.

Apart from that, the dollar is the global leading currency⁷⁴.

This leads Brooks and Wohlforth to the conclusion that “America’s economic dominance, meanwhile – relative to either the next several richest powers or the rest of the world combined – surpasses that of any power in modern history”⁷⁵. This economic preponderance is the basis for the United States military power.

Military

„The United States has overwhelming nuclear superiority, the world’s dominant air force, the only truly blue-water navy, and a unique capability to project power around the globe”⁷⁶. Overall, the United States in 2003 spent more on defence than the “next 15 to 20 biggest spenders combined”⁷⁷ and these figures are on the rise since. This is accompanied by comparably high expenditures in the realm of research and development (R&D)⁷⁸.

The forces of the United States military are technologically very advanced, present in many regions of the world⁷⁹, and even where they are not aviation forces of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are capable of “rapid employment worldwide”⁸⁰.

Under the current Bush administration, this military supremacy is understood as the basis for American power and is going to be even more strengthened. Its strategy is

⁷² Nye, Joseph (2003): Amerikas Macht. In: Speck, Ulrich; Natan Sznaieder (eds.): Empire Amerika. München: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 156 – 172, 162.

⁷³ Ibd.

⁷⁴ Kapstein, Ethan, Michael Mastanduno (eds. 1999): Unipolar politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press, 473. Yet, it was argued that in financial terms the United States is highly dependent from China and Japan, see Murphy, Taggart (2006): East Asia’s Dollars, in: New Left Review, No. 40, 39 – 64.

⁷⁵ Brooks and Wohlforth 2002, 22.

⁷⁶ Brooks and Wohlforth 2002, 21.

⁷⁷ Ibd.

⁷⁸ Kupchan, Charles (2003): The end of the American era: US foreign policy and the geopolitics of the twenty-first century, 2.nd. edition, New York: Knopf, 58.

⁷⁹ Compare: An Internet Guide to United States Military Bases Around the World, online: <http://www.libsci.sc.edu/bob/class/clis734/webguides/milbase.htm>, accessed 21.01.07.

⁸⁰ See for example: United States Air Force: Air Combat Command, online: <http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=137>, accessed 21.01.07.

based on the ideas that the deployment of military force must serve American interests, that it should encompass the whole globe and thus enable the United States to exert power everywhere, anytime and under any circumstances it wishes, and shall be perpetual in the sense that technological and scientific progress will ensure that American military primacy is here to stay⁸¹.

Furthermore, the United States are politically highly stable (with no major disruptions⁸² since the past century). On how finally competence is to be measured remains uncertain as Waltz does not elaborate on this question.

It can be seen, that the United States has a predominant position simultaneously nearly in all criteria, which distinguishes it from former poles in the system⁸³.

The reader might argue against understanding the US as a unipolar power, given its economic challengers China and Europe and the financial (inter)dependencies given in the former relation.

Wallerstein argues along these lines and actually explains the ever more unilateralist and aggressive foreign policies of the United States with their supposedly to be observed decline as a unipolar power:

“From 1945 until around 1970 the US exercised unquestioned hegemony in the world-system. This began to decline during the period between 1970 and 2001, but the extent of the decline was limited by the strategy that the US evolved to delay and minimize the effects of its loss of ascendancy. Since 2001 the US has sought to recuperate its standing by more unilateralist policies, which have, however, boomeranged - indeed actually accelerating the speed and depth of its decline”⁸⁴.

This might be true and even will support my further argument. Yet, arguing with Waltz, I contend that the United States still is a polar power and the superior one in the current world system. This polarity is mainly based on its military capabilities,

⁸¹ Klare, Michael: America's military revolution, online: <http://mondediplo.com/2001/07/04america2>, accessed 21.01.07.

⁸² Such as revolutions, intra-state wars, coups etc. Some authors, I am sure, would argue against the latter with regards to the 2000 elections or 911, for example. Yet as even the 'stolen election' did not lead to major political disturbances *within* the United States, it will not be regarded here as relevant for the argument. How 911 fits in this picture in the opinion of the author needs further discussion.

⁸³ Brooks and Wohlforth 2002, 23.

⁸⁴ Wallerstein, Immanuel (2006): The Curve of American Power, online: <http://newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=2627>, accessed 21.01.07.

then its economics, resources and political features.

“If the different capabilities of a nation no longer reinforce each other, one can focus on a nation’s strengths and overlook its weaknesses. Nations are then said to be superpowers even though they have only some of the previously required characteristics. ... We need only rank them roughly by capability.”⁸⁵.

The exertion of power in Global Governance

Force

Force generally is not discussed as an element of global governance⁸⁶. Force within global governance is however applied. Within this discussion of power in global governance I will only refer to the use of force which takes place in a multilateral framework and come to unilateral use of force later in the discussion about Empire.

Interventions with peacekeeping forces are one of the most common forms of application of force within global governance, interventions of the world community under the leadership of the United Nations are a regular feature of international politics. They serve to stabilize peace particularly in intra-state conflict regions⁸⁷. Currently, as of December 2006, there are 18 ongoing missions under the auspices of the United Nations. Generally, these missions are strongly supported by European powers but not the United States⁸⁸.

To give an example, UNAMSIL (from 2005 to 2006 UNIOSIL) was one of the largest UN peacekeeping missions in the world with 17.000 troops, 90 UN police forces, 320 international civilian participants and 550 local civilians⁸⁹. Whereas a large number of states support this mission with troops - Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Croatia, Egypt, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan,

⁸⁵ Waltz 1979, 130f.

⁸⁶ Generally, security issues within global governance are generally undertheorized, as an exception see Pugh, Michael (2004): *Maintaining Peace and Security*, in: Held and McGrew 2004; and Elke Krahmhann (different works).

⁸⁷ United Nations: *United Nations Peacekeeping*, online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/>, accessed 21.01.07.

⁸⁸ Adebajo, Adekeye: *Collective Security and Humanitarian Intervention*, online: un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Adebajo_paper_hum_intervention.pdf, accessed 21.01.07.

⁸⁹ United Nations: *Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Facts and Figures*, online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/facts.html>, accessed 21.01.07.

Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sweden, Tanzania, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zambia – the United States does not⁹⁰. Even if the mission is considered to be in the interest of the United States⁹¹, its absence from the mission is an expression of its reluctance towards international military cooperation under the auspices of the international community. With reference to the mission ambassador Williamson, United States Alternate Representative to the United Nations, stated:

“the UN and this Council rarely have the ability themselves to ensure a successful peace process. Seldom can the UN on its own impose a successful solution. In most cases, the parties themselves must create facts on the ground that will allow the UN to contribute to a lasting peace. We neither strengthen the UN, the Security Council, nor help bring peace to any conflict by over-promising, raising unrealistic expectations, or over-extending the capacity of the UN to deliver on the ground.”⁹²

In all UN peacekeeping operation, the United States ranks 43 with regards to its military contribution (overall 324 troops)⁹³. It might be derived from this that the United States is not particularly interested in using its military strength to keep the peace in the world. Interestingly, it is much more active outside the framework of the United Nations. This can be understood as a form of unilateral approach to force – inside or outside of global governance, this is open to debate and there might be different opinions on if the intervention in Kosovo can count as an element of global governance.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in Kosovo without having a UN mandate to do so in 1995 and 1999⁹⁴. This was a clear violation of international law according to the principles on the use of force laid down in the Charta of the United Nations. Whereas the participating NATO members proclaimed the interventions as an exception, the United States however proclaimed that in its NATO

⁹⁰ It has some police forces in the mission, though.

⁹¹ US Department of State: UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), online: <http://www.state.gov/p/io/fs/2003/26677.htm>, accessed 21.02.07.

⁹² United States Mission to the United Nations: Statement by Ambassador Richard S. Williamson, United States Alternate Representative to the United Nations, at the UN Security Council Workshop on West Africa, in the UN Security Council, July 18, 2002, online: http://www.un.int/usa/02_101.htm, accessed 21.01.07.

⁹³ United Nations: Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, online: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/dec06_2.pdf, accessed 21.01.07, 2.

⁹⁴ Adebajo.

actions is does not need a UN legitimization for the application of force:

“Most of NATO's member states have argued that the situation was exceptional and should have no bearing on the future need for Security Council authorization. Not so the United States; US officials have not spoken of an exception. Several high-ranking officials of the Clinton Administration have stated that they do not recognize the necessity for Security Council authorization when NATO takes enforcement action.”⁹⁵

We can see that the United States not intensely uses force *within* the framework of global governance. However, as will be discusses in the next chapter, it frequently uses force outside the framework of global governance in a unilateral manner. As global governance in strict terms particularly implies that states are bound in their application of force⁹⁶, we can speak here of an exceptionalism of the United States.

Exceptionalism⁹⁷ according to Foot et al. is marked by:

- 1) A unilateral predisposition, willing to ‘go it alone’ without consideration of opposition from others;
- 2) The missionary drive to universalize domestic values and policies, including the conviction to be right and superior;
- 3) Nationalization of interests, meaning that foreign policy behaviour is determined by domestic considerations; this might even lead to the acceptance of conflict with international obligations; and
- 4) Selective multilateralism, based on the belief that multilateral cooperation is an option, not mandatory⁹⁸.

According to these criteria, the United States (among other nations, such as the Soviet Union, China, and France) can be termed an exceptional state. The cited study comes to the conclusion: “there is no clear pattern or trend that signals a

⁹⁵ O'Connell, Mary (1958): The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo, in: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, 57 - 89, 57.

⁹⁶ According to the Charta of the United Nations.

⁹⁷ Ruggie coins the term ‘exemptionalism’ in referring to similar aspects. Ruggie, John (2004): American Exceptionalism and Global Governance. A Tale of Two Worlds? Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 5, online: www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_5_ruggie.pdf, accessed 21.01.07.

⁹⁸ Foot et al. 2003, 27.

growing US rejection of multilateral organizations as venues for the promotion of US foreign policy interests. The United States picks and chooses from a range of possible approaches, depending on the issue, its interests, and changing international and domestic conditions, America can afford to be discriminating in this way. US hegemony affords it broad discretion to use unilateral, bilateral and multilateral means to obtain its objectives. Hegemony provides it with the privilege of instrumental multilateralism.”⁹⁹. The US is found to make “instrumental use” of international organizations, showing the highest level of unilateralism in the realm of security and the application of force after the Cold War.

Coercion

Coercion in global governance is much less reported than force, yet presumably more frequent.

A case of coercion within the field of global security – this time in cooperation with the UN – were the sanctions against Iraq which started after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. The sanctions were not lifted after the intervention repelled Iraq and many civil society organizations argued for partial or total lifting. The widespread concerns over the humanitarian situation in Iraq led to the ‘Oil for Food Programme’ in 1997. However, “the US-UK blocked many contracts ... and serious humanitarian problems remained”¹⁰⁰. The United States in collaboration with the UK made it clear that the sanctions would not be lifted as long as Saddam Hussein was in power. The sanctions hit the general populations in Iraq, particularly children¹⁰¹ and most likely forced the Iraqi regime to change its behavior towards the United States.

With regards to Iran, the United States up to 2006 prevented negotiations for its accession to the WTO for which Iran had applied a decade earlier. In the International Atomic Energy Agency the United States pushed for the referral of the Iran case to the Security Council. After the ‘very likely’¹⁰² exertion of pressure – for example, India was accepted as an official nuclear power and offered nuclear

⁹⁹ Foot et al. 2003, 266.

¹⁰⁰ Global Policy Forum: Sanctions Against Iraq, online: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/indexone.htm>, accessed 21.01.07.

¹⁰¹ Nafeez, Mosaddeq (2003): Behind the War on Terror, Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers.

¹⁰² Kamran Matin in personal communication.

scientific exchanges in return for their support¹⁰³ – the case was referred to the Security Council and sanctions on Iran were imposed. As of writing, the United States pushes for application of Chapter VII of the Charta, which would entail the use of force against Iran.

Direct threat was used mainly targeting international companies and organizations to end nuclear capability-related trade with Iran. Whereas most of the organizations targeted with the regarding executive order already were under US sanctions, the order can be understood as a ‘tool of force’ to make other countries comply with the policies of the United States¹⁰⁴.

Coercion in the field of global rule and order was found for example in the proceedings regarding the establishment and functioning of the International Criminal Court:

“On the eve of an important Security Council vote, the United States threatened European Union nations of ‘very damaging’ consequences in transatlantic relations should EU nation continue to oppose US actions aiming to guarantee impunity of US nationals before the International Criminal Court.”¹⁰⁵

In 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the American Servicemembers’ Protection act which “contained a number of provisions, including prohibitions on the U.S. providing military aid to countries which had ratified the treaty establishing the court (exceptions granted), and permitting the President to authorize military force to free any U.S. military personnel held by the court”¹⁰⁶. Bilateral Immunity Agreements were established in order to prohibit the surrender of US-Americans to the ICC. Many of the 101 signatory parties have supposedly acted under the pressure of the United States. This pressure was realized when the US cut foreign aid to states that refused

¹⁰³ Foreign Policy in Focus: India, Iran and the United States, online: <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/2890>, accessed 21.01.07.

¹⁰⁴ Dinmore, Guy, Edward Alden: US threatens fines over Iran nuclear agency, online: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ad442242-e8d6-11d9-87ea-00000e2511c8.html>, accessed 21.01.07.

¹⁰⁵ FIDH: The United States threatens the European Union, online: http://www.fidh.org/article.php3?id_article=475, accessed 21.01.07.

¹⁰⁶ Wikipedia: International Criminal Court, online: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court#Adoption_and_entry_into_force_of_the_Rome_Statute, accessed 21.01.07.

to sign¹⁰⁷.

Furthermore, the United States coerced the Security Council to grant immunity from persecution within the ICC to US members of peacekeeping missions. As the US otherwise would have vetoed the renewal of the peacekeeping mission, the Security Council obliged¹⁰⁸:

“The US threatened to pull its troops out of the UN force in Bosnia unless they were given immunity from prosecution by the ICC. In a much-criticised decision, the UN Security Council voted on 12 July 2002 on a compromise that gave US troops a 12-month exemption from prosecution - renewed annually.”¹⁰⁹

Apart from these very well known cases, coercion from the sides of the United States is likely to be frequent, even if not very well reported. Generally, cases of coercion are not getting a lot of media attention if exercised by the United States. One reference for coercion was found in the case of Liberia:

“The United States on Friday threatened to cut its aid for Liberia's post-war reconstruction if the country's transitional parliament delayed elections scheduled for October 2005 by insisting on a new census.”¹¹⁰ The elections took place on October 11, 2005.

With regards to global economic institutions coercion of the United States was accurately described by Woods¹¹¹. She measures ‘influence’¹¹² in terms of financial structure (i.e. “proportion of the core budget paid by the United States”, “how regularly US approval sought”, for example), use of resources (i.e. is the US approval

¹⁰⁷ Coalition for the International Criminal Court: Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements, online: <http://www.iccnw.org/documents/CICCFStatusCurrent.pdf>, accessed 21.01.07.

¹⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch: The ICC and the Security Council: Resolution 1422, online: <http://hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/1422legal.htm>, accessed 21.01.07. Interestingly, in 2004, the immunity of US troops was not prolonged.

¹⁰⁹ BBC: Q&A: International Criminal Court, online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3834237.stm>, accessed 21.01.07.

¹¹⁰ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Liberia: United States threatens to cut aid if elections are delayed, online: http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=44515&SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=LIBERIA, accessed 21.01.07.

¹¹¹ Woods 2003.

¹¹² Woods uses the term influence, but according to the definition given above, she speaks of coercion in her results as threat is involved. Woods, Ngaire (2003): The United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence Within the World Bank and the IMF, in: Foot et al. 2003, 92 – 114, 102.

needed for lending decisions, to what extent to these reflect US priorities), staffing and management (i.e. composition of the staff according to nationality and training and so forth), and formal structures of voting and power (i.e. US proportion of formal voting power, extent of US influence over informal procedures and conventions, and so forth). Woods comes to the following conclusions:

“the US has substantial capabilities to bring to bear in shaping the mandates, policies, and *modus operandi* of the international financial institutions. ... At the core of US influence lies the financial structures of the institutions. ... in recent years both have, on occasion, fallen into the arms of US Congress. The IMF’s need for additional resources and the creation of the IDA within the World Bank have forced the institutions to ask their government members for additional contributions. In each case, the United States contribution has needed the approval of Congress. In turn, Congress has used the opportunity to impose conditions not just regarding the specific facilities for which the funds have been asked, but on the overall governance and direction of both the IMF and the World Bank”¹¹³.

According to Woods, in this relation threat was used as a means of power¹¹⁴.

The strong presence of United States interests in IMF policies as well as the tremendous (unintentionally devastating) effects on Russia’s market transition was described by Stiglitz¹¹⁵.

Sen discusses coercion of the United States in the WTO exerted on the EU and Japan, where specific commitments “were extracted”¹¹⁶ from both parties with regards to export subsidies and trade barriers.

Coercion is thus a common feature within global governance. According to Woods the indications found can be generalized for all international organizations in which the US is a member. The US, she argues, has disproportionate power in ‘every organization to which it belongs’ that surpasses its share in voting rights or financial contributions and results in the possibility to apply power to ‘induce some

¹¹³ Woods 2003, 113.

¹¹⁴ Woods 2003, 102.

¹¹⁵ Stiglitz, Joseph (2002): Globalization and its discontents. London: Penguin Books.

¹¹⁶ Sen, Gautam (2003): The United States and the GATT/WTO System, in: Foot et al. 2003, 115 – 138, 129.

submission` within these organizations.¹¹⁷

Influence

Influence is most probably the most often used kind of power in Global Governance. According to Sen, the conduct of the United States vis a vis developing countries can be grouped under influence: “The US ensured the acquiescence of developing countries on a range of issues through robust diplomacy and cajolery and continues to exercise its persuasive powers”¹¹⁸.

Payne for example studied the role of influence of the United States with regards to the Kyoto Protocol. Whereas here, as in some of the fields mentioned above, the United States showed a high degree of exceptionalism (rejecting the protocol under President Bush), it also achieved to influence the international community in the following way:

“it seems apparent that when U.S. government officials discuss global warming, they represent a powerful actor pursuing at least some instrumental interests. While it is simple to note American strength, it can be difficult to identify the use of misleading positions advanced in hopes of shaping normative commitments. ..., they more questionably also focus great attention on the need for ‘meaningful participation by developing countries’ in this same enterprise` ... U.S. contributions to the problem are thus acknowledged, but current and especially future emissions from states of the Global South are somewhat problematically highlighted for special attention. While it is literally true that a poor state like India may one day soon approach the aggregate emission levels of the U.S. or its affluent friends in Western Europe, the much larger population of the poor state means that its per capita emissions are actually quite small ... American power certainly affects the frame contest pitting ‘environmental security’ versus ‘environmental justice’.”¹¹⁹

Steger writes about “globalism” of the United States¹²⁰ referring to discursive power and thus influence in my terms. He refers to ‘soft power` as the basis of neoliberals

¹¹⁷ Woods 2004, 38.

¹¹⁸ Sen 2003, 129.

¹¹⁹ Payne, Rodger (2001): Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction, in: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 1, 37 – 61.

¹²⁰ He applies the term differently than I will do in the following.

success in achieving their desired outcomes globally without the necessity to resort to hard power. “These power elites constructed and disseminated narratives and images that extolled the virtues of deregulated and globally integrated markets. ... globalism was difficult to resist because it relied on the soft power of ‘common sense’, that is, the widespread belief that its prescriptive program ultimately derived from an accurate description of ‘objective reality’”¹²¹. Narratives that were constructed mainly within and by the United States and that dominated the global discourse about globalization before and after 9/11 are for example:

- The essence of globalization is liberalization that will lead to a global integration of markets;
- These processes are inevitable and irreversible;
- There is no hierarchy to be found within globalization (‘nobody is in charge’);
- In the long term all nations and peoples will benefit from globalization;
- Democratization is a beneficial outcome of the described processes, and finally (a narrative that was constructed after 9/11);
- Globalization has to be defended by a Global War on Terrorism¹²².

Thus, it is argued, the existence and content of these discourses themselves are proof for US influence in the world.

Conclusion

We can come to the conclusion, that the United States openly uses coercion within and in relation to international institutions that form the basis of global governance. Furthermore, it has a high level of influence in the discourse that is underlying global governance (i.e. the discourse about globalization). Overall, we can come to the conclusion, that within global governance the United States directly and in different ways uses and profits from its superior power and its application. I therefore think that we can speak of ‘hegemonic governance’ in order to describe the fact that global governance is not an egalitarian enterprise, but that power – expressed in coercion and influence – do shape global governance. This does not imply, however, that the United States has absolute control over global governance or its outcomes.

¹²¹ Steger, Manfred (2005): From Market Globalism to Imperial Globalism: Ideology and American Power after 9/11, in: Globalizations, Vol. 2, No. 1, 31 – 46, 32.

¹²² Steger 2005, 32 – 39.