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(Re)constituting ESDP in an Age of Terror

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Introduction¹

The European Union (EU) sees itself confronted with dynamic threats challenging Europe's security. The European Security Strategy (ESS) defines most prominently international terrorism as causing dynamic threats to Europe and to international peace and security. Terrorism is understood to be intertwined with proliferation of WMDs, regional conflict, state failure, and organised crime. (Berenskötter and Giegerich 2006: 98) In an expected scenario, terrorist groups secure WMDs from weak states or groups of organised crime by which they support either the processes of state failure or strengthen criminal organisations. The "most frightening scenario" (ESS 2003: 4) is one in which terrorist groups use WMDs to "cause massive casualties" (ESS 2003: 3). In using a 'dirty' bomb, terrorists are on their way "to undermine the openness and tolerance of our society". (ESS 2003: 4) Against these dynamic threats the EU prepares itself with civilian and military means. They are based on a particular European perception of security. (see Berenskötter and Giegerich 2006: 101)

In this paper I will show that, referring to these scenarios, ESDP has been (re-)constituted. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies as well as other EU institutions have reformulated the use and purpose of ESDP. (see European Council 2002: Annex V) I argue that the reconstitution of ESDP has been

¹ The paper is based on aspects of my PhD research project addressing the question of how ESDP become possible on the turning point of the 20th to the 21st century.

possible only on a changing meaning of security constituting ESDP. This was possible through a redefinition of EU identity making possible threat constructions for the first time. Overall, the redefinition of EU identity and threats has led to a changing understanding of security within the EU.

Traditional approaches in international relations theory understand security as an objective given affected by the international system. But such a concept is ill-suited to deal with complexes of security policies. I argue that security is as much influenced by actors' intersubjectivity as every other social interaction. Therefore, security is best understood as a relational concept shaped by social interaction. (see Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998) In this sense, the meaning of security is composed by three dimensions. The first is identity and hence the definition of the self. The second is the perception of threats from this particular perspective. The third dimension is rules which define appropriate behaviour in the case of security. These three dimensions are mutual constitutive through social interaction. Social interaction takes place through the use of language as the medium through which humans seek for reasoning and thereby find, or produce, order in the world. (Onuf 1989: 39) In this sense security produces order. This order is – formally and informally – institutionalised within the framework of ESDP.

In order to prove my argument, first, I need to develop the theoretical argument that social reality is produced by social interaction through the use of language. This will be based on Onuf's approach of constructivism since he has – in a remarkable way – conceptualised how language constitutes social order. As I will show, this perspective enables the research to conceptualise security as a particular kind of social order which takes into account actors' intersubjectivity and hence their processes of sense making. Furthermore, it equips the analysis with a methodology which is able to recognise the underlying structures of social order. While using discourse analysis, it is possible to analyse separately the construction of identity, the perception of threats, and the constitution of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of security. I will, therefore, be able to examine the three dimensions which together add to the meaning of security constituting ESDP.

Second, I will identify discursive fields in which discourses of each dimension can be located. These fields of discourses circle around meta-narratives as basic streamlines of discourses which bind human's sense making to time and space. I will briefly conceptualise these discursive fields and discuss how they affect the construction of identity, the perception of threats, and the constitution of rules. Third, I will analyse discourses within these three fields which constitute the meaning of security. Relevant discourses are those taking place within the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies since they build the most relevant institutions concerned with ESDP. The analysis will be separated into two periods of time. The first period ends with the attacks of 11 September 2001. I will analyse the above mentioned discourses especially in the year 2000 as the year of the Intergovernmental Conference in which conceptually ESDP was further developed. The second period starts exactly with the date of the attacks. I will especially

focus on the time of the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Also, I will focus on 2003 in which the ESS was produced. Finally, in the conclusion of the paper, I will discuss my argument that in the light of the attacks the meaning of security changed.

1. *Constructivist Account*

My approach rests on four central assumptions: discourse dependency (Onuf 1989: 38) – language as practice of social interaction –, intersubjective meanings as discursively upheld rules and knowledge, mutual constitution of agency and structure, and collective identities which affect how actors understand themselves and the world surrounding them. The important pre-assumption of my analysis is that actors only can make sense of the world through discourse. (Foucault 1991: 58) In this sense discourses play an important role defining intersubjective meanings. Meanings are the centre piece of social reality. They are central for the mutual constitution of agency and structure, and hence collective identities.

Humans are unable to know all features of the world independent of discourses about them. They are discourse dependent. (Onuf 1989: 38) Humans are language users. They use language to make sense of the world, to communicate and, therefore, interact with each other. “Through the medium of language, mind subordinated world.” (Onuf 1989: 39) In Onuf’s terms, while humans seek for reasoning they either find or produce order. Social life is constituted by social interaction of humans which produces order. Social life is fundamentally characterised by meaning, given to action and interaction. (Wendt 1992: 403) This meaning is produced through the use of language. No meaning exists outside of language. (see Foucault 1991; Zehfuss 2002: 202) By articulations actors put meaning to reality. For example, in British working life when someone refers to a ‘tea-break’ it does not necessarily mean that the person will drink tea. The meaning of the sentence is that the person is a member of staff who will have a break interrupting her working day. In that break she may or may not drink and eat something. The fundamental meaning is, however, that the person during that break will not be available for business purposes. She refers to a widely accepted practice on which she legitimately can claim not to be available. Through that sentence she defines herself as a valuable member of staff who claims to have a break while she participates on a commonly established practice ordering working life.

I argue, following Wittgenstein in his later work, that language can not be grounded in anything but language, because grounding depends again on “linguistic conventions and presuppositions”. (Crossley 1996: 41; Wittgenstein 1953: 20) It is through the use of language that agents produce and reproduce their understanding of reality. Hence, social reality does not exist *à priori*, (Derrida 1978: 279) it is (re)produced through social interaction. This logic denies that world and words are independent from each other. Instead, it sees them as mutually constitutive. (Onuf 1994: 94) Here, world again refers to the intersubjective knowledge of reality. Mutual constitution of world and words means that while agents use language to make sense of the world, at the same time, they define how the world is ordered, who they are and how they see themselves positioned in this world. The process of sense making through the use of language leads to an intersubjectively

held understanding of the world. The world which is constituted by words is taken for granted by agents as reality, as the objective truth of the world. (Luckmann and Berger 1966: 37, Giddens 1984: 321-2) This world is 'social reality'. Agents act within their social reality based on their knowledge of it. They are context bound since their knowledge enables only particular options of behaviour whereas others either seem inappropriate or are just not available from the agent's perspective. (see Diez 1999: 603)

The context in which actors are bound is provided by intersubjective meanings which are available in discourses. Discourses are processes in which meanings are defined, redefined and stabilised. These processes are constantly running. Meanings do not exist out there, independent or 'free floating'. They need to be articulated in order to be intersubjectively shared. Articulation of meanings is social interaction. Through social interaction actors "reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible". (Giddens 1984: 2, see also Giddens 1982) Through that, meanings constitute rules as social structure and, at the same time, affect actors in their self-perception, their understanding of the world surrounding them and their behaviour. (see Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996: 41) Social structure contains rules as "collective expectations". (Katzenstein 1996: 7) Actors follow these rules and thereby (re)constitute the social structure upheld by intersubjectively shared meanings. In the manner of reflexivity, agency and structure thereby mutual constitute each other (see Giddens 1984: 1-2; Checkel 1998: 326)

Identity construction

This aspect is important for the conceptualisation of collective identity. Wendt has argued that identities are a reflection of actors' socialization. (see Wendt 1992: 404) This emphasis is very important. Within the process of sense making agents interact with each other through the use of language. This process can be understood as socialization. It mutual constitutes rules and collective identities of a certain community or 'we'-group. (see Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996: 59) Also, it affects how actors approach the world outside of 'their' groups. (see Risse-Kappen 1996: 367; Wendt 1994) Therefore, identities lead to predictable and replicable patterns of action within a specific context. (Hopf 1998: 199)

Identity formation necessarily presupposes the existence of alternative others. Collective identities by definition include a dimension of "boundary drawing", (Wendt 1999: 74) The question is whether "identity requires difference to be". (Rumelili 2004: 30-4) I argue that identities are not particular about boundary drawing. They are produced alongside the definition of social structure which orders and establishes different actors within a group or community. This process does not include a process of othering. For example, a family may well be aware of other families, or other groups which label themselves differently. However, the social structure which orders the relation of family members does not necessarily build on boundary drawing against other families or other groups. At the same time, their identities provide to them a particular understanding of the world surrounding them. This view again affects their behaviour towards the outside. Keeping that in mind, it could be argued that othering at least affects the relationship between collective identities

and the 'other'. However, in the literature 'othering' rests on a particular discursive perspective of juxtapositioning discussed by Foucault. (see Foucault 1989: 151) It seems to be impossible to combine the two epistemological perspectives of i) group internal sense making and its importance to identity formation with ii) othering as an internal logic of discourses.

Threat construction

Rumelili has provided a way out by developing a heuristic definition of inclusive and exclusive identities. Inclusive identities "embody a conception of difference based on acquired characteristics". (Rumelili 2004: 37) The logic behind this concept is that identity formation rests on rules and knowledge to which 'others' can positively ascribe. The other can only be less 'self'. (Rumelili 2004: 37) The formation process of inclusive identity follows the logic of socialisation of group members. It rests on internal process of 'producing order'. (Onuf 1989: 39) In contrast, exclusive identities "are defined around some inherent characteristics". (Rumelili 2004: 37) The logic here is that the other is non-self. A barrier exists which makes it impossible for the other to ascribe to the identity and its inherent rules.

Rumelili describes two different mechanism of interaction of actors with given identities. These mechanisms are 'association' and 'dissociation'. (Rumelili 2004: 38) When inclusive identities meet association it leads to the formation of communities which further stabilises identities. Association with the 'other' signals to the 'self' that the 'other' is willing to become more 'self'. This settles and strengthens inclusive identities. In contrast, dissociation makes inclusive identities more insecure because the 'self' does not know whether the 'other' is willing to become more 'self'. Also, in the situation of dissociation institutional means of control are absent or deprived by the 'other'. (Rumelili 2004: 38) The effects are turned head down in regard to exclusive identities. The fundamental difference between inclusive and exclusive identity is the logic of appropriateness which they establish. Inclusive identities expect others to ascribe to their rules, whereas exclusive identities understand it as impossible and therefore inappropriate for others to join.

Conceptualising security

Both concepts, inclusive and exclusive identity, assume an important role of collective identities in affecting the construction of threats. It thereby refers to a wider debate on collective identities. In the literature collective identities are assumed to affect interstate structures, normative structures, institutions, and regimes. (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996: 62; Adler and Barnett 2000) In this vein of literature threats are conceptualised as being constructed. "Since what constitutes a threat can never be stated à priori, primordial constant, it should be approached as a social construction of an Other, and theorized at that level." (Hopf 1998: 199) The construction of threats can be conceptualised following the logic of intersubjectivity. Intersubjective meanings provide to actors a particular understanding of the world. Equipped with this perspective, actors approach the world surrounding them. (see Shapiro 1981: 132) The identity of actors then not

only defines who “we” are but also the boundaries of the ‘self’ against the ‘other’. (Risse-Kappen 1996: 367) Internally to the community, identities mutually constitute appropriate behaviour. The community of the ‘other’ might well be organised along other lines of appropriateness. “[A]ctors infer external behaviour from the values and norms governing the domestic political processes that shape the identities of their partners”. (Risse-Kappen 1996: 367; Doyle 1986: 1161) If these values and norms – or in my terms ‘rules’ – are different to the ‘self’ they can be perceived as threats.

Following the logic of my theoretical approach, security must be understood as a social construction. Security establishes a relation between a self and a significant other. (see Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 21) It is relational in the sense that it relates group identities to threats which are perceived as such from the identity’s perspective. (see Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 10) Collective identities are the most relevant aspects in order to discuss whether or not a group or community perceives something as a threat. From the perspective of collective identities actors approach the world surrounding them. (Marcussen et al. 1999: 103) Something is perceived as a threat because it is understood to be different, not understandable, negating, or in contrast to certain aspects of the identity. Whether or not threat construction is likely depends on two aspects: i) the type of the identity, e.g. inclusive or exclusive, and ii) the perception of the other’s behaviour, e.g. association or dissociation. Threat constructions establish a relation between a group identity and a significant other and thereby constitute the intersubjective meaning of security. This intersubjective meaning is “one key to understanding behaviour”. (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 31) It constitutes social order including particular rules applying only in the situation of security. Regarding the EU, these rules are institutionalised within ESDP. They also include normative claims about the use of force, conditions for action, cooperation with other institutions, and the objectives which are envisaged. In this sense, ESDP is a reflection of the process of sense making on European security.

Discursive fields

Based on this concept, three fields of discourses can be identified as important to the meaning of security constituting ESDP. The first is ‘European integration’. The discursive field on European integration includes a whole variety of discourses on concepts applying to the political, social, legal, and economic order within the EU. Discourses can be found on integration, political union, democracy, common market, and so forth. The second is ‘global challenges’. It includes discourses on issues, actors, and problems which are considered to have the potential of destabilising the international order. The most relevant for this paper is the understanding of international terrorism. The third is ‘international order’. It includes discourses on international cooperation, international organisations, and normative claims of just behaviour on international as well as domestic levels. In regard to my analysis, processes of sense making regarding the institutional design of ESDP and the code of conduct towards security issues is related to

discourses within this discursive field. Overall, the meaning of security constituting ESDP can be located in the area in which these three discursive fields overlap.

In the following I will conduct a discourse analysis of discourses of these three fields in the time before and after the 11 September 2001 in order to examine the meaning of security constituting ESDP. I will analyse documents and speeches which are produced and circulated in the most relevant bodies concerned with issues of ESDP. These are the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies. The analysis is designed as a grounded theory in order to analyse how discourses create subjects, objects, and relationships among them. (Shapiro 1981: 141)

2. *Prior to 9/11*

In this section I will analyse the construction of EU identity, the perception of threats and the constitution of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of security prior to the attacks of 11 September 2001. I will start with identity construction.

2.1 EU identity

The identity of the EU, as it is constructed within the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies, rests on a variety of basic principles. These principles can be categorised into four categories. The first deals with core democratic principles, the second highlights the importance of self-initiative, the third deals with principles of how to cooperate internally, and the fourth with international cooperation.

Democratic principles

EU identity is constructed around some “European standards” (Council 2000d: Annex) to which the EU and its member states as well as other states need to apply to if they want to come “closer to the European structures”. (Council 2000c) These principles are “respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law [...] and to respect international law and standards”. (Council 2000b: Zimbabwe) These core principles are fundamentally important for the EU. (see Council 2000b: Zimbabwe) They are reflected in almost all EU policies towards its outside, whether that might be the Great Lakes Region, Indonesia, the Western Balkan, Ex-Yugoslavia, or Cuba.

“[T]he objective of the European Union [...] remains the encouragement of a process of peaceful transition to pluralist democracy, the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the [...] people.” (Council 2000c: Cuba – conclusion)

The quote given above does not only exemplify the European standards. It is worth a closer look to understand different aspects of the construction of EU identity. First, the EU is established as an actor with an objective, with a desire to act. This desire also has a history to which “remains” refers to. Second, the objective of the EU includes the already known European standards. Democracy includes “a regular electoral process[,...] the need for broad political consensus and

[...] political parties to participate constructively in the preparations for [...] elections". (Council 2000c: South Africa) The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms includes "to cooperate with UN Human Rights mechanism" as well as ratification of "the UN Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political Rights [...], to cooperate [...] with the CHR Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups, as well as to sign the Memorandum of Understanding with the office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights". (Council 2000i: China) The understanding of human rights and fundamental freedoms establishes a particular meaning of people. In fact all European standards address the safety of the civilian population in one or the other way. They do not intend to secure the state as such. Rather, they demand a 'good governed' state which is able to take care of its citizens while applying to European standards. (Council 2000a: no. 6) States and international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) or the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are responsible for, or help in, establishing European standards. (see Council 2000h: Great Lakes Region) The protection of the civilian population is the end which is envisaged. Therefore, the central focus of European standards rests on the people. They need to be protected from violence, suppression and undemocratic rules. This aspect is very important when it comes to the argument why ESDP needs to be implemented and further developed. I will show that ESDP mainly was established to support development policy and therefore to help to implement better conditions for civilian people in difficult situations. However, before I come to that point I need to further elaborate the construction of EU identity.

Self-initiative

Apart from European standards, the quote above shows further aspects of identity construction. The objective of the EU is to 'encourage' a process of change in Cuba. The meaning of 'encourage' is important here. It refers back to the understanding of how Europe has established peace, stability and prosperity. The European integration process is understood as a self-initiated process. Only because European states took seriously their responsibility to overcome the war shaken past, integration unfolded establishing peace and economic wealth. This understanding was also reflected during the Lisbon European Council on employment, economic reform and social cohesion: "The rapid and accelerating pace of change means it is urgent for the Union to act now to harness the full benefits of the opportunities presented." (European Council 2000a: I.A) Encouraging then rests on the assumption that other actors have to take on their responsibility to change to the better situations in which they are involved in or which they have caused. "[The Council] reminds Russia of its heavy responsibility in addressing the deteriorating humanitarian situation." (Council 2000d: Russia) This can only be done by "peaceful transition" (see above) or "peaceful solution of the conflict" (Council 2000d: Russia). If actors take on their responsibilities peaceful solution can be achieved which then leads to dialogue between the EU and these actors. The "EU maintains its position that dialogue is an acceptable option only if enough progress is achieved and reflected on the ground." (Council 2000i: China)

Internal Cooperation

Internal cooperation is mainly organised around two principles. The first is effectiveness and the second is coherence.

“The increase in the number of its external partners, the introduction of new instruments and increased financial resources have reinforced the need to define a clear and consistent strategy. [...] This exercise takes place in the framework of the debate on increasing the effectiveness of external Union action and [...] to improve its management of the programmes involved.” (Council 2000a: point 3)

The EU evaluates all its action using the measurement of effectiveness and coherence. This applies as much to crisis management as it does to ESDP as a whole. “The European Council expressed its determination to increase and improve the effectiveness of the Union’s capacity to respond to crises, including by actions in civilian areas.” (European Council 2000b: Annex 3)

International Cooperation

In contrast to internal cooperation, international cooperation does not merely apply to effectiveness and coherence. The ordering structure in this sphere is given by the UN Charter as well as international law and standards. The Union will keep “with the principles of the UN Charter, the OSCE Charter and the Helsinki Final Act”. (Council 2000g: ESDP) International cooperation must be organised within the framework given by these principles. Agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral, are understood to be binding. (see Council 2000d: Croatia) Situated in this structure, the EU understands itself as an international actor. “[R]einforcing the coherence of the Union’s external action and realising its policy objectives are priorities if the Union is to pull its full weight in international affairs”. (Council 2000f: effectiveness of external action)

Summary

European standards are promoted to be established by European partners. At the same time they represent the internal logic of political and social order and thus add to the construction of EU identity. The same holds true for responsibility. The meaning is strongly connected with the understanding of European integration. European states themselves have taken on the responsibility for their future. Because of their cooperation, peace, stability and prosperity have been established in Europe.

The way in which all four aspects of European identity are constructed is very important for the following section on threat construction. As I have argued above, threat construction is more likely when identities are constructed as exclusive identities. The analysis of EU identity has shown very clearly that it rests on inclusive aspects alone. European standards are constructed in a way that it is possible for almost every other actor to apply to them. Actors only need to become democratically organised, implement the rule of law, and face up to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Depending on the given circumstances, this may well be a long lasting

process of change. However, as soon as the actor in question shows its willingness to change circumstances in the light of European standards, he will reach the level of being only less self vis-à-vis EU identity. Here, 'othering' is impossible. Even when the actor does not show any intention to change things, it is still possible from the EU's perspective to see him as less self rather than as 'other'. The behaviour of the actor would be understood as a problem but not necessarily as a threat towards EU identity because inclusive identities enable actors to understand differences as less self until a very large extent. This is also the case in respect to the principles guiding internal and international cooperation. Effectiveness and coherence as well as the importance to apply to international law and standards are constructed as inclusive. The principles are open for every other actor to apply to them.

2.2 Threat construction

In this section I will focus on those dynamics which construct issues or actors as threats to the EU or a problem which is understood as affecting the EU. I will limit the analysis to aspects which add to the meaning of security constituting ESDP. A whole variety of meanings of security are imaginable, for example environmental security. But they do not relate to ESDP in any meaningful way. The purpose of this section is to analyse to which threats or problems ESDP is constituted as the appropriate behaviour. I will show that poverty is understood as the root cause of conflict, instability and insecurity. In this regard, ESDP provides appropriate tools only if development policy is unable to prevent conflict from breaking through.

From the EU's perspective poverty is understood to cause other problems which could even lead to crisis or conflict situations. "Poverty, and the exclusion which it creates, are the root causes of conflict and are endangering the stability and security of too many countries and regions." (Council 2000a: no. 1) The quote nicely shows the reasoning of what constitutes a problem to international security. Poverty is related to human and political rights. The logic is that poverty creates exclusion. Civilian populations which live under poverty are excluded from certain standards of living either because they can not afford these standards or because structures which would provide access to these standards are not available.

"Poverty is defined not simply as the lack of income and financial resources but also as encompassing the notion of vulnerability and such factors as no access to adequate food supplies, education and health, natural resources and drinking water, land, employment and credit facilities, information and political involvement, services and infrastructure." (Council 2000a: no. 8)

The list of 'factors' clearly relates to European standards and therefore to an important aspect of EU identity. This includes democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Poverty in this sense is understood as a problem because it makes the civilian population less self vis-à-vis the EU.

Poverty is constructed as a problem affecting the civilian population only. This can be seen in the second quote. Indicators of poverty are measured in regard to whether or not access is provided. Access clearly does not relate to state institutions do not suffer from poverty. The civilian population is constructed as the only objects of poverty. Furthermore, under conditions of poverty the civilian population is vulnerable. This could be translated into violable, unprotected or endangered. Overall it means that the civilian population even when they try to step up to their responsibility it is impossible for them to change these circumstances. This understanding is probably the most central point why poverty – in the way it is constructed here – is understood as a problem which needs to be addressed by the EU. In the first place, poverty is addressed by development policy. “The European Union provides approximately half of all public aid to the developing countries[...]. This effort reflects the essential solidarity which is an underlying feature of its international activity.” (Council 2000a: no. 2)

However, poverty is not only understood to have direct effects for the civilian population. Also, it is constructed as a security problem. This is stated in the first quote given above in which poverty is qualified as “the root cause of conflict”. (see above) The link between both, poverty and conflict, can be illustrated by the following quote. The Council “urged the Commission to address the issue of poverty relief [...] with emphasis on [...] particular needs resulting from ethnic conflict and refugee movements”. (Council 2000i: Indonesia) The meaning of conflict is important to understand how poverty becomes a security problem. Conflict is constructed as to come about in different forms. This includes concepts of violence: violence against civilian population (Council 2000e: Russia), ethnic groups (Council 2000c: Kosovo), violation of human rights (Council 2000b: Burma) and democratic principles (Council 2000h: Serbia). It can lead to refugees and illegal trafficking. (Council 2000i: Western Balkans) Conflict might also be further supported or come about with weak state institutions which are not able to provide essential services. One example is that of Liberia in which the government “has failed to act to prevent arms and other supplies from reaching the rebels”. (Council 2000c: Liberia)

However, in the quotes given until now the link between poverty and conflict is constructed one dimensional. Poverty is the independent event which causes conflict as the result. But, this link is also turned head down in other moments of discourse. Then, conflict leads to poverty. The “senseless outbreak of renewed fighting [...] had dramatic humanitarian consequences for the civilian population”. (Council 2000h: Ethiopia/Eritrea) Overall, the question whether the one causes the other is not so important here. It is important what is constructed as subjects and objects in regard to poverty as well as conflict in order to understand how it adds to the meaning of security. In regard to poverty, civilian populations are constructed as objects. They suffer from poverty. In contrast, subjects are not explicitly constructed. As I have shown above, poverty is measured in a list of factors which add to the situation of poverty. These factors can be reduced by introducing European standards or at least standards which lead up to them. In the understanding of EU identity, states are responsible to implement these standards. In this sense,

states are not directly constructed as subjects responsible for poverty. They are not understood as to cause poverty but they are able to prevent poverty to increase. The perspective is different in regard to conflict. In the situation of conflict, state actors are understood to be at least one type of subjects directly responsible for the break out of violence. The other subjects are non-state actors. Violence is “perpetrated by both state and non-state parties”. (Council 2000h: Great Lakes Region) Furthermore, conflict contains the potential to affect other states. The Council “expressed concern about the risk of spill-over of the conflict to neighbouring countries”. (Council 2000i: Russia)

Hence, conflict is understood to be caused by poverty leading to civilian suffering and potentially to the destabilisation of a whole region. This understanding is important for the meaning of security. From the EU perspective, conflict and the risk of spill-over constitutes a security problem. This understanding centrally adds to the meaning of security constituting ESDP.

Purpose of ESDP

In reference to the concept of poverty and conflict, the EU established ESDP. “The Council underlined that [...] the roots of [...] conflicts require a realistic, integrated and coherent approach by the international community using different types of instruments appropriate to the prevailing circumstances”. (Council 2000h: Africa) ESDP is constituted as one appropriate instrument. “The European Council reaffirms its commitment to building a Common European Security and Defence Policy capable of reinforcing the Union’s external action through the development of a military crisis management capability as well as a civilian one”. (European Council 2000b: I C) The Petersberg Tasks are the legal framework for crisis management operations. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam the Petersberg Tasks are established as an objective of the EU. They contain “the full range of conflict-prevention and crisis-management missions”. (Council 2000g: CESDP) Therefore, ESDP was constituted as a tool enabling appropriate responses to conflict situation caused by poverty and related problems. In that sense, the EU “will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”. (European Council 2000b: Annex I)

The reason why ESDP was constituted as crisis management capability can be explained by the nature of EU identity and security problems identified from this perspective. EU identity is constructed as an inclusive identity. From this perspective it is possible to understand almost all behaviour as being less self rather than constituting an ‘other’. Furthermore, EU identity includes a strong understanding of civilian populations as the main objectives of its policies. Policies need to support the civilian population in their political, social and economic life. Situations in which this is not the case are understood as being problematic. The most serious of these situations is poverty. Poverty, again, has the potential to cause conflict. At least conflicts need to be tackled by state actors. ESDP as a crisis management tool is particularly design to re-establish or stabilise state structures. This takes place through civilian or military means which establish security, the

rule of law, human rights and basic democratic principles. They thereby intend to bring a state closer to the EU's self.

3. Post 9/11

In this section I will analyse the discourse by which actors of the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies tried to make sense of the attacks of 11 September 2001. The attacks of 11 September 2001 mark a crisis in the process of sense making. Those kinds of attacks were unknown before. This does not mean that the EU had to invent itself from scratch. The process of sense making had to start from EU identity as its point of origin. In contrast to the section above, I will start with threat construction because this is the main area in which change is likely. The attacks and the structure around it – that what is understood as international terrorism – had to be introduced in the reasoning of the actors of the EU. EU identity is mutually affected by this process and has changed as a result. Finally, this will have established different rules applicable in the case of security.

3.1 Threat construction

Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the language used within the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies has become stronger when issues of security are concerned. In the time before the attacks nothing has been constructed as a security threat. Only poverty is understood as an international problem which can lead to conflict. ESDP has been constituted as the appropriate tool to prevent conflict from further harming civilian populations. This changed dramatically in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. International terrorism is understood to reach globally and to threaten EU identity by negating democratic principles for example. Furthermore, terrorism is understood to intend to harm civilians. Combined with the understanding that the world after the Cold War is more fragmented, international terrorism is a problem of global reach causing other problems such as regional conflict as well as making them more serious. This is the reasoning why ESDP in the face of 11 September 2001 had to be reconstituted. In the following I will provide detailed prove of this argument.

The attacks are presented as “terrorist attacks”. (Council 2001e: 6) They are “tragic events” (Council 2001c: challenge for development), “terrible” (Council 2001d: 3) and “horrific attacks”. (European Council 2001b: 10) All three adjectives establish the meaning of being unimaginable or surreal. In the description a taste of destiny comes about. This meaning is strengthened within the Laeken Declaration by the understanding that the terrorist attacks constitute a “rude awakening”. (European Council 2001c: 20) This framing stays in relation to the construction of EU identity which is nicely visible a little earlier in the text: “it looked briefly as though we would for a long while be living in a stable world order, free from conflict, founded upon human rights”. (European Council 2001c: 20) In contrast, the attacks have been understood to be “an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies”. (Council 2001e: 6) They represent “an

increasing threat against democracy and against international peace and security". (Council 2003c: 25) This includes the "conscience of each human being". (European Council 2001a: 1)

The interesting thing about the quotes presented above is the way in which almost every international problem is connected to international terrorism. This becomes clear in the Laeken Declaration but also in later texts and especially in the ESS. The bright picture drawn within the Laeken Declaration of a world without conflict is a myth. Since the end of the Cold War a variety of regional or sub-regional conflicts and humanitarian crises have occurred. Also, the separation wars in Ex-Yugoslavia do not suite the glory picture. However, terrorism is understood to have changed everything. It reaches every part of public and private life: it negates democratic principles and human rights; it causes economic consequences internationally; (European Council 2001b: 2) and its main targets are individuals world wide. With their attacks, terrorist try to "cause a large number of casualties among civilians of various nationalities" (Council 2003c: 25) and "faith". (European Council 2003b: 15) It seems to be remarkable not only that civilians are the targets but also that no difference is made between nationalities and faiths. This tells a lot about the understanding of terrorism at work. The meaning of terrorism is related to the meaning of irrationality because terrorism does not even differentiate between targets. Terrorist groups are understood to be "fanatical" (Council 2001e: 7) which is based on "national, racist and xenophobic" drifts. (European Council 2001a: 4)

In this regard, international terrorism is understood to be a phenomenon with a "global profile [...] from which no country can consider itself free or safe". (Council 2003c: 25) It, therefore, constitutes a "real challenge for Europe and the world". (Council 2001e: 7) "The pursuit of terrorists or terrorist organisations" is essential. (Council 2001a: 4) The reference to 'organisation' directly points to the question of how international terrorism works. The organisation of terrorism is identified as Al Qaida headed by Osama Bin Laden to which responsibility "all information point clearly and convincingly". (Council 2001e: 6) In order to carry out their attacks terrorist organisations need to build upon a decent amount of financial resources. (European Council 2001b: 3) Another problem of international terrorism is the proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as well as its delivery systems. Terrorist try to gain access to these materials or devices. (for example: European Council 2003c: 37) As I have stated in the introduction, a terrorist attack using WMD or related material is the "most frightening scenario". (ESS 2003: 4) This aspect brings me to the next point which constitutes dynamic threats.

Probably more important than the internal structures and procedures of terrorism is the understanding that international terrorism is taking place in a "highly fragmented world". (Council 2003b: 9) As I have shown above, international terrorism is reasoned as posing a threat against Europe and the world in a whole. But, it is not only terrorism which does this. International terrorism is understood to be connected or interrelated with other international problems. These are for example proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The logic behind this is, that international problems which were previously manageable with existing approaches in the light of

international terrorism have become more serious. The concept of dynamic threats is discussed in the Council Conclusions of 16 June 2003. "Key threats [...] included international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, failed States and organised crime. They were significant threats by themselves but their combination constituted a radical challenge to security". (Council 2003b: 9)

The concept of dynamic threats is also introduced into the ESS. It is the central concept by which international terrorism is taken as increasing other international problems. The concept does not say that necessarily terrorism is involved when for example proliferation is at stake. But, dynamic threats are a result of the process of reasoning on terrorist attacks and it is mainly developed by referring to international terrorism. One example is that of proliferation of WMD. Another is the understanding that terrorism "arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies." (ESS 2003: 3) Modernisation as well as cultural, social and political crises is connected with poverty. (see Council 2000a: no8) This again is linked to violent conflicts.

"Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty." (ESS 2003: 2)

The logic of dynamic threats constitutes the link between poverty, conflict and international terrorism. The basic argument is that in circumstances of poverty and conflict terrorism can start to develop. "Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime." (ESS 2003: 4) It is exactly this problem which needs to be addressed by ESDP. Against this background ESDP has been reconstituted. However, in the following I will briefly show how EU identity has changed during the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001 followed by the analysis of how rules of appropriate behaviour constituting ESDP have changed.

3.2 EU identity

Following the terrorist attacks, EU identity has been reformulated regarding the establishment of actorness and actor like capabilities. The basic principles of EU identity remain the same. Also, the principles of internal and international cooperation pretty much stayed unchanged. But, the constitution of EU's actorness never before was as strongly argued than following the attacks of 11 September 2001. Although the basic principles of the construction of EU identity did not change significantly, the type of identity construction reaches a level of exclusiveness. This process, together with the construction of threat based on the reasoning on the attacks, leads to the reconstitution of ESDP.

EU identity is still based on democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the argument has changed dramatically of how this constitutes a global actor. "Does Europe not, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world

order, that power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and people?" (European Council 2001c: 20) In the following sentence of the document, the EU is constructed as the origin of democracy and human rights referring to the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, and the French Revolution. The EU presents itself as a valuable actor who has the right and the obligation based on his past to turn the world into a better, more equal, peaceful and prosperous place. This position refers back to self-initiative as an important aspect of EU identity. "Constant renewal, while learning from our rich traditions and history, is our very nature". (European Council 2003a: 2) The title of the ESS: "A secure Europe in a better World" (ESS 2003) reflects the perspective of being an actor which has the obligation and right to make the World 'a better place'. This has not been part of EU identity before. Such a construction can not be found in the timeframe before the attacks of 11 September 2001.

However, in the aftermath the EU constructs itself as an international power not merrily by choice but by duty. "The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world's heartrending injustices." (European Council 2001c: 20) This perspective did not only occur as an impulsive reaction to the "horrific attacks". Still in 2003, this perspective shapes EU identity. "We are committed to facing up to our global responsibilities." (European Council 2003a: 2) In regard to international terrorism the EU will "continue to fulfil as a first priority its responsibility to prevent and eradicate this threat". (Council 2003c: 25) This is because terrorist violence "is unjustifiable in any place or under any circumstances. No pretext, be it political, ethnic or religious, can be invoked to condone it." (ibid)

At this point EU identity turns to be at least equipped with an exclusive moment. By strengthening actorness through strong and tight definitions of basic principles, EU identity more than before is about boundary drawing. The construction of EU actorness following the attacks of 11 September 2001 was realised through the establishment of objectives for external relations. These objectives refer back to European standards such as democracy and human rights. In principle, this is neither new nor surprising. As I have argued in the theoretical section, identity always affects behaviour towards the outside. But following the attacks of 11 September 2001, basic principles do not only affect action towards the outside. They are constituted as the best and just solution to tackle all sorts of international problems reaching from poverty to proliferation, from humanitarian crisis to regional conflict and so forth. Above I have shown that the EU has equipped itself with the perspective to be a just and valuable international actor who has the duty to "point the way ahead". (see above) "The Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values". (European Council 2001c: 20) This constitutes exclusiveness and draws boundaries between EU identity and those who refuse European standards. In this sense, "the Union is in the process of defining the possible interaction between the military capabilities under the ESDP and the fight against-terrorism". (European Council 2003c: 34) In the following section I will show how this translates into the reconstitution of ESDP.

3.3 Purpose of ESDP

On a basic level, the purpose of why the EU has established ESDP is unchanged comparing with the period before the attacks of 11 September 2001. The main purpose remains to be crisis management. But there are important aspects which are different. The first is that the need to make ESDP operational has been argued more forcefully referring to a terrorist threat. The Union “will be more effective in [...] making the European Security and Defence Policy operational as soon as possible”. (Council 2001a: 3) Through the military and civilian capabilities of the EU the “CFSP will become stronger and better contribute to preventing and controlling the terrorist threat for the benefit of the populations concerned”. (Council 2001d: 3) This is one argument addressing the development and implementation of ESDP. Another interesting aspect in this regard is how the relationship between ESDP and NATO is slightly reconstituted. Before the attacks of 11 September 2001 the need for autonomy of ESDP was almost always highlighted in regard to NATO. (see European Council 2000c: Annex VI no IV) In the aftermath, consultations between both organisations are more often called as an important respond to the terrorist attacks rather than pointing out autonomy. (European Council 2001b: 3)

The reason why operability of ESDP is more important since the terrorist attacks needs to be seen in relation to the concept of dynamic threats. As I have argued above, threats are understood to be dynamic because they can spill-over and produced other threats or make them more serious. For that reason, conflict prevention becomes more important. Conflict prevention can either be done through diplomatic efforts and economic support and hence development aid. Or, another option is the use of civilian and military capabilities of crisis management. Whereas previous to the terrorist attacks, ESDP was constituted as a tool to support development policy implemented only in the situation of a crisis, this has changed in the aftermath of the attacks. ESDP is constituted as an important, detached tool to prevent crisis and threats. “Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.” (ESS 2003: 7) In the Athens Declaration EU’s civilian and military capabilities have been constituted as “to enhance stability beyond its borders and further its humanitarian goals”. (European Council 2003a: 2) The aspect of ‘stability beyond its borders’ has been reformulated in the ESS: “With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad.” (ESS 2003: 7) This clearly changes the character of ESDP from being connected to development policy towards the purpose of supporting EU’s foreign policy in a broader sense. Again the ESS clearly supports this understanding: “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (ESS 2003: 11) In the following paragraph of the document this is related to defence budgets and the ability to “sustain several operations simultaneously”. (ibid) In this regard, the Political and Security Committee has been tasked “to keep a close watch on those situations which could require particular attention in the coming months”. (Council 2003a: 12)

Finally there is one aspect totally new to the construction of ESDP. Only in some occasions it is discussed that ESDP could be used internally to help to minimise civilian casualties and

consequences of a terrorist attack within the EU borders. "In this context, a database of military assets and capabilities relevant to the protection of civilian populations against the effects of terrorist attacks, including CBRN, has been established with the EUMS" (Council 2003d: XI) The database is made available to the Community Civil Protection Mechanism as the policy framework to organise civil protection mechanism in the light of terrorist attacks especially against nuclear power plants. (see Council 2001b) However, this discussion is still under way but it shows that military capabilities – and hence ESDP – constitute an appropriate mechanism to react to terrorist attacks and dynamic threats more general. This way of constituting the purpose of ESDP is different compared with the time previous to the attacks of 11 September 2001.

4. Conclusion

In this paper I have argued for security to be understood as a relational concept. The meaning of security is constituted by three dimensions: identity, perception of threats, and appropriate behaviour to face these threats. Identity is constructed through social interaction of actors of a certain group. It shapes their self-perception as well as their understanding of the world surrounding them. Based on this perspective they understand certain issues and actors as threatening or as a problem to which they need to find a solution. Whether or not threat construction is likely depends on the type of identity constructed through social interaction. Inclusive identities make threat construction less likely. Exclusive identities are highly vulnerable for threat construction. However, the meaning of security can not only be defined based on threat constructions. Also, the meaning of security can be constructed based on the understanding that something builds up to an international problem. If an actor understands itself to be in any way affected by this problems or responsible for a solution, an appropriate meaning of security will be defined.

Utilising this theoretical perspective I have analysed the meaning of security constituting ESDP previous and following the attacks of 11 September 2001. I tried to answer the question of how the meaning of security changed in this period of time and how this effected the constitution of ESDP. I have shown that EU identity construction changed in the aftermath of the attacks. It developed an inclusive moment. This took place through the strengthening of the meaning of EU's actorhood. The EU established itself as a strong international actor who has the obligation and the right to observe international developments and to show 'the way ahead' to other international actors. This perspective is understandable as an approach to take seriously self-initiative as a constituting concept of EU identity. In any case, it constitutes a change in the construction of EU identity.

At the same time, the EU understood international terrorism as a threat against itself. For the first time, on the EU level threat construction took place. It established international terrorism as an illegitimate, horrifying and irrational act of violence causing all sorts of difficult problems. International terrorism causes for example civilian casualties, international economic crises, and possibly regional conflicts. But threat construction did not only take place vis-à-vis international

terrorism. The understanding of living in a 'highly fragmented world' together with the perception of international terrorism led to the understanding of dynamic threats. The concept of dynamic threats constitutes relations between formerly separate international problems like proliferation of WMD, state failure and poverty. In the face of international terrorism, all these single problems are understood to affect each other. The result is a serious global challenge for security.

Based on this understanding ESDP has been reconstituted. Previous to the attacks of 11 September 2001, ESDP was constituted as a tool to back up development policy in the situation of crisis. The EU understood it to be important to have military and civilian crisis management capabilities at its disposal. Even if the concept of capabilities did not significantly change following the attacks, the purpose changed for which they should be used. ESDP is no longer connected almost exclusively to development policy. The EU perceived much more international problems as worth or essential to be addressed by EU policies. Dynamic threats thereby constitute the scenario against which ESDP needs to provide combating tools. Also, based on the more exclusively constructed EU identity, the threshold for the use of ESDP seems to have been reduced. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the EU constituted itself as an international 'power' which has to face security challenges in the form of dynamic threats and particularly international terrorism. ESDP is constituted to provide an appropriate response to prevent these challenges to occur – and "prevention can not start too early". (ESS 2003: 7)

The theoretical approach enabled the research to separately analyse constructions of identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour which together constitute the meaning of security. My approach is based on Onuf's understanding that humans are discourse dependent. Starting from this assumption, I developed a theoretical account of how social order is constituted through the use of language as social interaction. Security needs to be understood as a part of this social order. I have shown that social order can best be analysed using a discursive approach. My approach emphasises actor's intersubjectivity as the most relevant aspect affecting social interaction and hence the meaning of security. It thereby goes further than traditional approach analysing security policy.

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