

Standing Group on International Relations
Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference
Turin, 12-15 September 2007

‘The Impact of the EU’s Democratic Anchoring on the Settlement of the Cyprus Crisis’

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Introduction

The EU has played a considerable role in the transformation of Europe from a zone of ever re-occurring war into an area of lasting peace. Could it play an important part also in the resolution of conflicts at its borders? The main goal of the proposed paper is to examine the role played by the European Union (EU), in its interrelationship with Turkey, for the resolution of Cyprus crisis. In particular, it will provide an evaluation of the influence of EU's democratic anchoring on Turkey for the possible settlement of Cyprus crisis.

Strengthening the Union's security, preserve peace and develop democracy are among the objectives of its common foreign and security policy since the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 (art. 11 Treaty on the EU). Similarly, according to the draft Constitutional Treaty, the Union's external action should safeguard the security of the Union, consolidate democracy, preserve peace and prevent conflicts (art. III 193 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe). But what is the relationship between the Union's security, the preservation of peace, and the development of democracy?

The EU sees the promotion of democracy as a means to promote stability and security at its borders and therefore to prevent conflicts and preserve peace. This link has been clearly articulated in the European Security Strategy, drafted under the aegis of the EU High Representative Javier Solana and approved by the Brussels European Council on December 12, 2003. First, it is stated that '[i]t is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed' and that '[o]ur task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean'. Then, in the same document, it is specified that '[t]he best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order' (European Council 2003, 7-10).

After an initial review of the literature on the EU's role in conflict settlement, I describe the EU's democratic anchoring on Turkey, with particular attention paid to institutional links, the EU's assistance and the Union's political conditionality. Then, after a brief description of the historical background of the Cyprus crisis, I compare the role played by the EU in the settlement of the Cyprus crisis with that of the United Nations (UN). Finally, I describe the positions of the Turkish political class and the elite to the leverage of the external actors involved in the crisis, to evaluate if the EU's democratic anchoring on Turkey has contributed to the settlement of the Cyprus crisis, by favouring political, economic or social developments that have positively transformed the interests of Turkish political authorities and other domestic actors relevant for crisis resolution.

1. The impact of the EU on conflict settlement

The literature has explained the EU's influence on conflict settlement making reference to the Union as a framework of governance, law and policy that can offer a conducive context for the settlement of conflicts, and as an actor that can generate incentives for the settlement of conflicts through its policy instruments (Hill 2001; Pace and Stetter 2003; Tocci 2004; Coppetiers *et al.* 2004; Kamov 2006; Tocci 2007). Then, when analysing the Union's role as an actor, particular emphasis has been put on the concept of Europeanization (Pace and Stetter 2003; Coppetiers *et al.* 2004), assuming that the Europeanization process has a positive impact in transforming conflicts (Pace and Stetter 2003: 19). Europeanization, in the context of conflict settlement, has been defined as a 'process which is activated and encouraged by European institutions, primarily the EU, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of the parties involved in it into European structures' (Coppetiers *et al.* 2004: 7).

The link between the final outcome of the conflict and a certain degree of integration in European structures is made operational by conditionality and socialization mechanisms. Conditionality could affect conflict resolution directly

and indirectly. This means that the delivery of EU benefits could be made directly conditional on conflict settlement, or that conditionality could affect policy fields linked to the conflict resolution agenda which can affect the bargaining positions of the conflict parties (Coppetiers *et al.* 2004, Tocci 2007). It has been explained how conditionality works into all domestic dynamics (Börzel and Risse 2003). Actors are rational, they engage in bargaining, and weigh the costs and benefits of different strategies in order to maximize their utilities on the basis of ordered preferences.

But conflict resolution can be affected also by socialization, or diffuse mechanisms of learning and persuasion taking place through the different linkages – at institutional, political, economic and wider societal level – between EU actors and conflict parties. Unlike conditionality, in the case of socialization change occurs through a transformation of perceived interests as domestic actors internalize EU norms (Coppetiers *et al.* 2004, Tocci 2007).

As concerns how these mechanisms work into domestic dynamics, it has been explained that while conditionality generates ‘simple learning’, socialization generates ‘complex learning’. ‘Simple learning’ means that strategies and tactics change, while underlying preferences do not, while ‘complex learning’ occurs when ‘agents, in the absence of obvious material incentives, acquire new values and interests; their behaviour in turn, comes to be governed by new logic of appropriateness’ (Checkel 1999: 90). Consequently, it has been argued that while conditionality can be expected to operate mostly in the short term, socialization has longer term effects. But notwithstanding the analytical distinction between the mechanisms of conditionality and socialization, their logics of action may occur simultaneously (Börzel and Risse 2000).

Recently, Tocci has added a new mechanism to promote peace, i.e. passive enforcement or ‘rule application’ (Olsen 2002). In this process, a third country respects EU rules not because of the offer of carrot or the threat of stick, but as these rules come to be viewed as a *sine qua non*. Moreover, unlike socialization, change does not occur through contacts and learning from others,

but it is based on the country's own experience of respecting the rule (Tocci 2007: 17-18).

Starting from this literature, I propose to use the concept of anchoring to analyze how the EU can favour conflict settlement, instead of Europeanization, conditionality, socialization, or other mechanisms, for two main reasons. First of all, the notion of external anchoring, allows one to explain the process of domestic change making reference at the same time to different mechanisms of leverage, such as conditionality and socialisation, and thus to combine rational with constructivist explanations. Then, the notion of anchoring, rather than Europeanization, can cover the activity of all the relevant external actors in a situation of conflict, and allows one to compare the role played by the EU with that of other relevant external actors as the United Nations and the OSCE, that have security mandates and are engaged in conflict management, but also of the Council of Europe, and of unilateral players as the United States and Russia.

The economic literature on external anchoring is extensive, particularly in relation to macroeconomic policy of developing countries (Francois 1997; Berglof and Roland 1998; Gros 2001; Tovias and Ugur 2004; Featherstone 2004; Dodini and Fantini 2006; Berger *et al.* 2007; Di Tommaso *et al.* 2007; Önis and Bakir 2007). These literature evaluates if and how the anchoring of an external actor, that may be the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or regional organization as the EU or the North American Free Trade Agreement, has an impact on macroeconomic reforms of transition countries. Increasingly in the last years, also the politological literature adopts the concept of anchor. In particular, domestic anchors have been used to explain the process of democratic consolidation (Morlino 2005), but also the concept of external anchor has been adopted to explain the impact of the EU or of other external actors promoting democracy on the political reforms of third countries (Ugur 1999; Coricelli 2007; Magen and Morlino 2007).

In this field, the most developed contribution is the one of Magen and Morlino who explain the impact of the EU's anchoring on the reforms of Romania, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine in the field of civil and political rights,

judicial system, institutional and administrative structures, anti-corruption policies and civilian control of the army and police. At the highest level of analysis, they define external anchoring as process in which national political regimes are subject to variably dense external linkages, pressures and stimulants, influencing the conditions of democracy. Moreover, they affirm that anchoring may involve four main methods of influence, i.e. conditionality, socialization, control¹ and example² (Magen and Morlino 2007). However, control and example are less applicable than conditionality and socialization to the anchoring of the EU, as it does not impose – at least with the use of force – democracy, and as the dynamic of example may occur also without the activity of democracy promotion of an external actor.

On the basis of all this, I propose the following working definition of external anchoring, in the context of conflict settlement: a process in which an actor keeps close to itself a country, offering some incentives (the anchors) in exchange or not for the respect of some conditions as concerns also conflict settlement. In the case of the EU, the anchoring is democratic as the Union conditions the offer of its anchors to the respect for its democratic principles and practices, common to its member states.

According to this definition, main dimensions of the EU democratic anchoring, that can be empirically detected, are institutional ties with the EU, economic assistance, and the demand to comply with certain political conditions. Institutional links, together with economic assistance, are the main incentives or anchors the EU offers to third countries. Institutional links between a third country and the EU may be of a diplomatic, military and civilian nature (Kamov 2006: 48 and 70) and are the result of bilateral contractual relations in the context of the first Community pillar and of the Union's specific policy initiatives in key functional areas (Pace 2005: 15; Pace 2007: 11). In general, those countries that have the prospective of membership of the Union, rather than association or partnership, have a stronger incentive or anchor, as they can participate, at the same level of the other member states, to the EU process of decision making, and

they can benefit, as the other member states, of redistributive policies of the Union.

Economic assistance is the other main benefit that third countries are given by the EU. It is important to evaluate if the EU is or not the first donor for the country, as it can be hypothesised that if the Union is for the country an important donor, then the country should be more willing to comply with the requests of the EU in order to continue receiving the same amount of assistance or at least, not to be sanctioned in terms of the committed assistance.

The demand to comply with certain political conditions, is interrelated to the mechanism of political conditionality. It can be analysed at two different levels: the formal or 'proclaimed' conditionality which may be both positive and negative, and the 'effective' conditionality (Baracani 2007). EU's democratic conditionality, as proclaimed in Copenhagen in 1993, means that third countries have to respect the Union's political conditions – democracy, human rights, rule of law, and minority rights – in order to become closer to the Union in terms of association or membership. Positive democratic conditionality is when the European Union declares that the more a country complies with its requests, the closer it will become to the Union. Democratic conditionality is negative when it is stated, as in EC's economic assistance regulations, that the country that does not comply with the EU's political conditions will be penalised in terms of the amount of economic assistance allocated. However, democratic conditionality in order to be perceived from the third country as credible has to be implemented or become effective. Effective conditionality refers in particular to the level of determinacy of political conditions,³ to the monitoring of compliance of the country with the political conditions, and to the reward or punishment in case of compliance or not.⁴ Only an effective political conditionality, that is not subordinated to other considerations, can be perceived from the third country as credible, and thus can contribute to make the country comply with the requests of the Union also as concerns the settlement of the conflict.

All the empirical dimensions of the EU's democratic anchoring – institutional links, economic assistance, and the demand to comply with the

Union's political conditions – can generate, through the mechanism of socialization, a process of internalization of EU's principles and practices, that could contribute to positively transform the interests of actors relevant for crisis resolution.

2. EU's democratic anchoring on Turkey

2.1 Institutional links

Relations between Turkey and the European Community (EC) date back to 1963, when an association agreement, the so-called Ankara Agreement, was signed. The main aspects of this agreement were the creation of a customs union in a three-phase period and the prospect of membership in the Community.

After the Mediterranean enlargements to Greece, Spain and Portugal, in 1987 Turkey applied for membership of the EC in 1987, but the European Commission's opinion in 1989 was 'that it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away', giving both economic and political reasons and noting the negative effects of the dispute between Greece and Turkey and the situation in Cyprus.

Meanwhile, in 1995, Turkey became a partner of the EU's Barcelona process for the southern Mediterranean countries and became the first country to establish a customs union with the EU in anticipation of subsequent full membership (Council of the European Union 1995). It has been explained that the establishment of the customs unions with Turkey led to misunderstandings on both sides. On the one side, the EU hoped that Turkey would have begun to commit itself to the realization of the customs union, without pushing for membership for the time being. But on the other side, Turkish authorities believed that the customs union was a fundamental step towards membership, which should have happened no later than in two years time (Arikan 2003: 82).

After another rebuttal of Turkey's candidacy at the Luxembourg European Council of 1997, the Helsinki European Council of 1999 produced the great leap forward in EU-Turkish relations, deciding that, 'Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states' (European Council 1999). Therefore, since this date Turkey-EU relations are developed in the framework of the pre-accession process.

The Turkish process of getting closer to the EU seems to slow down with the Copenhagen European Council of 2002, which decided to postpone the decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey until December 2004. But the European Council of December 2004 enabled the opening of accession negotiations.

Membership has always been the final objective of the pre-accession process, but Turkey might turn into an exception. Indeed, the accession negotiating framework for Turkey establishes that negotiations are an 'open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand'. Moreover, it specifies that '[w]hile having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria ... if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond'. This means that in the case of Turkey it is uncertain what the end of pre-accession process will be; it might be membership but also possibly something different.

2.2. Economic assistance

The EU is for Turkey the first donor of economic assistance, followed by Japan, Germany, Spain, France, Austria, the Arab countries, the United States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Greece (OECD 2006). Indeed, the EU share of total Official Development Aid (ODA)⁵ to Turkey in 2004 was 75% (European Commission and OECD 2006, 22 and 27). However, a comparison of EU aid per capita to Turkey shows that the country has received much less assistance than Romania and Serbia (Baracani 2007).

From 1964 to 1995 EU assistance to Turkey was given through financial protocols that accompanied the Ankara Agreement. According to the Turkish General Secretariat for EU Affairs, even though in this period Turkey was allocated 453 million euros of assistance, only 78 million euros were paid, which amounts to 2.4 million euros each year.

Then, from 1995, when Ankara became a partner of the Barcelona Process, it received EU assistance through the MEDA Programme, which was the principal financial instrument for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Under MEDA I (1996-99) Turkey was allocated 376 million euros for 55 projects on economic transition, on the strengthening of socio-economic equilibrium and on democratization and civil society. But according to the same Turkish General Secretariat for EU Affairs, only 52 million euros were paid, which amounts to 13 million euros each year.

After the Helsinki decision to recognise Turkey as a candidate for accession and thus since 2000, financial assistance to the country has been pre-accession oriented, that means granted priorities listed in the Accession Partnership for Turkey in order to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria. On the whole, during 2000-06 Turkey was allocated each year an average of 232.8 million euros (see Table 1).

Table 1: EU pre-accession assistance allocated to Turkey 2000-06 (million €)

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Average
177	147	126	144	235.6	300	500	232.8

Source: Directorate General Enlargement of the European Commission (my compilation).

In the last five years (2002-06) the main sectors of EU assistance to Turkey were economic and social cohesion, followed by approximation to the *acquis*, public administration, political criteria, civil society dialogue and support for European integration, and justice and home affairs. In terms of assistance for the political criteria, it was very low in 2002, but it increased in 2003 and 2004, and in 2005 reached a peak of 48.24 million euros (see Table 2).

Table 2: Main sectors of EU assistance allocated to Turkey 2002-06 (million €)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Average	Average 2002-05
Political criteria	2.04	9.5	21.02	48.24	9.79	18.11	20.2
Approximation to the acquis	0	22.6	31.8	63.67	53.91	34.39	29.51
Public administration	44.66	25	49.54	0	0	23.84	29.78
Justice and home affaires	12.20	5.02	11.4	0	0	5.72	7.15
Economic and social cohesion	40	45.3	77.5	91.35	16.8	54.19	63.53
Civil society dialogue, and support for European integration	0	0	0	55.43	24.85	16.05	13.85

Source: Directorate General Enlargement of the European Commission (my compilation).

2.3. Conditionality and required reforms

Since the experience of accession of Central and Eastern European countries, the EU conditionality has been both positive and negative. Indeed, Turkey was informed that the more it complies with the Union requests, the closer it will become to the Union, and according to the Accession Partnership for Turkey, EU economic assistance is conditional on satisfying the Copenhagen criteria and meeting the specific priorities of the Accession Partnership, and a failure to respect these conditions can lead to a decision by the Council to suspend this financial assistance (Council of the European Union 2001: 10).

As mentioned above, EU conditionality for the associated countries that wish to become members of the Union was proclaimed at Copenhagen in 1993, but only in 1997, when the Luxemburg European Council launched the enhanced pre-accession strategy, did the EU start to implement this conditionality. In fact, the enhanced pre-accession strategy was based on three new key components that have allowed the European Commission and the Council of the European Union to make this proclaimed conditionality effective: Accession Partnerships, annual assessment of the progress achieved by the candidate country, and accession-driven economic assistance.

The main idea behind the new concept of Accession Partnership is that specific priorities or required reforms concerning the Copenhagen criteria are set out in these documents for each candidate country. Therefore, for the first time, formal political conditions – democracy, human rights, minority rights, rule of

law, good neighbourly relations – are translated into much more specific political priorities that should address the main democratic challenges of each country. Another important feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy is the monitoring of compliance in the framework of the Association Agreements bodies and the annual review by the European Commission of the candidate's progress in fulfilment of the Accession Partnership's priorities. The monitoring of compliance by the European Commission is the way chosen by the EU to assess, once political priorities have been listed, whether they have been satisfied or not. But this is also a way for the Commission to make sure the country has understood what reforms are necessary to fulfil the priorities indicated in the Accession Partnership. Finally, all the various forms of EC assistance become accession-driven, that is, economic and technical assistance is designed to help candidates satisfy the priorities set by the EU in the Accession Partnerships.⁶

In order to evaluate the level of determinacy of the EU's political priorities the actual content of these required reforms has to be analyzed. The following table summarizes all the topics that have been object of required reforms in the fields of 'democracy and rule of law', 'human rights and minority protection', and 'respect for international obligations'.

Table 3: EU political priorities for Turkey

Democracy and rule of law	Judiciary functioning and independence
	Civil control of the military
	Fight against corruption
Human rights and minority protection	Freedom of expression (and media freedom)
	Freedom of association and peacefully assembly
	Freedom of political parties
	Freedom of religion
	Non discrimination
	Torture and ill-treatments
	Death penalty
	Detention conditions
	International treaties on human rights
	Training on human rights issues
	South East
Cultural rights for minorities	
Respect for international obligations	Cyprus problem
	Border disputes with Greece

Source: 2001, 2003 and 2006 Accession Partnerships for Turkey (my compilation)

In particular, as concerns the Cyprus problem, in the 2001 Accession Partnership, the country is asked to ‘strongly support the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem’ (Council of the European Union 2001: 16). This request does not change in the following Accession Partnership (Council of the European Union 2003: 43), while in the last partnership, Turkey is asked not only to ‘[e]nsure continued support for efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the UN framework’, but also because of Cyprus insistence,⁷ to ‘[i]mplement fully the Protocol adopting the Ankara Agreement to the accession of the 10 new EU Member States, including Cyprus’, and to ‘[t]ake concrete steps for the normalisation of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus’. Finally, in the part on ‘transport’, Turkey is requested to ‘[r]emove all restrictions on Cyprus flagged vessels serving the Cyprus trade and the provision of the aviation agreements that discriminate Member States’ carriers on the basis of their nationality’ (Council of the European Union 2006: 39 and 42).

Analysis of all the specific content of the EU’s political priorities for Turkey in the Accession Partnerships, has shown that within the EU perspective it was sufficiently determinate in all cases. This means that the EU has informed the government as to what objectives it has to reach, even though the country has been left autonomous in deciding how to reach these goals (see Baracani 2007 for details). Moreover, the level of determinacy of the EU’s political priorities has been reinforced through annual monitoring of the political situation of the Commission, which informs the countries whether they met the specific requests and what further steps are required (on this last point, see also Schimmelfennig 2005: 119-120).

As regards the European Commission monitoring of the progress accomplished or not by the country in satisfying the Union’s priorities, there is an annual monitoring, which started in the case of Turkey in 2001. This activity

is fundamental to enable the EU to reward or sanction the country that has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, the Union's political conditions.

Finally, the EU has both rewarded Turkey for its general compliance with the Union's conditions and sanctioned the country not to have respected its conditions in particular as concerns Cyprus. Indeed, in October 2005, progress in satisfying the requested priorities was rewarded with the decision to open accession negotiations, which was also accompanied by the decision to allocate the country 500 million euros of economic assistance for 2006 (the same assistance allocated for 2005 had been 300 million euros). But, in December 2006, the EU decided to sanction Turkey in terms of institutional links, establishing not to open accession negotiations on some specific chapters with Turkey. This decision was the consequence of the lack of full implementation by Turkey of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, and of the restrictions on the free movement of goods. In particular, the Commission recommended that the Intergovernmental Conference on Accession with Turkey should not open negotiations on chapters covering policy areas relevant to Turkey's restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus,⁸ and that no chapter could be provisionally closed until the Commission had confirmed that Turkey had fully implemented its commitments with respect to the Additional Protocol (European Commission 2006).

3. The Cyprus crisis

The origins of conflict in Cyprus date back to British colonial domination in the early twentieth century, when the Greek Cypriot community, supported by Greece, became increasingly dissatisfied with British control. The Greek Cypriot wish was not independence, but self-determination through *enosis*, union with Greece. The Turkish Cypriot community, 18 per cent of the population, rejected union with Greece and demanded *taksim*, a partition of the island into Greek and Turkish zones. By the 1950s, Greek Cypriot dissatisfaction developed into armed struggle against the colonial regime. Supported by Turkey and spurred on by the

British, the Turkish Cypriots formed a reactive armed movement and inter-communal clashes erupted. In 1959 the British colonial rule ended and the 1959 London and Zurich accords, created the new and independent Republic of Cyprus (RoC), both *enosis* and *taksim* were ruled out.

Established on 16 August 1960, Cyprus should be a bi-communal state, allowing for power-sharing between its two constituent communities.⁹ But from the outset, most Greek Cypriots regarded the agreements as over-generous concessions to the Turkish Cypriots, and in 1963, the Greek Cypriot leadership proposed a constitutional revision in order to create a centralised unitary state with minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots. Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the proposed revision. At the same time, violence broke out again between paramilitary groups, leading to thousands of deaths and the forced displacement of over 30,000 Turkish Cypriots from mixed areas to enclaves.

The crisis intensified following the 1967 military coup in Greece, and in particular in July 1974, when the Greek Cypriot National Guard staged a coup to extend its dictatorship to Cyprus. Invoking its rights under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey intervened militarily and extended its control to 37 per cent of the island's territory in the north. The 1975 Vienna accords on exchange of populations led to the displacement of Greek Cypriots from the north and Turkish Cypriots from the south. The island was de facto partitioned into two zones – the Turkish Cypriot in the north and Greek Cypriot in the south – and the 1960 constitutional order was not restored. In 1975 the Turkish Cypriots in the north constituted the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”, and then in 1983 declared independence as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), not recognised by the international community,¹⁰ with the sole exception of Turkey. In the south, the Greek Cypriots retained the title of “Republic of Cyprus”, viewed by the international community, with the exception of Turkey, as the only legitimate authority on the island despite the absence of Turkish Cypriots in state institutions.

The decades that followed witnessed a consolidation of the conflict, notwithstanding the efforts of the United Nations, supported in the last years also by the European Union.

4. External anchoring on Cyprus crisis

The most important international actor involved in the Cyprus crisis were the United Nations. First of all, a UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) was deployed already in 1964 ‘in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions’. In the absence of a political settlement to the Cyprus problem, the mandate of UNFICYP has been periodically extended and it remains to this day despite changed circumstances. Then since 1974, while the EC refrained from involvement in conflict resolution efforts, the UN Secretary General developed increasingly detailed proposals for a settlement of the conflict, even if without achieving a compromise.

In 1974, the UN Security Council Resolution 367 proposed a solution based on an independent, sovereign, bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, which paved the way for the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 establishing guidelines for a settlement. After these, in the period 1980-83 UN Special Representative Hugo Gobbi mediated inter-communal negotiations which failed when in May 1983 the RoC, with the support of Greece, secured the UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253 in favour of the immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces, to which Turkish Cypriots responded with their unilateral declaration of independence, and the Greek Cypriot team left the negotiations. In 1984-86 the UN drafted three agreements under the Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, proposing a federation consisting of two provinces.¹¹ The Turkish Cypriot side accepted the first and third draft agreements for a federal settlement, but the Greek foreign minister George Papandreou and the Greek Cypriot President Kyprianou rejected them. Talks were resumed in Geneva in August 1988 between

Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, and the newly elected Greek Cypriot President Vassiliou, considered more moderate than his predecessor.

In the 1990s, following the Commission's positive opinion on the RoC application for EU membership,¹² the Union started to be another key external player for the settlement of the conflict.

Meanwhile in 1992, the new UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali presented a new proposal, known as the 'Set of Ideas', endorsed by the UN Security Council in April. But direct talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot teams ended already in November, and stalled until 1997.

In the meantime Cyprus accession process proceeded with the General Affairs Council decision in 1995 to open accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the completion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. The EU thought that the membership perspective would serve as an impetus for the resolution of the conflict. But in 1997, the Commission document 'Agenda 2000' stated that accession negotiations could begin with the RoC despite the persistence of the conflict. Thus, the RoC's beginning of accession negotiations was no more conditioned to the settlement of the Cyprus problem. The main reasons for this decisions were Greece pressure and the intention to place Turkish Cypriot and Turkey in a situation in which they could no longer block Cyprus' accession in the EU by refusing to negotiate a settlement of the conflict.

In view of the opening of accession negotiations, the UN re-launched inter-communal negotiations in July-August 1997, but they failed, and Denktash refused further direct talks. To break the impasse in 1999, the UN Security Council decided to launch proximity talks, in which, rather than negotiating, the parties discuss their position with a third-party mediator, but in December 2000 the Turkish Cypriot side unilaterally decided to abandon the talks.

As in the case of the opening of accession negotiations with the RoC, at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU decided again not to condition the RoC accession to the settlement of the conflict. But it also decided to grant Turkey the candidate status and to condition Turkey's EU accession to the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

In the period 2002-04 the UN led the negotiations on the conflict under the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ which proposed to reunify the island, before joining the EU. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presented five successive revisions of the Plan since November 2002, the last of which was submitted to separate referendums on 24 April 2004. The Plan provided for the establishment of a single United Cyprus Republic, constituted by a federal level and two constituent states (a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot state). Most competences would be attributed to the constituent states and the federal level would be responsible principally for foreign relations, monetary policy, federal finance and citizenship and immigration. Federal institutions would be a Presidential Council, a federal parliament, and a Supreme Court. The Presidential Council would be composed of nine members comprising nine members, including at least two Turkish Cypriot voting members, and one Turkish Cypriot non-voting member, and a rotating Presidency. It would strive to reach decisions by consensus. The federal parliament would be composed of two houses and decisions would require the approval of both chambers by simple majority. The Supreme Court would be represented by an equal number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and would serve as a dispute-resolving mechanism if federal institutions became deadlocked.

5. Turkish positions

For a long time the Turkish public had become accustomed to the view that no solution is the solution in Cyprus and advocating ideas challenging the *status quo* in Cyprus amounted to virtual treason.

Indeed, after the Luxemburg European Council of December 1997, which decided to start accession talks with the RoC, without a settlement of the conflict being a precondition, and at the same time not yet recognizing Turkey’s accession candidacy, Turkish reaction was very negative. According to Denktash, Turkey would annex the north of the island if ever the EU accepted a ‘shrunk’ Cyprus Republic (Kadritzke 1998).

The Helsinki European Council, opening the prospect of Turkish accession, could have improved Turkish position on a settlement in Cyprus. However, at the same time, the European Council concluded that a settlement would not be a condition for Cyprus' accession. Again, the Turkish reaction was not positive. Those sceptical of Turkey's EU membership continued to reject any link between a Cyprus settlement and Turkey's accession, while those in favour of Turkey's accession were not yet ready to accept this linkage.

After forty years of being part of fruitless negotiations and supporting the *status quo* on the island, Turkish Cyprus policy changed with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). For the AKP government, EU membership was a priority. Moreover, this time it was clear that Cyprus' EU accession was inevitable, also without a settlement. Thus, the AKP government could accept the link between membership and settlement. Indeed, within weeks of assuming office, Erdogan helped advance the island's reunification distancing his government from Denktash.

What happened after the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council, which offered Turkey to review in December 2004 the possibility of starting accession negotiations, while at the same time inviting the divided island to enter the Union? Those sceptical of Turkey's future in Europe continued in their opposition to a settlement and in particular to the UN Plan. Among those in favour of Turkey's EU membership, some proposed to postpone a settlement until December 2004, when Turkey's EU prospects were clearer, while other pushed for an early settlement based on the UN Plan.

In North Cyprus since 2002 Denktash became increasingly pressured by pro-Plan movements, which eventually led to the win in the December 2003 parliamentary elections of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), led by Mehmet Ali Talat.¹³ This was made possible not only by the internal dynamics in northern Cyprus, but also because of the change of power in Turkey and of the change in Turkish Cyprus policy.

By February 2004, those in Turkey pushing for an early settlement appeared to gain the upper hand, despite strong resistance from the opposition

party, the presidency and some part of the military. The National Security Council in Turkey convened a meeting on Cyprus in late January 2004, that resulted in a Turkish and Turkish Cypriot commitment to re-launch direct negotiations and to use the Annan Plan as a reference for an agreement (Tocci and Kovziridze 2004: 34). Thus, also the military associated itself with the position of the government in support of the Annan Plan. Shortly afterwards, during a World Economic Summit meeting in Davos Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan went even further, declaring that the UN Secretary General had the authority to 'fill in the blanks' if the parties failed to agree on changes to the Plan.

Convened in New York by the Secretary General, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides made a remarkable proposition. They presented a three-stage timetable for reaching an agreement before Cyprus' accession on 1 May. The first stage would see a re-launch of negotiations between the two Cypriot leaderships aimed at reaching an agreement on the basis of the Plan. If the first stage had not resulted in an agreement, in the second stage Greece and Turkey would intervene attempting to reach a solution. In the absence of an agreement, in the final stage the Secretary General would add the final touches to the Plan which would then be submitted to the two communities in separate referenda. In the three-stage process, the Turkish government remained committed to its pledges and, together with the CTP, supported the final version of the Annan Plan submitted to separate referenda in April 2004. But notwithstanding that 65% of Turkish Cypriots accepted the Plan, it could not pass, as 76% of Greek Cypriots rejected it.¹⁴ Therefore, on the 1st of May 2004 a divided Cyprus became member of the Union, with the *acquis communautaire* applying only for its southern part.

In July 2005, Turkey signed the Additional protocol, extending the customs agreement with the EU to the new members states. According to the December 2004 European Council, it was a precondition for the opening of membership talks with the EU in October and meant that Turkey should open its ports and airports to vessels from Cyprus. But the Turkish government explicitly mentioned in a declaration that this act does not lead to the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and resisted extending its implementation to Cyprus in spite

of EU pressure that culminated in the decision of December 2006 to suspend talks on eight of the 35 negotiating chapters.

Conclusions

The analysis of the impact of the EU's democratic anchoring on Turkey shows that two main variables can explain the change in Turkish Cyprus policy in the period 2002-04: domestic political change and the perceived value of the incentives offered by the Union in exchange for the respect of its conditions.

For the former Turkish coalition government, Turkey's EU accession process did not generate sufficient political will to support a solution for Cyprus, even if since December 1999 the country was granted accession candidacy. This remained the case until the November 2002 election of the AKP, that enhanced the perceived value of EU accession. Indeed, in the 2002 AKP program, it is affirmed that 'Turkey shall rapidly fulfil its promises in its relations with the European Union' and, as concerns Cyprus, that 'the solution of the Cyprus issue ... cannot be ignored' (AKP 2002). Thus, there are no doubts that the election of the AKP government has favoured a shift in Turkish Cyprus policy, but this change is also strictly connected to the importance the AKP gave to Turkey's EU membership.

What about the latest developments as concerns both EU's democratic anchoring on Turkey and recent events in Turkey? EU's democratic anchoring on Turkey seems to be changed for three main reasons. First of all, according to the negotiating framework of October 2005, accession is not the certain end of the process and eventually could not take place before 2014. Moreover, in this document, as in the 2006 Accession Partnership, Turkey is asked not only to support the efforts to achieve a settlement of the problem within the UN framework, but also to fulfil its obligations under the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement. But the price of this request is much higher, than the demand to contribute to a settlement of the problem, as it means a *de facto* recognition of

Cyprus. Finally, the lack of compliance under the Additional Protocol has led the EU to partially suspend Turkish accession negotiations.

Also as a consequence of these events, Turkish public trust in the EU has recently decreased. Survey show that Turkish public opinion overwhelmingly believes that the EU will not admit Turkey as a member, even if it meets all the Copenhagen conditions. Moreover, during recent electoral competitions, EU accession process was no more the main subject of the electoral campaign, even if the AKP continues to consider the process of accession to the EU as a process of restructuring that raises Turkey's standards. Differently, Cyprus has been an important issue of the electoral campaign. In particular, according to the AKP, the 'Cyprus issue cannot be considered as a prerequisite of Turkey-EU relations. It is on the agenda of the UN. We will continue the strategy of protecting our interests and the rights of Northern Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean' (Turkish Daily News 2007).

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¹ Control refers to the imposition by an external actor, also with the use of military force, of a democratic regime in place of an authoritarian regime (see also Whitehead 2001).

² This expression has been used to explain the adoption by non-member countries of EU rules and practices not because of any external incentives or persuasion, but to emulate successful neighbors (see also Whitehead 2001).

³ It means that a third country has to know exactly what it has to do in order to comply with the EU's requests (Schimmelfennig 2005, 110)

⁴ For example an accession candidate country that has complied with the EU's political conditions can be rewarded with the opening of accession negotiations or allocating a larger amount of assistance, and a third country that has not complied with its political requests can be sanctioned suspending negotiations with the EU or reducing the amount of EC assistance allocated.

⁵ Official Development Assistance is defined as those flows of funds to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: i) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and ii) it is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent.

⁶ The PHARE Programme used to be at the beginning "demand driven", that is, assistance was provided according to the needs of the transition, as established by the recipient (Rupnik 2000: 125).

⁷ Upon Cyprus insistence, for the first time in December 2004, the European Council had demanded Turkey to sign the protocol extending its customs union with the EU to the new member states (including Cyprus) before its accession negotiations could begin. In the autumn of 2005, Turkey fulfilled this request, but it refrained from implementing the protocol.

⁸ Free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture and rural development, fisheries, transport policy, customs union, and external relations.

⁹ The parties also signed the Treaties of Guarantee, of Alliance and of Establishment. The Treaty of Guarantee granted Britain, Greece and Turkey the right of unilateral intervention to restore constitutional order on the island. The Treaty of Alliance allowed Greece and Turkey to station 950 and 650 troops respectively in Cyprus. The Treaty of Establishment accorded the UK sovereignty over two military bases in Dhekelia and Akrotiri.

¹⁰ See UN General Assembly Resolution 5412 (1983), UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), and Council of Europe Resolution 1056 (1987).

¹¹ 1984 Working Points, 1985 Integrated Documents, and the 1986 Draft Framework Agreement.

¹² The RoC applied for EC membership on 4 July 1990, the Commission Opinion was of 1993. However, already in 1962, the independent Cyprus had applied to join the EC, but the violent clashes that broke out one year later made this impossible. Despite the division of the island the EC continued its relations with the Greek Cypriots and in 1973 they evolved into an Association Agreement.

¹³ Until late 2001 Turkish Cypriots viewed Cyprus' EU membership as a threat as they believed that it would necessitate a centralized state that would eliminate bi-zonality, and that would cut links to Ankara. But by 2002, EU accession was no more viewed as a threat, rather as a necessary condition for Turkish Cypriot communal survival and prosperity, mainly because of the economic gains expected from accession.

¹⁴ When the peace process was resumed in the beginning of 2004, the Republic of Cyprus had already signed the EU Treaty of Accession. Consequently, the stimulus of the Greek Cypriot side to engage actively in the negotiations was lowered and the president Papadopoulos started openly to campaign against the Plan.