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# ***Turbulent Society: Enmity in International Society***

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**Huss Banai  
Brown University**

[Huss\\_Banai@Brown.Edu](mailto:Huss_Banai@Brown.Edu)

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Granted that disorder spoils pattern, it also provides the material of pattern. Order implies restriction; from all possible materials, a limited selection has been made from all possible relations a limited set has been used. So disorder by implication is unlimited, no pattern has been realized in it, but its potential for patterning is indefinite. This is why, though we seek to create order, we do not simply condemn disorder. WE recognize that it is destructive to existing patterns; also that it has potentiality. It symbolizes both danger and power.

Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger*<sup>1</sup>

Enmity occupies a central place in social relations among individuals and groups in international society. Whether it is borne out of ideological competition, economic disparities, social injustices, religious orthodoxies, claims to supremacy, or whether it springs forth from more mundane circumstances such as familial disputes or personal jealousies, enmity is, almost at once, both a symptom and a cause of a kind of disconnect from the object of its unrelenting passions. As such, enmity is but a logical implication of an identity variously formed and reformulated in response to an entirely foreign set of characteristics perceived as being hostile and threatening. Indeed, as Carl Schmitt long ago observed, this rupture is the very condition necessary for the realization of ‘the political’ – i.e. the social space of varied encounters – in society.<sup>2</sup> In Schmitt’s formulation, moreover, enmity is especially worthy of attention for it represents the immanent possibility of death and carnage (‘War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy. It is the most extreme consequence of enmity’).<sup>3</sup> To be sure, the study of war – as a social phenomenon – has been a central preoccupation of International Relations (IR) scholars and practitioners for centuries. Yet, it is especially striking, given the complex substratum of differentiation atop which violent conflict rests, how little

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<sup>1</sup> Douglas, M. 2002. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. London: Routledge. p. 117.

<sup>2</sup> Schmitt, C. 1996. *The Concept of the Political*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 26. As Schmitt notes from the outset, ‘The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy’.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 33. Schmitt adds, ‘It [war] does not have to be common, normal, something ideal, or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain a real possibility for as long as the concept of the enemy remains valid’.

direct attention has been paid to the origins, evolution, and maintenance of enmity in international society.

This glaring oversight may partly be attributed to the way in which most mainstream IR scholars conceive of the international realm as an anarchical arrangement of 'like units' (states) different only either in 'material capabilities'<sup>4</sup> or 'perceptions'<sup>5</sup> in relation to each another. Yet, and more importantly, it points to the complexities involved in dealing with the normative and often contingent foundations of such notions as identity and difference, of interpretation and representation, and of discourse and practice. In what follows, I shall consider the nature and function of enmity in international politics using the English School framework. Enmity is both constrained and mediated by what Hedley Bull identified as the 'rules of coexistence' and 'rules of cooperation' that define the terms of membership in a society of states. Yet, paradoxically, the normative foundations of enmity also affect the rules and institutions of international society as they transcend the hard boundaries of nation-states and spill onto the more contingent (and much larger) arena of world society.<sup>6</sup> In fact, in the age of transnational terrorism and 'extraordinary renditions', of instant messaging and network communities, and of seemingly perpetual conflict between the forces of 'good' and 'evil', enmity is both a resource and a curse for elites in international society. Enmity establishes a sort of dialectic between different domains in international society and as such serves as an important factor in distinguishing a pluralist society of states from a solidarist one.

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<sup>4</sup> Waltz, K. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

<sup>5</sup> Wendt, A. 2000. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>6</sup> As Charles Manning rightly observed, 'it is at this intermediate level between the solid earth of manhood down below and the stratosphere of statehood up above that...the multi-dimensional interplay of social forces goes perennially on'. Manning, C.A.W. 1962. *The Nature of International Society*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. p. 34.

My main objective in this paper is to consider the implications of enmity as a constitutive force *in* international society for the study of international politics. It must be noted from the outset, however, that this paper is neither a general meditation on the phenomenon of enmity in the abstract sense of the term, nor does it amount to a comprehensive survey of the existing literature on the subject; rather, it is a look at the multiple locations, contours, and effects of hostility and antagonism in international society. As such, it is organized into three sections. The first section examines the different conceptions and figurations of enmity in international society through the analytical prism of English School theory. The second section considers the more ‘constructivist’ arguments of the English School by further exploring the ideational and normative foundations of enmity at the ‘intermediate level’<sup>7</sup> between international and world society. Lastly, the third section aims to go beyond some of the classical arguments of the English School by considering the relevance and application of a post-classical approach to the study of differentiation in international society.

### **The English School on Enmity**

At first glance, much of English School theorizing – in articulating the dynamics and contours of the international society perspective on world politics – has curiously little to say about enmity as an enduring historical current in international politics. This is not particularly surprising given how the School’s central concept – i.e. international society – tends to rest on cooperative notions about commonality, order, and harmony. As Hedley Bull conceived of it,

‘A *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound

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<sup>7</sup> Manning, C.A.W. *The Nature of International Society*. p. 34. (See footnote 7)

by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions'.<sup>8</sup>

Consequently, later reflections on international society have sought either to clarify just what is meant by 'common interests', 'common values', 'common set of rules', and 'common institutions', or to broaden the scope of inquiry altogether to include previously-neglected dimensions of world politics such as culture, economics, gender, justice, and terror.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the very idea of international society, as Martin Wight described it, is premised on a 'Rationalist' perspective which credits the 'continuous international and institutionalized intercourse' between states to the immanent triumph of reason over deep-seated passions and hatreds.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, as Bull observed, membership in the society of states provides an incentive structure whereby states come to recognize the utility of cooperation as a means of guaranteeing 'the elementary goals of social life' – i.e. survival, trust, and independence.<sup>11</sup> Even war, as a settled institution of international society in the English School formulation – along with the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, and the great powers – is regarded as rational and even beneficial when conducted in the interest of maintaining order and toward the enforcement of international law. In other words, from the perspective of international society war is rendered irrational and harmful only when it threatens the stability of the order on which the society itself rests (e.g. in the case

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<sup>8</sup> Bull, H. 1977. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Palgrave. p. 13. Italics in the original.

<sup>9</sup> For the most comprehensive works in the former, see Buzan, B. 2004. *From International to World Society? English School Theory and Social Structure of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and Linklater, A. and H. Suganami. 2006. *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For a pithy compilation of the latter see, Bellamy, A. J. ed. 2005. *International Society and Its Critics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

<sup>10</sup> Wight, M. 1992. *International Theory: The Three Traditions*. Gabriel Wight and Brian Porter, eds. New York: Holmes and Meier. pp. 7-15.

<sup>11</sup> Bull, Hedley. 1977. p. 64.

of superpower rivalry involving nuclear weapons).<sup>12</sup> This is not to say, however, that the outbreak of war is not also thought to be dangerous for the acute sense of division and feelings of antagonism it otherwise conveys, but to merely underline the extent to which rationality and dispassion are continually prized over other, less instrumental variables in relations between states.

The Rationalist perspective, therefore, conceives of enmity as the inevitable outcome of power politics resulting from international anarchy – inevitable, but nevertheless manageable under societal constraints. What renders *reconcilable* whatever differences that may arise as a result of anarchy are mediated through what Bull termed the ‘rules of coexistence’ and ‘rules of cooperation’. The former are meant to satisfy the elementary goals of social life such that the otherwise ‘legitimate’ use of violence by states against one another are kept within the boundaries of collectively agreed-upon statutes and strictures in, for instance, ‘establishing the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents in relation to one another’.<sup>13</sup> The latter set of precepts accord to ‘those more advanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence’.<sup>14</sup> What emerges from these ‘complexes of rules’, in short, is a sense that elevated passions and disagreements may only be rendered less destructive in their effects if they are judged to be either justly permissive or inexcusably transgressive. In either case, it is not enmity *per se* which inspires reflection, but its structural implications.

It would perhaps be useful at this stage to contrast the general proclivity of the ‘Rationalists’ (also known as ‘Grotian’) toward the orderly ways of international

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<sup>12</sup> As Bull notes, ‘From the perspective of international society, war retains its dual aspect: on the one, a threat to be limited and contained; on the other hand, an instrumentality to be harnessed to international society’s purposes.’ Ibid. p. 191.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. 66.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. pp. 67-8.

society with those of the other two ‘traditions’ as identified by Wight, namely the ‘Realists’ (‘Machiavellian’) and the ‘Revolutionists’ (‘Kantian’). The most famous expositor of the realist perspective in the English School – insofar as he is actually considered among its founding members, of course – was E.H. Carr. His seminal work, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, is at once a conservative and a radical text, both populist-sounding and trenchantly iconoclastic. Its central argument reflects on the dark world of power politics and the language of moral hubris that serves to disguise (and advance) its brutal, self-interested aims. Born out of a “diseased situation,”<sup>15</sup> the book speaks to Carr’s frustrations with the delusions of the status-quo liberal regime in the inter-war period. Carr vociferously argues for the (re)assertion of the central tenets of realist thinking (as first enunciated by Machiavelli) in order “to bring down the whole cardboard structure of utopian thought by exposing the hollowness of the material out of which it is built.”<sup>16</sup> For Carr, the unequal distribution of power in international society rendered it a most dangerous and insecure realm where the outbreak of violence was, alas, an endemic feature. Utopians had in fact made an idle edifice out of reality by misconstruing the ‘satisfied’ position of the powerful with the status-quo as evidence of a supposed ‘harmony of interests’.<sup>17</sup> Realism would debunk these pretensions by instead representing the world as it really is, and by empirically revealing the purchase which power holds over morality in politics. For realists such as Carr, therefore, enmity is the expression of, and a means to, power politics in international politics. Yet Carr did not harbor any illusions about the explanatory power of realism itself: it is more a necessary catalyst for a fuller (more sober)

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<sup>15</sup> Martin Wight viewed *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* as very much a product of the inter-war turmoil that had bedeviled the European continent in particular and international politics more generally. See, Wight, M. 1991. *International Theory: the Three Traditions*. p. 267.

<sup>16</sup> Carr, E.H. 2001. *The Twenty Year’s Crisis*. London: Palgrave. p. 71.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* p. 102.

understanding of international politics than an all-encompassing doctrine.<sup>18</sup> In fact, as I will later argue below, in his careful critique and explication of the normative dimension of power politics, Carr anticipates many later approaches (both normative and analytical) to the study of enmity in international society.

Of course, and much to the chagrin of realists, nowhere is utopian thought more evident than in the behavior and belief of 'Revolutionists'. The mindset of the Revolutionist is decidedly normative in that its agency is premised on, and defined by, the quest for alternative possibilities. As Wight makes clear,

'Whereas the Rationalist denies the ultimacy of politics and finality of human institutions, the Revolutionist condemns the existing system of power by a standard external to that system of power but drawn from within the political category. He resembles the Realist in finding the ultimate meaning within the realm of politics; indeed he divines the political category: it is politics which prescribe human goals, the right of moral judgment and duty of action.'<sup>19</sup>

Whether inspired by religious beliefs, propelled by ideological solidarity, or united against injustice, Revolutionists are rather clear about the object of their passions. It is not a matter of coincidence that enmity expressed through violence is at its most pronounced when what is at stake are alternative visions for how a given order of things ought to be like. For Revolutionism, as Wight demonstrates, is ultimately premised on the principle of sameness; it does not settle for mere coexistence with its rivals, but rather insists on a universal mode of social and political organization. Revolutionism may seek a world without enmity and difference, but one which ultimately it has constructed or envisions in *opposition* to the current scheme of things. Indeed, from Bull's perspective, it was this proclivity of Revolutionism which

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid. p. 87. As Carr made clear, 'That human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought is a postulate so fundamental that its rejection seems scarcely compatible with existence as a human being. Nor is it in fact rejected by those realists who have left their mark on history....We return therefore to the conclusion that any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality.'

<sup>19</sup> Wight, Martin. 1991. p. 105.

bred disorder - the world is simply too heterogeneous and anarchic to willingly submit to any sort of overarching and totalizing moral ideals: 'what is incompatible with order on a world scale is a discord of competing principles of universal political organization'.<sup>20</sup>

I merely contrast Wight's 'three traditions' in the manner that I do above not to express a preference for one over the others, or even to demonstrate how they stand in relation to one another; rather, in order to illustrate the degree to which they take for granted the friend-enemy distinctions of which the social-political arena of international society is ultimately constituted by. Although they each clearly operate on a unique set of assumptions about human nature, individual and group interests-formation, and power relations, they take little interest in understanding the genesis, evolution, and maintenance of opposing identities in international politics. As such, Realists, Rationalists, and Revolutionists mainly differ on how they envision social relations between states in lieu of the general condition of international anarchy: as Bull observed, it is anarchy which is 'the central fact of international life and the starting point of theorizing about it'.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, all three traditions also accord a great deal of importance to the principle (institution, in the case of Rationalism) of power politics. Yet, paradoxically, neither tradition has shown much interest in the multifarious processes of differentiation, of enmity and amity that form the very threads out of which the fabric of politics (and of the political) is woven together. Bluntly stated, it is the *power* of politics which the 'three traditions' seek to examine, not the *politics* of power. As a result, the normative content of politics is often sacrificed in favor of structural analysis and greater analytical clarity.

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<sup>20</sup> Bull, H. 1977. p. 65.

<sup>21</sup> Bull, H. 1966. 'Society and Anarchy in International Relations,' *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*. H. Butterfield and M. Wight, eds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p. 35.

It is this condition of *normativity*, the aspirational as well as the inspirational force of power, which animates political identities. When it comes to matters of identity, however, it is one thing to demonstrate the constitution of As I have alluded to above, the English School's central preoccupation as regards the nature of international society is much closer to the 'Rationalist' perspective than the other two 'traditions'.<sup>22</sup> As a decidedly historicist approach to the study of international politics, moreover, the English School also shares a great deal with constructivist/interpretivist approaches.<sup>23</sup> In fact, as others have shown<sup>24</sup>, the 'three traditions' – 'Machiavellian', 'Grotian', and 'Kantian' – are quite similar in logic to Wendt's 'three cultures' of anarchy – 'Hobbesian', 'Lockian', and 'Kantian' – in that they 'are neither normative positions in a general sense, but social structures that constitute identities and interests of states.... [They] take a social approach to structures and a structural approach to society'.<sup>25</sup> In short, while the English School's interpretivist ontology provides an important opening to understanding the implications of particular norms for states, its epistemological adherence to scientific realism does not go far enough in revealing *how* the often contentious dialogic interplay between various agents in interstate as well as world societies affect the adoption of norms in the first place. This

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<sup>22</sup> Linklater observes that the first-wave of English School scholars – Manning, Wight, Bull, Adam Watson, and R.J. Vincent – began from the proposition that there was 'more to international relations than the realist suggests but less than the cosmopolitan desires'. Linklater, A. 1996. 'Rationalism', *Theories of International Relations*. Scott Burchill, ed. London: Palgrave. P. 95.

<sup>23</sup> In fact, as Hidemi Suganami has convincingly argued, Manning's emphasis on the decisive impact of politics at the 'intermediate level' between international and world societies coupled with his insistence on the indispensability of social context to the study of societal dynamics, reveal him to be an 'early [exponent] of constructivism in International Relations, predating the current rise of interest in constructivism by a few decades'. Suganami, H. 2001. 'C.A.W. Manning and the Study of International Relations', *Review of International Studies*. Vol. 27, No. 1. p.102. Suganami goes on to point out, however, that nothing quite like Alexander Wendt's detailed treatment of the social dimensions of world politics has ever come out of the English School. For the influence of early English School theorists on contemporary constructivists such as Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore and Christian Reus-Smit see Timothy Dunne's intellectual history of the English School, *Inventing International Society: A History of International Society*. 1998. London: Macmillan.

<sup>24</sup> Adler, E. and T. Dunne. 2005. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 'Forum' on Buzan's *From International to World Society?* Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 156-99.

<sup>25</sup> Adler, E. 2005. 'Buzan's Use of Constructivism', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*. Vol. 34, No. 1. p. 173.

dichotomous relationship between ontology and epistemology erects an artificial wall separating real-world ‘civilizational’ cultures from a multiplicity of normative frameworks (i.e. ‘cultures of anarchy’ or ‘traditions’) governing international society. As such, the normative force of such inescapable variables as identity and difference in the formation (and contestations) of international norms and values are either deemphasized or remain under-explored. Given the threat of enmity as a destructive force in relations between states and among groups it is imperative to understand *why* individuals and groups are capable of the certain social relations over others. In the next section, I shall explore this question through a normative examination of enmity as both a cause and symptom of identity.

### **Enmity: A Normative Consideration**

To be sure, enmity is not an abstract social condition devoid of context and independent of interpretation; it is, as I mean to suggest throughout this inquiry, highly *situational* and realized upon a spectrum of identity and difference. Enmity is a product of differentiation and therefore exists in degrees, ranging from indifferent estrangement to benign contempt (rivalry) to utter hatred (violence/war). It is first and foremost an existential phenomenon and as such it exists ‘as a set of [deeply-held] ideas in the minds of statesmen’<sup>26</sup> as well as ordinary citizens. In examining the normative foundations of enmity, therefore, we must begin with a consideration not merely of the ideas and norms which influence the behavior of states in international society, but also of the multiplicity of constituencies and communities which take a special interest in cultivating and maintaining particular sets of identities. Manning

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<sup>26</sup> I borrow this formulation, anachronistically, from Buzan’s tripartite classification of international society as either existing in the minds of statesmen, or ‘as a set of ideas in the minds of political theorists’, or ‘as a set of externally imposed concepts that define the material and social structures of international system’. Buzan, B. 2004. *From International to World Society?* p. 48.

was first among the classical English School scholars to fully appreciate the special burden which identity and difference place upon the study of international society:

‘One should interest oneself therefore in the sociology of appreciation and study those forms of cultural conditioning which make men’s thinking what it is. One should notice in particular the conditioning which makes men’s judging what it is. For though judging is the function of the individual, it is by the individual-in-society that it is done. And society is not without its influence upon how it happens’.<sup>27</sup>

But surely we must travel further and deeper still, beyond the mutual interaction of social agents and societal structures to the ever-elusive domain of power relations where Weberian ‘webs of significance’ and representational bonds are first formed, and where understandings about Self and Other continually evolve and are perpetually fought over. It is in this contingent domain where enmity – as the sovereign and actionable expression of identity and difference – gains normative force. As such, enmity is not simply, as Wendt contends, a consequence of a ‘Hobbesian culture of anarchy’<sup>28</sup> – it is the normative by-product of the political condition that is perpetually present in social relations among individuals and groups in interstate, transnational, and world societies.

This is not to say that constructivism’s insights about the social construction of enemy images and processes of differentiation are not relevant. To the contrary, constructivism’s explication of the relative importance of ideas over material conditions, its insights about the constitution and structure of ‘roles’ and of ‘degrees of internalization’ with respect to norms, and of ‘identity formation’ and ‘structural change’ are simply indispensable in considering the impact of polarized identities on the behavior of states and transnational groups.<sup>29</sup> The main problem with

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<sup>27</sup> Manning, C.A.W. 1962. *The Nature of International Society*. p. 36.

<sup>28</sup> Wendt, A. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. pp. 259-60.

<sup>29</sup> For a comprehensive collection of liberal constructivist account of norms and identity, see Katzenstein, P., ed. 1996. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New

constructivist readings of international politics arises, however, when roles, norms, and values are conflated together so as to uniformly constitute a particular ‘culture of anarchy’. For instance, Wendt has famously argued that ‘self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy’, and that ‘there is no “logic” of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities rather than another... *Anarchy is what states make of it*’.<sup>30</sup> Now, it is certainly true, as many English School theorists also recognize, that the logic behind state behavior and power politics depends to a great extent on the particular cultural practices (i.e. norms, rules, values) of the interstate society in question, but what we must also recognize is that the *politics* of power will also generate their own conflicting set of identities and roles in both the *transnational* and *interhuman* societies which are hardly ever in perfect harmony with the official roles and identities of the states in question. English School theory takes a step further by incorporating social constructivist accounts of ...

For example, to what particular ‘culture of anarchy’ can we best relate the following relationships: the United States (US) and Iran, the US and China, and the US and the United Kingdom (UK)? At first glance, we can easily define the *official* ‘role’ each country fulfills in relation to the US: enemy (Iran), rival (China), and friend (UK). But once we move to the broader interhuman sphere in which transnational organizations and individual citizens of these states privately, and hence freely, encounter one another, we can easily find (as empirical studies and international public opinion polls do indeed reveal) evidence of all three roles bound up together. What this illustrates is the impossibility of treating any given culture as a

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York: Columbia University Press. Also, see Wendt, A. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Chapters 3-7.

<sup>30</sup> Wendt, A. 1992. ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, *International Organization*. Vol. 46, No. 2. pp. 394-5.

settled and static web of relationships and institutions: no culture (of anarchy) can be reduced simply to a particular shade of identity – e.g. hostile (Hobbesian), competitive (Lockian), friendly (Kantian). It is not the case, as Wendt contends, that ‘the culture of an international system is based on a structure of roles’;<sup>31</sup> rather, it is the result of a productive process of identification and differentiation which can never truly be settled or conceived of as whole. Relationships between states in international society and between individuals and groups in transnational and world societies are ‘contextual’ precisely because they are constituted by the sort of Schmittian political schemes which I alluded to in the introduction. The political is made actionable through the exercise of power, and power appropriated through the identification/differentiation implications of the political. Therefore, the ‘enemy’, ‘rival’, and ‘friend’ categories are normative constructs, not structural molds conditioning behavior in uniform fashion; they are inspired by an envisioned view of both a self and an other which is realized upon a spectrum of differentiation.

I merely insist on the normative/structural distinction as regards the constitution of roles and identities because the constructivist emphasis on structure tends to privilege the *social* bases of interaction between individuals and groups in international society at the expense of oft-contingent and consequential *political* factors. ‘Rules of coexistence’ and ‘rules of cooperation’ are observed or violated on the basis not of particular values, interests, or norms which have at one point or another been internalized by agents interacting with one another; rather, they are *politically* necessitated by the shifting priorities of differentiation. Obviously, power – and especially the power to set the agenda and enforce priorities – becomes enormously important. Questions relating to what, where, how, and why certain

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<sup>31</sup> Wendt, A. 1999. p. 251.

norms and values become internalized or resisted, by whom, and to what extent, therefore, must be confronted head on. The English School's particular concern with patterns of convergence and divergence in the latter domains, moreover, place it in a unique position in relation to constructivism for it accords a place to normative factors alongside structural ones in the constitution of rules and institutions – *and* it does so while being mindful of the varied layers of interaction at the interstate, transnational, and interhuman levels of society.

This brings us to the so-called 'pluralist-solidarist debate' in English School theory, since, in Buzan's reconstruction of its terms, it engages directly with the 'how/why and what' questions concerning shared values, norms, and institutions in interstate/transnational/interhuman society.<sup>32</sup> The substance of the debate, as Linklater and Suganami note, boils down to 'differing empirical judgments about the extent of solidarity or potential solidarity present in the existing international society'.<sup>33</sup> In other words, while solidarists perceive sufficient signs of convergence, of solidarity, or of the potential for solidarity beyond the elementary goals of social life, pluralists are skeptical of this view and instead hold that the diversity of political forms as reflected in the principle of sovereignty make convergence difficult, if not impossible.<sup>34</sup> As Buzan observes, moreover, 'pluralism and solidarism should be understood not as mutually exclusive positions, but as positions on a spectrum representing, respectively, thin and thick sets of shared norms, rules and institutions'.<sup>35</sup> Convergence or divergence around a certain set of norms and values,

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<sup>32</sup> Buzan, B. 2004. *From International to World Society?* pp. 139-160.

<sup>33</sup> Linklater, A. and H. Suganami. 2006. *The English School of International Relations*. p. 65.

<sup>34</sup> Although no English School theorist can be classified as squarely belonging to either camp (this is especially true of those belong to the classical tradition such as Bull and Vincent), definite preference can certainly be gleaned – for an example of solidarist thinking, see Wheeler, N. 2000. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For a defense of pluralism, see Jackson, R. 2000. *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>35</sup> Buzan, B. 2004. *From International to World Society?* p. 139.

therefore, can be judged to exist in degrees and not as absolute expressions of either unanimous solidarity or irreconcilable plurality.

Moreover, Buzan goes on to make an important distinction between the ‘*how/why* dimension’ and the ‘*what* dimension’ of Wendt’s modes of internalization: it matters less whether certain values are internalized through either coercion, calculation, or belief than *what* those values actually are. Solidarism, in Buzan’s view, amounts to an idea about particular aspects of international society (e.g. on issues relating to human rights, the environment, non-proliferation, etc.), and not an existing condition of life in it.<sup>36</sup> Reconstructing the pluralist-solidarist debate in this way raises a number of important points about the political relationship between interstate, transnational, and interhuman societies. First, it frees up individual and group identities from those of the states in which they may reside, and allows for potential transnational and global convergences around a set of interests or beliefs. Second, it allows for analytical inquiry into the normative origins of ideas or values embraced by different individuals, organizations, or states across time and space. Third, it provides a crucial opening, however understated, for fairly sophisticated and multi-dimensional analyses of conditions underlying amicable or hostile relationships across multiple divides. Lastly, it makes explicit the varied contours of the inescapable condition of *the political* which over the course of just a few centuries have compelled humankind to organize itself into and across so many identity groupings and societies. To what other factor may we attribute this almost narcissistic proclivity toward consolidation/fragmentation but differentiation?

It is important to point out here that the English School, as a result of its rigorous engagement with the social-historical origins, subsequent evolution and

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid. p. 158. Buzan notes, ‘Those campaigning in the name of solidarism need to be aware that they are advocating a particular type of solidarist international society, and not solidarism *per se*’.

expansion of international society,<sup>37</sup> readily reflects on the implications of this political force for the relationship between interstate, transnational, and interhuman domains. Indeed, as Buzan makes clear, what values are shared by whom, how, and why, are a constant source of concern and ‘worry’ for some English School thinkers:

‘When one says that a state shares a given value with other states, what does this mean? At a minimum, it means that the present leadership of that states holds that value. At a maximum, it means that the value is widely diffused throughout the elites and the mass of ordinary citizens. *In between lie innumerable configurations of contestation and indifference.* The value may be strongly supported by one political party and its followers, and strongly opposed by another and its supporters. Or it may be widely supported among the elites, but regarded with suspicion or hostility by a substantial part of the population (the Davos cultures versus the anti-globalization movement). If this pattern extends across state borders, such that a set of ruling elites support a value, but their citizens mostly oppose it, one finds the grounds for tension between international and world society that so worries some English school writers.... [V]ariations of this kind will make a difference to the stability of international society, opening up the possibility that even quite advanced, seemingly solidarist international societies may in fact be quite fragile, and vulnerable to sudden reversals because of domestic political changes in key countries.<sup>38</sup>

There is, then, ample space for the sort of inquiry into the normative foundations of enmity which invariably arise out of the ‘innumerable configurations of contestation and indifference’, and which, we may add, constitute world politics. Yet, as invaluable as Buzan’s analytical distinction between different layers/domains of international society remains, it is curious why it has not generated the kind of interpretive inquiry into the political dynamics of differentiation and convergence at/between the interstate, transnational, and interhuman levels.

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<sup>37</sup> For complementary volumes, see Buzan, B. and R. Little. 2000. *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.; Watson, A. 1992. *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative, Historical Analysis*. London: Routledge.; and Bull, H. and A. Watson. 1984. *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p. 155. Italics not in the original.

Perhaps this lack of interest is partially due to the ever-prevalent preoccupation of most theorists with the structural and material markers of multiple pluralisms and/or solidarisms in international society. This is especially reflected in the particular interest in the structural effects of primary and secondary institutions of international society on the behavior of agents in either three domains. But perhaps the main reason has to do with the reluctance to move beyond the classical English School canon and toward what James Der Derian has described as the ‘post-classical’ approach to international society.<sup>39</sup> The reconvention and reconstruction of the English School has certainly reinvigorated the discipline by taking up the contextual web of relations underlying international relations, but it has not gone much beyond the classical canon in interpreting the ‘innumerable configurations of contestation and indifference’ which animate agency, structure behavior and experience, and enclose boundaries in between societies. In the era of ever-increasing interaction and interdependence between peoples across the globe, of seemingly unmitigated violence, of the rise and proliferation of private authority and nuclear technology – one can go on – having the analytical and interpretive tools to map out and mine multiple zones of differentiation (i.e. of enmity) is of immense importance. To do so would require a closer examination of the way in which existing and emerging vocabularies of antagonism are cultivated and maintained through the power political discourses of differentiation and identification which form the basis of the relationship between danger, security, and identity in the three domains of international society alluded to above. It is to a consideration of such vocabularies, discourses, and modes of representation which I shall turn now.

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<sup>39</sup> Der Derian, James. 2003. “Hedley Bull and the Case for a Post-Classical Approach,” *International Relations at LSE: A History of 75 Years*. In Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi, eds. London: Millennium Publishing Group.

### **Differentiations: A 'Post-Classical' Consideration**

As highlighted in the first section, the classical approach toward enmity – within the English School at least – has tended to navigate around Wight's 'three traditions', and has generally sought to interpret international relations through a uniquely 'Grotian' perspective. As a result of this engagement, English School theory has responded more to the discourses and formulations that have produced it than to its putative object (i.e. international society), which was also conceptualized within, and in response to, the classical traditions. Thus English School ruminations on international society demonstrate both an internal consistency as regards structure and agency and a highly articulated set of relationships to the dominant classical traditions surrounding them. This is not to deny that the classical traditions either overlook the normative foundations of differentiation or have nothing remotely interesting to say about enmity in international society; to the contrary, as Jackson points out,

'[C]lassical theorists view international relations as posing a distinctive set of human problems which grow out of the inescapable social fact of men and women living side by side, often cheek-to-jowl, and thus coming into social contact – not only as individuals but also as groups – in relations that exhibit amity and enmity, co-operation as well as conflict, power and wealth alongside weakness and poverty, differences as well as similarities of civilization, culture, language, physical geography, ecology and so forth'.<sup>40</sup>

What the classical approach is ill-equipped to accurately account for, however, is the underlying discursive constitution of normative behavior behind identity which enables processes of differentiation and enmity in different domains in international society in the first place. It is no doubt true that, as Jackson (in his defense of classical traditions) observes, 'International relations cannot be comprehended if either humans

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<sup>40</sup> Jackson, R. 1996. 'Is there a Classical International Theory?' in Smith, S., K. Booth and M. Zalewski, eds. *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 206.

or states are ignored'<sup>41</sup>; but the classical traditions have for far too long ignored the very constitutive factors which render intelligible the behavior of individuals and states in the first place. Crudely stated, international relations cannot be comprehended if either *discourses* or *representations* about the *identity* of individuals and states are ignored.<sup>42</sup> In seeking out alternative pathways to understanding such factors, therefore, we are not attempting to 'repudiate the classical tradition', as Jackson seems to worry, but simply to amend its latest reconstructions.

A post-classical approach, in contrast, does not treat the collective wisdom of classical traditions as mere 'reflective forces' in international society, but rather views them as 'constitutive' of its varied domains. As Der Derian puts it, the traditions 'do not simply record and transmit the history of world politics: they are part of a constant making and unmaking of history through interrogation, interpretation, and narration'.<sup>43</sup> Discourses about agents and structures in international society, therefore, are inextricably tied to, and very much implicated in, differing representations of those very actors and structures in international politics. As sovereign and actionable expressions of identity and difference, enmity and amity constitute, as I have hinted at throughout, the discursive framework of 'the political' in international society. Sovereignty entails drawing a border between a 'self' and an 'other', and, depending on the level of perceived threat posed by those outsiders, demarcating oneself

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid. 207.

<sup>42</sup> Here I share Suganami's view that what particular stories agents and structures tell of themselves and of other agents and structures matters a great deal in understanding/explaining international relations – that 'narrative' is central to rectifying the 'agent-structure problem'. Suganami, H. 1999. 'Agents, Structures, Narratives', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 3. pp. 365-386. For narratives to be useful, however, they must be understood in terms of their constitution and in relation to the complex web of discourses, representations, and identities out of which they are constructed. This is a point which, alas, Suganami does not venture into.

<sup>43</sup> Der Derian, James. 2003. 'Hedley Bull and the Case for a Post-Classical Approach', p. 77. Der Derian goes on to offer 'a troika of post-classical counter-traditions' of his own: the 'Relevatists' ('Nietzschean'), the 'Revelationists' ('Gandhian'), and the 'Irenists' ('Beauvoirian'). These are certainly important conceptualizations, but since I am compelled to free up enmity from any particular discursive categorization of it, I will not pursue these counter-traditions any further here.

alongside ‘friends’ and in opposition to ‘enemies’ in society. Formulated in this way, the necessity for proper vocabularies and appropriate modes of discourse becomes rather apparent. Enmity and friendship are virtually indiscernible in the absence of words and expressions, of borders and walls of separation, of representations and contact. Moreover, given how international society ultimately rests on a spectrum of difference, its many borders and far-reaching boundaries are meant to represent and emphasize the possibility of real danger and of enemies ever more urgently and virtually than those of safety and of friendships. A post-classical study of international society would therefore focus on the presentation and *representation* of danger in relation to processes of differentiation.

Furthermore, a closer scrutiny of different methods and modes of representation necessitates a more interdisciplinary, focused, and concerted approach toward words, images, and sounds which often combine to bring about conflicting narratives of differentiation in different domains of international society (which, as alluded to in the previous section so worries Buzan and other English School theorists). For instance, in between interstate, transnational, and interhuman domains are troubling cases of monolithic identities and ideas that move from one community or constituency to another, as when extremist notions about the role of Islam in social life are imported into highly secular Western societies, or when certain Western ideas about the management of local economies are credulously adopted by those developing nations otherwise ill-equipped to deal with their social and political ramifications. Such movements into new environments (i.e. domains or sectors) are never unimpeded, obviously. They necessarily involve processes of representation and institutionalization different from those at the point of origin. Needless to say, this complicates any account of the transplantation, transference, circulation, and

commerce of identities and ideas. It is little wonder, then, that such identities and ideas, regardless of their substantive content, function, or normative force, are readily interpreted through the prism of 'the political' and represented as either friendly or hostile to the interests of those encountering them. As Schmitt aptly puts it,

Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy. The political does not reside in the battle itself, which possesses its own technical, psychological, and military laws, but in the mode of behavior which is determined by this possibility, by clearly evaluating the concrete situation and thereby being able to distinguish correctly the real friend and the real enemy'.<sup>44</sup>

There is, however, a discernible and recurrent pattern to the movement of identities and ideas which a post-classical approach can make explicit. First, there is a point of origin, a series of inaugural encounters and circumstances in which ideas came to birth and identities entered discourse. Second, there is a distance traversed, a passage through the boundaries of either interstate, transnational, or interhuman societies where identities and ideas move from an earlier point to another time and place where they will come into new prominence. Third, there are zones of acceptance and of resistance which then confront the transplanted identities and ideas, making possible their introduction or toleration, however alien or familiar they might appear to be. Lastly, the now settled or incorporated identities and ideas are to some extent transformed by their new representations and uses in different domains of international society, their new positions, postures, and encounters in a new time and place. It is through these complex movements and affiliations that identities and ideas come to distinguish enemies from friends and foes from mere rivals: the more

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<sup>44</sup> Schmitt, Carl. 1996. *The Concept of the Political*. p. 37.

concentrated and controlled the movements (as in the case of authoritarian social structures) the more monolithic and solid the identities and the ideas.

In all these domains the specific situation or locality of a particular identity or idea seems uneasily distant from, and only rhetorically assisted by, the legendary wholeness, coherence, and integrity of the general field of activity to which it belongs. In other words, enmity, as a complex amalgam of ideas and identities, cannot easily be rendered discernible as a particular type of culture (i.e. 'culture of enmity'), but must rather be treated as a kind of disciplinary discourse full of movement, subject to rendition, and devoid of a unified logic. The reality of this condition may not interest us much in its non-violent variety, but once the possibility it engendering a violent figuration becomes apparent, its genesis, evolution, and maintenance form the basis of a response – of our reaction to it. And so continues the cycle of enmity, and ushers in, as David Campbell puts it, an 'economy of violence'.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, among contemporary international relations scholars no one has reflected more on the implications of differentiation for world politics than Campbell. In true interdisciplinary fashion, Campbell draws on classic works in anthropology, philosophy, linguistics, sociology, and history to show the dynamic relationship between the 'logic of differentiation', 'logic of defilement', and the production of danger in international society:

'Were there no borders, there would be no danger, but such a condition is at odds with the logic of identity, for the condition of possibility for experience entails (at least to some extent) the disciplining of ambiguity, the containment of contingency, and the delineation of borders. In other words, given that difference is a requisite for identity, danger is inherent to that relationship: "Where there is no differentiation there is no defilement."<sup>46</sup> As such, danger is not an external condition that can be either tempered or transcended; danger is part of all our relationships with the world.... our current situation

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<sup>45</sup> Campbell, D. 1998. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p. 81.

<sup>46</sup> Douglas, M. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. p. 198.

leaves us with one certainty: because we cannot escape the logic of differentiation, we are often tempted by the logic of defilement'.<sup>47</sup>

Such are the 'logics' which a post-classical approach would amend and infuse the classical explanations of 'pluralism' and 'solidarism', of 'cultures of anarchy' and 'degrees of internalization', of 'rules of coexistence' and 'rules of cooperation' with. It is somewhat of a commonplace today – in academic and intellectual circles anyway – that matters concerning cultural identity and group membership are in no way discernible outside of the social conventions, rules, and regulations that condition their activation and reception by the society at large. To the extent that we are made to appreciate the myriad ways in which the disciplinary mechanisms of dominant moralities limit and foreclose, at once, the playgrounds of human agency, we are confronted with the contours of a 'normalizing society', what Michel Foucault perceptibly defined as 'the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life'.<sup>48</sup> It is within the permissible premises of differentiation, therefore, that we must seek out the contest over and about identity and difference in international society. Challenging classical presuppositions about the outbreak of war, Der Derian offers a post-classical perspective as an alternative explanation:

'More than a rational calculation of interests takes us to war. People go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine and speak of others; that is, how they construct the difference of how others as well as the sameness of themselves through representations. From Greek tragedy and Roman gladiatorial spectacles to futurist art and fascist rallies, the mimetic mix of image and violence has proven to be more powerful than the most rational discourse. Indeed, the medical definition of mimesis is 'the appearance, often caused by hysteria, of symptoms of a disease not actually present'. Before one can find a cure, one must study the symptoms – or, as it was once known in medical science, practice *semiology*'.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Campbell, D. 1998. *Writing Security*. p. 81.

<sup>48</sup> Foucault, Michel. 1984. *The Foucault Reader*. Paul Rabinow, ed. Hamondsworth: Penguin. p. 266.

<sup>49</sup> Der Derian, J. 2002. "In Terrorem: Before and After 9/11," in Booth and Dunne eds. *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order*. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. p. 110.

In the end, the politics of enmity, it would seem, are the politics of differentiation; but what is more, such politics, however perverted or efficacious, must rely on new forms of power, new identities, and new movements to disseminate. As regards identity and difference, such dissemination is age-old; it has been tested, tried, reproduced, even reconfigured, yet it has never ceased to exist at any point in time. If transgressions, as Foucault believed, made visible the boundaries of the acceptable, then, we must ask, how it is that such acts of subversion come to conquer new moral terrains and set in motion new processes of differentiation. How it is, for instance, that in spite of innumerable struggles against colonialism, apartheid, racism, inequality, terrorism, extremism – one can go on – dominant stereotypical, often chauvinistic, depictions of self and other, as evidenced in the perplexing cohabitation of old- and new-style differentiations, still abound? The answer, as I have asserted above, lies in the unreflective perpetuation of identity roles manufactured and reinforced by the political dictates of interstate, transnational and interhuman societies.

### **Conclusion**

Enmity as a normative (and destructive) force in international society is the ‘negative figuration’ of a particular ‘logic of differentiation’.<sup>50</sup> The classical English School conceptualizations of enmity, as I have argued in the preceding, to the extent that they reflect on it at all, have tended to focus solely on the structural implications of differentiation for international society. The recent work by Buzan and others on the reconstruction of the pluralist-solidarist debate, moreover, has opened an interpretive space for a consideration of the normative foundations of enmity in the interstate, transnational, and interhuman domains of international society. Yet, in spite of such recent analytical insights the English School has not sought out the intricate

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<sup>50</sup> Campbell, D. 1998. *Writing Security*.p. 88.

linkages between processes of differentiation and different pluralist and solidarist configurations within and across different domains of international society. In short, I have argued that there is a need for a ‘post-classical’ inquiry into the way in which existing and emerging vocabularies of antagonism are cultivated and maintained through the power political discourses of differentiation and identification that form the basis of the relationship between danger, security, and identity in international society. A post-classical approach would look at various discourses of differentiation in order to make explicit the varied effects of ‘the political’ on the constitution and representation of identities and ideas in different domains of international society. Only then would we develop a better understanding of violent conflict and deep-seated antagonisms, of struggle and *turbulence* among different agents and domains in, and over, international society.

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